Recocido

Although the consent holders accept that increased scrutiny is necessary for effective resource management, there is still concern that the availability of the metering data will lead to an increase in enforcement activity for compliance issues. This is largely due to a long held belief that

“compliance officers don’t do grey” (respondents 6(Df,D), 14(ISP), 11(ECan)).

The first year of data collection was expected to reveal a number of farmers who were unwittingly over-abstracting, simply because they have never had access to such information in the past. ECan

intended to adopt a pragmatic approach during this period, issuing warnings to the farmers rather than pursuing punitive measures (respondents 13(ECan), 11(ECan), 14(ISP)). Respondent 2(Df,D) was found to be in this situation with two of the four wells on his property exceeding an instantaneous flow limit. Once aware of the issue, the respondent approached ECan with the proposed solution of putting four the wells under a single consent so that the lower abstracting wells could balance out the higher ones. Despite receiving verbal confirmation from ECan that this solution was acceptable, respondent 2(Df,D) was surprised to receive a warning letter about the matter. This approach was considered to be greatly unfair given his attempt to be proactive approach in finding a solution. It is stories such as this amongst the farming community that make consent holders nervous about how compliance issues will be dealt with in the future (respondents 1(Df,D), 6(Df,D)).

As previously mentioned, ECan is currently transitioning between the role of education and support, to one of enforcement with regard to the Regulations (respondent 11(ECan)). This change of

approach has been noticed by the consent holders with many receiving warnings for minor transgressions that would have gone undetected in the past (respondents 14(ISP), 1(Df,D), 8(Af,E), 9(Af,E), 6(Df,D)). Respondent 8(Af,E) notes that while those familiar with the processes of the RMA do not get too concerned when receiving such notifications from ECan, for others, particularly older farmers it can be a stressful experience.

The increase in enforcement activity is also considered in part to be due to the large volume of consents that must be monitored. The compliance team at ECan relies on automatically generated exception reporting to identify individuals that need to be followed up with (respondent 13(ECan)). While this process is efficient for dealing with the volume of consents, it limits the capacity for personal judgement to be applied: “the fast solutions are a tool that tells people if they are being naughty or not, without the human intervention in the middle” (respondent 14(ISP)).

While this black and white approach could be considered to be fairer as “everyone gets nailed equally as there are no grey areas” (respondent 14(ISP)), it could also potentially antagonise consent holders in cases where a non-compliance is unavoidable or due to a factor beyond their immediate control. Respondents 9(Af,E) and 10(Af,E) found themselves in this situation when the telemetry network they are connected to failed to transmit their data over a period of weeks. Technicians from their service provider were called but were unable to identify any fault with the equipment.

Eventually, it was discovered that a new cell phone tower had been erected near the network base station as part of the Government’s rural broadband programme, and this was interfering with the telemetry signal. Although the relationship between water users and ECan is considered greatly improved since the consent review process, the past conflict has certainly not been forgotten

(respondents 8 (Af,E), 7(Af,E), 1(Df,D)). Actions viewed as unfair could therefore aggravate past grievances.

Similarly, respondent 1(Df,D) fears that a black and white approach to compliance will fail to adequately accommodate the reality of operating large irrigation infrastructure where the

operational constraints mean that there is very little flexibility available to accommodate unexpected events. In the event of a natural rise in groundwater, as has happened recently in parts of the Rakaia- Selwyn groundwater allocation zone, the respondent notes that to throttle back pumps to remain within the instantaneous flow rate limits may not only damage the equipment, but may also reduce the water use efficiency of the system, as it is no longer operating within the optimal design

conditions. In situations such as this, where an unforeseeable natural event has created the non- compliance, it is considered crucial to adopt a pragmatic approach (respondent 1(Df,D)). It may be more efficient to operate the system over the instantaneous rate limit, but to do so for a reduced period of time so that overall volume limits are not exceeded.

Among some consent holders, there is an additional concern that the metering will be used to justify the introduction of volumetric charging or a water tax (respondents 10(Af,E), 8(Af,E), 11(ECan)). “Why else would you put a water meter on if you aren’t going to charge?” (respondent 10(Af,E)). Charging for water has been identified as a potential mechanism for improving water use efficiency that could be introduced in New Zealand (Counsell & Evans, 2005; Gunningham, 2011a; Land and Water Forum, 2012), despite this, most of the research participants expect that the introduction of such a measure would be hugely contentious and is therefore unlikely in the immediate future. However, the introduction of the Regulations has come at a time when farmers are facing a range of new regulatory measures, such as the introduction of nutrient limits. The costs (both in terms of time and money) associated with compliance can be significant, and as respondent 7(Af,E) reflects “it seems that the regulatory stuff is set up for the corporates to thrive and the family farms to be pushed out”.