As it has been discussed in the previous section, the debates around citizenship have introduced criticisms especially from feminist scholarship. As Marshall’s formulation has been cited and discussed widely, feminists have been criticizing this framework in terms
of its historicity or theoretical framework (Voet 1994). These criticisms have sparked alternative arguments around citizenship rights.
First and foremost, feminist scholars have questioned the alleged differentiation between the private and the public spheres inherent in the liberal understanding of citizenship. As civil rights are the pioneers of the classical tripartite scheme of citizenship rights, it can be observed that the private property and its protection from the arbitrary use of power by the sovereign has been at the center. In a Lockean sense, private property denotes not only the physical belongings of individuals, but also the actual body of the individuals. In other words, protection of private property as being the founding ground for civil rights and liberties has also legitimized the principle of bodily integrity or habeas corpus. In that sense, protection of the contents of the private sphere is closely linked with the protection of the individual from the intrusions of the state. This clear separation of private sphere from the public sphere is the foundation for rights and liberties the liberal thought.
Yet, feminists have been questioning the practical implications of this theoretical distinction between the private and the public spheres on women’s power and agency. Some feminists argue that private sphere has been essentially a male sphere where private property belongs to the men (Dietz 1992: 66). For instance, Young (1989:253-254) argues that this distinction between the private and the public spheres also corresponds to a moral division of labor between “reason and sentiment,” where reason is associated with masculinity and sentiment with femininity. As a result of this moral distinction, women are considered as care-takers of those in the private sphere who lack the rationality required for exercising citizenship in the public sphere. Women, then, are effectively excluded from enjoying equal citizenship status with men.
Hence, it’s the rights and the agency of the men that have been protected through civil liberties. This positioning creates a power discrepancy between men and women where the latter either has been a latecomer in terms of enjoying these universal citizenship rights or has still been struggling to do so. One example of such struggles is the right to enter into contract. Interpreting this right as to include the right to name a child after the mother’s surname, which is still not that common, Voet (1994:65) argues that the practice of rights is still short of reflecting the theoretical equality and universality of citizenship rights between men and women. For others, Marshallian framework is oblivious not just towards women but also ethnic and racial minorities (Yuval-Davis 1991; Young 1989).
In her critique of the social contract theories, Pateman (1988) argues that normative underpinnings of the hypothetical contract ignore the agency of women. More specifically, she argues that the hypothetical contract discussed by the political theorists such as Locke, Rousseau or Hobbes is “the means through which modern patriarchy is constituted.” (Pateman 1988: 2). Hence, the idea of modern state and citizenship assumes not only a division between public and private spheres but also a hierarchy between men and women which contributes to the discrepancy between theoretical equality between citizens and its practice.
This discrepancy between legal or theoretical equality and the practice of citizenship, stemming from the patriarchal structuring of the society, has been preventing women from being full citizens (Pateman 1992: 21-25). Women, being reduced to either carrying out the patriarchal duty of procreating for the nation or being completely ignored in the public sphere, have not been able to fulfill their agency and act as full citizens. To overcome this discrepancy, some scholars argue for active engagement of women in the public sphere, where others advocate for challenging the common framework of citizenship by incorporating the categories neglected by it (Dietz 1992: 76, Yuval-Davis 1991). For some feminists, interpreting citizenship as rights can be helpful to overcome this discrepancy. Lister (2003: 37-39) argues that acting as a citizen, i.e. social and political participation, is the key to fulfill the potential of the legal status of citizenship for women. As women have been denied the formal status and rights of citizenship, even when they actively involved in revolutionary social movements as in the case of French Revolution (Lister 2003: 68-69).
Feminist contributions to citizenship literature demonstrate the inherent problems of the existing theories of citizenship. Their critique suggests that gender is another, albeit ignored, dimension of citizenship as men and women have different experiences concerning the rights and liberties associated with citizenship as well as the access to this status (Walby 1994: 391). Hence, feminist contributions challenge the patriarchal assumptions of the classical debates of citizenship, starting from the first modern feminist manifesto by Mary Wollstonecraft’s A Vindication of the Rights of Women in 1791.
Although feminist critiques have unearthed the intrinsically gendered nature of the concept, Marshall’s account of citizenship composed of civil, political, and social rights presents a relevant and useful analytical framework for this study. The reason for its relevance lies within its categorization, which is also used for the empirical part of this
research as well. His account will be revisited in the Chapter 6 where the survey data is analyzed.
Before moving onto the other chapters, this chapter will conclude by introducing a new perspective concerning citizenship, which has not been adequately studied within the literature. This new perspective is about the actual perceptions of citizens themselves regarding their rights and liberties. This perspective is important to understand the implications of citizenship as a dynamic and political notion. In addition, incorporating perceptions on citizenship is helpful to establish the link between the conceptual aspects and the empirical observations. The reason is that how citizens experience and perceive citizenship is contingent upon the political preferences and developments. By providing insight into how citizens, as actors with distinct political preferences, perceive their status, research on perceptions carry the potential to contribute to the literature in an empirical manner.