I. Introducción
1.1. Realidad problemática
presented as existing, and judgment consists in either accepting or rejecting the existence of the object. In the other, the mode of interest, the object is presented as being good, and acceptance or rejection consists in either loving (desiring) or hating (being averse to) the object presented. Being presented as existent is one mode; being presented as good is the other. Brentano did not countenance states of affairs as the object of presentations, but the basic idea can be transferred.
For a state S to seem good one does not need to grasp the concept of goodness and judge that it applies to S. Rather one just has to accept the presentation of the object in the mode of interest. If, in addition, one can master and apply concepts, including the concept of goodness, then such presentations would provide a reason to embrace the associated judgment.
Both non-conceptual content and mode of appearance are sufficient to ensure that babes and brutes enjoy a rich life replete with a full range of desires.
11 Conclusion
The value appearance thesis unifies and explains a wide range of phenomena, including the need for value data, the magnetism of the apparent good, and the immunity of fitting attitudes to both the wrong kinds of reason and the
paradoxes of solitary goods. It also suggests that other aspects of value and our responses to value may be illuminated by the analogy with perception. Consider the fact that experiences in general are highly perspectival. One always
perceives the world from a particular location within the world. It would be absurd to require that all perceivers should “ideally” have exactly the same experiences of a perceiver-independent world. One’s perceptions depend not just on the properties of perceiver-independent states but on the different
relations each perceiver bears to those states. This is not a bug in perception but a necessary feature of the fact that perceivers are differently situated in the world. Perception is always perception of how things appear from where one stands in relation to them. So, if desires are perceptions of value, the heavily perspectival nature of perception in general provides a powerful resource for explaining and legitimizing the subject-relativity of desire, even if and when desires are responses to subject-independent value.41
Notes
(1.) I would like to thank the participants of the Nature of Desire conference in Geneva in the summer of 2012 for numerous comments on an early version of this paper. I owe a special debt of gratitude to Federico Lauria who read,
(2.) See also Friedrich this volume.
(3.) Sometimes this is called “the guise of the good” thesis, but one must be careful here. For the guise of the good is often understood as the thesis that desires are or involve value judgments. That is both implausible and no part of the value appearance thesis. For “the guise of the good,” see Döring and Eker, Massin, Lauria this volume.
(4.) Stampe 1987; Oddie 2005.
(5.) See Friedrich 2008; Lauria 2014, this volume; Döring and Eker this volume.
(6.) See Döring and Eker, Alvarez this volume.
(7.) Lewis 1979.
(8.) I also think, and argue elsewhere (Oddie forthcoming) that on the property view the objects of desire are even better candidates for bearers of value.
(9.) See Tenenbaum 2007, and Döring and Eker, Massin, Lauria this volume.
(10.) Aquinas 1975: lib. 3 cap. 62 n. 7. Thanks to Bob Pasnau, who tracked this down for me. The usually quoted formulation—quoted in Kant—does not appear to be anywhere in Aquinas.
(11.) The thesis has been the focus of a good deal of technical work stemming from Lewis (1988, 1996), who claims that the thesis is incompatible with the most basic elements of subjective decision theory. See Oddie (1994, 2001) for two different analyses of Lewis’s argument. Whether or not desires might be beliefs about goodness, it is at least possible for the two to covary, contrary to the conclusion of Lewis’s argument.
(12.) See Döring and Eker, Gregory (this volume) for the desire as belief thesis.
(13.) Stampe 1987: 381. See also Oddie 2005. While Stampe obviously takes propositions to be the objects of desire, his overall position does not hinge on this. One could easily generalize his formulation to properties, simplifying it in the process: “One who wants to be φ perceives something that makes it seem to that person that it would be good to be φ.”
(14.) Stampe 1987: 377.
(15.) Stalnaker 1984: 15.
(16.) Lauria (2014, this volume) makes the point that one can explain a
disposition to behave in terms of salient desire, something that is ruled out by
(17.) See the extended criticism by Döring and Eker (this volume) in their searching analysis of the evaluative theory of desire. They also criticize the evaluative theory for conflating standing desires with occurrent desires. For a response to this kind of objection see Oddie (2005: 55–57).
(18.) Stampe (1987) maintains that the assumption that desires are at least fairly reliable indicators of goodness is a necessary condition for them to count as perceptions at all.
(19.) Oddie 2005.
(20.) Ibid., 55
(21.) See Lauria 2014.
(22.) The idea has a long history: Brentano 1889; Broad 1930; Ewing 1939, 1948, 1959; Chisholm 1986; Lemos 1994; Mulligan 1998; Scanlon 1998;
Tappolet 2000; D’Arms and Jacobson 2000; Zimmerman 2001.
(23.) Broad 1930: 283.
(24.) If F(V) is a class of fitting attitudes, then the schema should be this: X is V if and only if it is fitting to take any member of F(V) to X. We could restore the uniqueness of F(V) by taking the disjunction of members of F(V) to be a single attitude.
(25.) Tappolet 2011: 119.
(26.) Ibid.
(27.) This was precisely why Ewing (1939: 14) endorsed it.
(28.) Tappolet 2011: 119.
(29.) See Bykvist and Hattiangadi 2007.
(30.) See Oddie (2014a) for an extended discussion.
(31.) Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen 2004.
