RECOMENDACIÓNES

Ownership is one of the important structural factors that impact upon corporate media’s narrative on the nationalisation discourse. Ultimately, it is the corporate media systems that are used as a tool to advance the values and objectives of competing political interests (Freedman, 2008). Herman and Chomsky (2002) assert that the media functions on behalf of the powerful societal interests that control and finance them. “This is normally not accomplished by crude intervention, but by the selection of right-thinking personnel and by the editors’ and working journalists’ internalisation of priorities and definition of newsworthiness that conform to the institution’s policies” (Herman and Chomsky, 2002: 3).

Essentially, the ownership patterns have an impact on the content of news, as those who own and control the media have influence over hiring and firing as well as over the editorial direction of news organisations (Radebe, 2007). As Shoemaker and Reese (1991:163) argue

on what the media organisation may execute: “If employees don’t like it, they can quit.

Others will be found to take their place, and routine can always be changed.”

While significant changes have occurred in terms of the racial composition of ownership, class continuity is still very much evident in the South African media (Teer-Tomaselli and Tomaselli, 2001; Duncan, 2009). Historically, South African media ownership has been concentrated in the hands of four conglomerates, some of whom were dialectically linked to the industrial bourgeoisie, and aimed at the white apartheid middle strata preferred by advertisers (Jacobs, 2004). This has largely remained the case, with the exception of a few cases where black-owned conglomerates took over Times Media Group, formerly known as Johnnic Communications, then Avusa and the recent takeover of the Independent Group by Sekunjalo Investments. Despite this black ownership, transformation of the corporate media has been intractably slow and mirrored that of the broader economic and land transformation of the country, which has progressed at a snail’s pace. Even in instances where black ownership has occurred, including the public broadcaster, the media systems have structurally remained elitist due to elements such as the funding model. In this regard, the corporate media have remained a tool for waging class battles.

This slow transformation of the media and its concentration fundamentally entrenches the apartheid patterns (Duncan, 2014). In the South African context, where the rate of transformation is measured by the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (B-BBEE)²³ codes, “The press, however, had consolidated a B-BBEE score level of five by 2011: a poor showing for an industry that claims to represent the public interest. If the press are out of step with the society demographically, then they will find it extremely difficult to portray itself convincingly as a mirror of society” (Duncan, 2014: 3). This echoes the sentiments expressed earlier in this chapter by former state president Nelson Mandela. Broadly speaking, it could be

23 Since the democratic dispensation, Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (B-BBEE) has been adopted as an initiative of the South African government aimed at promoting economic transformation in order to enable meaningful participation of black people in the economy. The BEE Act of 2003 outlines the required targeted areas of development within the South African economy. However, it is crucial to note that after the introduction of BEE, as South Africa moved towards proper integrated society Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (B-BBEE) was introduced which accommodates companies owned by other races but has shareholding of blacks or employees share schemes, And where these companies buy goods and services from BEE companies and are involved in skills development and enterprise development through adopting the BEE companies and developing them (http://www.newdiscoverybs.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=994:econopedia).

argued that the corporate press in South Africa has been slow in embracing transformation, and more than 20 years into the democratic dispensation it still lags behind with little hope of any meaningful transformation. A transformation charter for the industry was rejected, with the corporate press opting to set up its own “Print and Digital Media Transformation Task Team to develop a roadmap for transformation of the industry from within” (Duncan, 2014: 4). It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the ANC emerged with the Media Appeals Tribunal (MAT) resolution at its 2007 Polokwane conference. This was partly due to the slow pace of transformation, but most importantly because it views the Press Council of South Africa as a self-serving system (Duncan, 2014). A cursory glance at the outcomes of the British Press Complaints Commission²⁴ would suggest that the ANC’s proposals on the MAT are not farfetched, and are actually proactive (Freedman, 2008), especially since the corporate press has consistently failed to self-regulate. However, Duncan (2014) argues that in Britain, in the light of phone-tapping scandals, self-regulation has not necessarily failed as such, but rather a particular model of self-regulation exists that is implicitly designed to benefit the industry.

