RECEPTORES

Gauthier’s solution to the problem of generality is to rely on the weak conception of rationality, which is a conception ‘without any prior moral assumptions’.²⁹ In fact, this strategy of avoiding moral assumptions is also the common strategy of Hobbesian contractarianism since making moral assumptions would lead to controversy.³⁰ People who do not care so much about impartiality might refuse to identify themselves with the hypothetical contractors who have a strong motivation to be impartial. The relationship between hypothetical contractors and actual people would become unclear. In order to prevent this controversy, Hobbesian contractarians propose that a contractarian theory should appeal to ‘a non-moral, or morally neutral, base’.³¹

Hence, Hobbesian contractarians, including Gauthier, borrow the conception of rationality from the theory of rational choice, which does not have any prior moral presupposition and provides only a ‘weak and widely accepted conception of practical rationality’.³² Gauthier believes that maximizing individual utility is the fundamental characteristic of human beings.³³ It is hard to prove the generality of the conception of rationality; not because it is groundless, but rather because its

29 Gauthier (1986: 6).

30 Kavka (1986: 64-65) and Hampton (1986: 22).

31 Gauthier (1986: 17).

32 Gauthier (1986: 17).

33 Gauthier (1977: 332).

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generality seems to be self-evident. Yet I can give two reasons to support this claim:

the first is empirical; the second is theoretical. First, the generality can be proved by current neuroscientific studies. According to some neuroscientists, the utility calculation model is actually a decision-making structure that physically exists in our brain.³⁴ This structure quantitatively encodes the relative desirabilities of all possible courses of action. Our brain then chooses among these courses of action according to the relative desirabilities. This mechanism is just like the rational decision-making process that we discussed before. Based on these empirical studies, neuroscientists argue that the utility calculation model is not merely an arbitrary assumption that a person could choose to accept or not, but rather an innate neurobiological structure of the brain each person is born with. This empirical study can also explain why the utility-function decision-making model is transcultural; it persists in many societies in various forms.³⁵

We also have a second reason to accept this conception of rationality. As Binmore argues, the conception of rationality does not specify what goals people must have.

These rules simply require people to be consistent in pursuing their goals.³⁶ Regardless of the goals of people, they will be hard pressed to deny that they have to pursue these goals consistently. Even though sometimes people might behave irrationally and fail to maximize their individual utility, it does not mean that rationality does not occupy a crucial role in their practical reason. Hence it is sensible

34 See Glimcher, Dorris and Bayer (2005). For a psychological point of view, which argues that people acquire this model of decision-making in an a posteriori way, through living in a culture and learning early in life, see Morton (2001).

35 See Miller (1999) and Rapoport and Chammah (1965).

36 Binmore (1994: 21, 27).

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to claim that, compared with other interpretations of practical reason, rationality is a general interpretation which is acceptable to most of the people.³⁷

These two reasons can also shed light on the question of why so many contractarians adopt the Hobbesian approach. The standard critique of contractarianism is that the relationship between the hypothetical contract theory and the real world is unclear.

However, Hobbeisan contractarianism can avoid this problem for it is based on a weak conception of rationality borrowed from the theory of rational choice. It is a minimal assumption that does not invoke any controversial moral assumptions and assumes only that individuals are rational utility-maximizers. In fact, this is also the distinctive strength emphasized by Hobbesian contractarians. As Kavka points out, unlike philosophers who imagine human beings as too ‘good’, ‘Hobbesians…see a system of plausible moral and political hypotheses emerging from a realistic portrayal of human nature’.³⁸

By grounding their theory on a widely accepted assumption, Hobbesian contractarians believe that actual people will have no problem in identifying themselves as hypothetical contractors. The hypothetical contractors are rational persons who aim at maximizing utility effectively, but they are also familiar with the

‘capacities, situations, and concerns’ of actual people, hence their decisions should also be able to promote the utility of actual people.³⁹ The contract that they will

37 Here the claim that rationality is generally acceptable merely means that people are bound by the rules of rationality in their practical reasoning and they would usually agree that they have an obligation to follow these rules. But it does not mean that people generally accept rationality as the only component of practical reason. As we will see later in the thesis, the Hobbesian conception of practical reason overlooks the reasonable aspect of practical reason. Apart from rational utility-maximizers, people also generally conceive themselves as reasonable moral persons who are concerned with justifiability. However, it does not affect the general acceptability of the conception of rationality.

38 Kavka (1986: 80).

39 Gauthier (1986: 9).

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make is a mutually advantageous agreement which can bring benefits to actual people. The actual people, who also want to maximize their utilities rationally, will not find this agreement weird and will accept this agreement. Therefore, the Hobbesian contract is not an authoritarian scheme which imposes arbitrary restrictions on people by relying on an irrelevant contract story. Rather, the Hobbesian contract explains what political principles are rationally justified and actual people who are rational should comply with these political principles.