(32.) Olson 2009; Ewing 1959.
(33.) Bykvist 2009.
(34.) See Lauria 2014: 50–54, this volume. Döring and Eker (this volume) and
(35.) Lauria this volume.
(36.) See Heathwood (2007) for a defense of this claim.
(37.) Basho, in Hass 1994: 11. I am indebted to Bradford Cokelet for alerting me to this wonderful example of the undying nature of real desire.
(38.) Schroeder 2014.
(39.) See Gärdenfors 2000.
(40.) Friedrich 2008, this volume; Lauria 2014, this volume; Stampe 1987.
(41.) Some of these are sketched in Oddie (2005, 2010) and further developed in Oddie (2014b, 2016).
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Notes:
(1.) I would like to thank the participants of the Nature of Desire conference in Geneva in the summer of 2012 for numerous comments on an early version of this paper. I owe a special debt of gratitude to Federico Lauria who read,
commented on, and helped me considerably improve the paper through several drafts.
(2.) See also Friedrich this volume.
(3.) Sometimes this is called “the guise of the good” thesis, but one must be careful here. For the guise of the good is often understood as the thesis that desires are or involve value judgments. That is both implausible and no part of the value appearance thesis. For “the guise of the good,” see Döring and Eker, Massin, Lauria this volume.
(4.) Stampe 1987; Oddie 2005.
(5.) See Friedrich 2008; Lauria 2014, this volume; Döring and Eker this volume.
(6.) See Döring and Eker, Alvarez this volume.
(7.) Lewis 1979.
(8.) I also think, and argue elsewhere (Oddie forthcoming) that on the property view the objects of desire are even better candidates for bearers of value.
(9.) See Tenenbaum 2007, and Döring and Eker, Massin, Lauria this volume.
(10.) Aquinas 1975: lib. 3 cap. 62 n. 7. Thanks to Bob Pasnau, who tracked this down for me. The usually quoted formulation—quoted in Kant—does not appear to be anywhere in Aquinas.
(11.) The thesis has been the focus of a good deal of technical work stemming from Lewis (1988, 1996), who claims that the thesis is incompatible with the most basic elements of subjective decision theory. See Oddie (1994, 2001) for two different analyses of Lewis’s argument. Whether or not desires might be beliefs about goodness, it is at least possible for the two to covary, contrary to the conclusion of Lewis’s argument.
(12.) See Döring and Eker, Gregory (this volume) for the desire as belief thesis.
(13.) Stampe 1987: 381. See also Oddie 2005. While Stampe obviously takes propositions to be the objects of desire, his overall position does not hinge on this. One could easily generalize his formulation to properties, simplifying it in the process: “One who wants to be φ perceives something that makes it seem to that person that it would be good to be φ.”
(14.) Stampe 1987: 377.
(15.) Stalnaker 1984: 15.
(16.) Lauria (2014, this volume) makes the point that one can explain a
disposition to behave in terms of salient desire, something that is ruled out by the dispositional account.
(17.) See the extended criticism by Döring and Eker (this volume) in their searching analysis of the evaluative theory of desire. They also criticize the evaluative theory for conflating standing desires with occurrent desires. For a response to this kind of objection see Oddie (2005: 55–57).
(18.) Stampe (1987) maintains that the assumption that desires are at least fairly reliable indicators of goodness is a necessary condition for them to count as perceptions at all.
(19.) Oddie 2005.
(20.) Ibid., 55
(21.) See Lauria 2014.
(22.) The idea has a long history: Brentano 1889; Broad 1930; Ewing 1939, 1948, 1959; Chisholm 1986; Lemos 1994; Mulligan 1998; Scanlon 1998; Tappolet 2000;
D’Arms and Jacobson 2000; Zimmerman 2001.
(23.) Broad 1930: 283.
(24.) If F(V) is a class of fitting attitudes, then the schema should be this: X is V if and only if it is fitting to take any member of F(V) to X. We could restore the uniqueness of F(V) by taking the disjunction of members of F(V) to be a single attitude.
(25.) Tappolet 2011: 119.
(26.) Ibid.
(27.) This was precisely why Ewing (1939: 14) endorsed it.
(28.) Tappolet 2011: 119.
(29.) See Bykvist and Hattiangadi 2007.
(30.) See Oddie (2014a) for an extended discussion.
(31.) Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen 2004.
(32.) Olson 2009; Ewing 1959.
(33.) Bykvist 2009.
(34.) See Lauria 2014: 50–54, this volume. Döring and Eker (this volume) and Massin (this volume) make similar claims.
Access brought to you by:
(36.) See Heathwood (2007) for a defense of this claim.
(37.) Basho, in Hass 1994: 11. I am indebted to Bradford Cokelet for alerting me to this wonderful example of the undying nature of real desire.
(38.) Schroeder 2014.
(39.) See Gärdenfors 2000.
(40.) Friedrich 2008, this volume; Lauria 2014, this volume; Stampe 1987.
(41.) Some of these are sketched in Oddie (2005, 2010) and further developed in Oddie (2014b, 2016).
University Press Scholarship Online
Oxford Scholarship Online
The Nature of Desire
Julien A. Deonna and Federico Lauria
Print publication date: 2017 Print ISBN-13: 9780199370962
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: June 2017 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199370962.001.0001