Freedman (2008: 70) posits that the British media policy is premised on a “marketised interpretation of the public interest”. In this context, media policy that informs and affects self-regulation mechanisms depends on a definition of public interest based on plurality of ownership, diversity of sources, economic benefits and market effects (Freedman, 2008). The power and influence that accrue to owners of the media make ownership a vital component to be considered when analysing any ideological discourse. Freedman (2008) further emphasises that media owners wield huge unaccountable political and economic power, and their ability to deploy their market power to act as influential “cultural gatekeepers” makes ownership an important aspect. Furthermore, a concentration of media power is a concern because, over and above market power, which leads to monopoly tendencies, a media that is excessively tied to financial interests is likely to be unable to provide adequate checks and balances against abuse by special interests (Stiglitz, 2002).

24 The Press Complaints Commission (PCC) is a voluntary regulatory body for British printed newspapers and magazines, consisting of representatives of the major publishers. The PCC is funded by the annual levy it charges newspapers and magazines. It has no legal powers – all newspapers and magazines voluntarily contribute to the costs of, and adhere to the rulings of, the Commission, making the industry self-regulating. It received extensive criticism for its lack of action in the News of the World phone hacking affair, including from MPs and Prime Minister David Cameron, who called in July 2011 for it to be replaced with a new system. The Leveson Inquiry was set up and reported in November 2012, but there has been deadlock over its proposals for self-regulation despite the establishment of a Royal Charter on self-regulation of the press (http://en.wikipedia.org).

The corporate media in liberal democracies have to consider their shareholders: “With stock outstanding, [they] have fiduciary obligations to their owners to focus on the bottom line, which may well conflict with any theoretical public service obligations” (Herman, 2002: 64).

Corporate media owners, as beneficiaries of the market system, are, in all likelihood, biased towards the market system in ideological discourses. Obviously, this is a much more nuanced process and thus there is some dispute as to the extent to which media owners influence behaviour and performance (Herman, 2002). Because there is pressure on the bottom line, there are policy implications for the corporate media’s focus in attracting advertisers, managing relationships with critical sources of information, and avoiding conflicts with powerful constituencies (Herman, 2002). Indeed, media proprietors are not philanthropic investors who are interested in the public good and safeguarding the democratic system, but rather shrewd business people who invest on the basis of carefully calculated return on their investments. For example, Herman (2002) suggests that some have imposed their strong political views on their outlets, and that evidence indicates that even those deemed less strong ideologically have had a distinct influence on media policy choices. This influence is sometimes quite nuanced, “by hiring senior editors known to fit the owners’ general outlook and to be sensitive to propriety demands; by politically biased selection, emphases, and tone that guides underlings as to what is expected of them” (Herman, 2002: 65). A contemporary local example of this is the acquisition of the Independent News Group by Sekunjalo Investments, which led to the suspension of some editors who, like the editor of the Cape Argus, were purportedly ideologically opposed to the approach of the new owners. Of course, some, like the editor of the Sunday Independent, left “voluntarily”. This clearly suggests that the influence of policy is a dynamic process which is not only a top-down approach but also influenced from below by media managers. Herman (2002: 65) alludes to this point when he indicates that “distinguishing between proprietary-editor and mere profit seeking is difficult”. Over and above this, policy is inevitably enforced by the very nature of the market economy, which prioritises profit maximisation (Herman, 2002).

Indeed, ownership is crucial in shaping the corporate media’s narrative on development discourses such as nationalisation. As Wright and Rogers posit,

the way media and communication … is owned, produced and controlled has pervasive consequences for the character of public debate, the attitudes people form towards social issues and social conflicts, and ultimately the possibilities for various kinds of social change to occur in a democracy” (Wright and Rogers, 2010: 1)

Therefore, the nationalisation discourse exists in the context of the capitalist media system that

“tends to reflect the interests of its owners and controllers – the corporations and the capitalist state” (Harper, 2012: 97). This means that, as Chomsky (1992: 92) points out, “what conflicts with the requirements of power and privilege does not exist”. In this regard, this research study highlights the extent to which corporate media influences the broader societal views on public debates by analysing the coverage and presentation of the nationalisation discourse.