Recomendaciones

437

NCA, J. Hurley Diary, 31 August 1941.

438

DOD Archives, War Diaries Box 404, September 1941, 17 September.

439

DOD Archives, War Diaries Box, 404, October 1941, 9 October.

440

gigantic British push into Libya or the return of the whole division to the Union.441 Private Jerry Hurley was destined to miss both of those events, if either turned out to be materialise, as he was struck down with severe tonsillitis on 30 October and transferred to the UDF camp at Helwan for hospitalisation.442

As October passed very few UDF commanders had any illusions regarding the battle readiness of their brigades. When, on 8 November, the two Corps Commanders General A.R. Godwin-Austin (13th Corps) and Lieutenant General C.W.M. Norrie (30th Corps) issued their operational orders the 2nd SA Division was stuck at El-Alamein laying mines and preparing defences, 1st SA Division was still busy with its desert training with 1st Brigade having barely begun exercising in countering armoured attacks, while 5th Brigade did not even progress past the battalion scheme exercises443 and would not be ready when Cunningham’s ‘Operation Crusader’ commenced on 15 November. In spite of securing three extra days, much to the dismay of his superiors, in which to train his men, Brink had to decide between sending his untrained men against the Germans or have his division replaced by the 4th Indian Division and become a national embarrassment. In true South African fashion, Brink chose to fight444 and, on 31 October, he issued orders to his brigade commanders to prepare to move out on a protracted divisional exercise the next day.445 Moving further and further westwards C Company was under the impression that they were merely busy with large scale training exercises and remained hopeful that home leave might still be forthcoming. For the next few days their routine was the same and consisted of tactical training and navigation while moving ever closer to the ‘wire’ which was a well- constructed and broad barbed wire barricade that indicated the border between Egypt and Libya.446 Private Holland and the rest of his Company crossed the wire into the Libyan Desert on 18 November and headed west in the direction of Bir el Gubi, which was no more than a stone cairn erected over a well of water deep water while at the same time being a point of reference on military maps.447 In the late afternoon of the first day’s march the Carbineers reached an old landing strip eighty kilometres inside Libya and for the first time C Company took digging slit trenches and defensive positions seriously.448

Progress was very slow over the next few days. Enemy artillery restricted motorised movement and the Carbineers also attracted, for the very first time, the attention of the

441

DOD Archives, Pamphlet Section, Box 41, Sidi Rezegh, Sidi Rezegh, p3.

442

DOD Archives, Personnel Cards, J.J. Hurley, 4486V.

443

J.A.I. Agar-Hamilton and L.C.F. Turner, The Sidi Rezeg Battles, 1941, p89.

444

J.A.I. Agar-Hamilton and L.C.F. Turner, The Sidi Rezeg Battles, 1941, pp119-120.

445

DOD Archives, War Diaries Box 404, October 1941, 30 October.

446

NCA, H.G. Symmons Diary, Part 2, 12 October 1941.

447

NCA, J. Holland, Memories of the Middle East: June 1941 to April 1943, Bir El Gobi 1941,

448

much despised Stuka dive-bombers.449 The Stuka was described as a frightening apparition with bombs slung beneath the aircraft’s wings and a siren attached to its landing gear which was actuated by a propeller whirring in the wind and making a horrible screeching sound. The bombs were designed to detonate on contact with the stony earth with a deafening crack, sending jagged steel splinters and sharp-edged broken rock flying horizontally through the air. The Stuka’s seldom operated alone and would usually be accompanied by several yellow-nosed Messerschmitt 109 fighters which ranged around the perimeter shooting up anyone not in a horizontal position on the ground.450 Although no serious casualties were sustained during these first attacks, the Carbineers quickly learned to dive for the nearest slit trench during air attacks. It was during one attack, while the dust was still thick in the air and the enemy making another pass that one of the Coloured drivers, having had enough of being on the receiving end of enemy fire, grabbed a rifle and fired wildly at the plane overhead while shouting ‘Ja jou bliksem ek kan ook skiet’ (Yes you bugger, I can shoot as well).451

On 20 November, 1st Brigade was ordered to attack Bir el Gubi while 5th Brigade had to occupy Sidi Rezegh. The Italian defenders were in no mood to surrender their position that easy and put up a stiff resistance.452 With the armour that was supposed to protect the vulnerable infantry brigades scattered by the German panzers, 5th Brigade’s defensive box came under severe attack from increasing German forces. The Carbineers were ordered to launch a dismounted attack against the Italians at Bir el Gubi in order to relieve the pressure on their comrades to the North.453 For infantry to attack over open ground against well entrenched defenders which may have tanks in support with only two companies was definitely not sound military tactics.454

Before setting off, the rum ration was sent around: except it was not rum but KWV export quality brandy straight from the vats of the Western Cape, more commonly known as Union Death Fluid, and each member of C Company received a mugful of the stuff before setting off on what may well have been their last walk on earth. It went down well and warmed them up in the cold desert air, providing a little more courage than was usually found in the men from Natal.455 Just before the number 12 platoon could break into a charge, their rifles and bayonets at high port, the attack was called off, much to their relief and they returned happily to their defensive positions. 456

449

DOD Archives, War Diaries Box 404, November 1941, 19 November.

450

NCA, J. Holland, Memories of the Middle East: June 1941 to April 1943, Bir El Gobi 1941,

451

NCA, H.G. Symmons Diary, Part 2, p53. Translated into “Yes you bugger, I can shoot as well”

452

J.A.I. Agar-Hamilton and L.C.F. Turner, The Sidi Rezeg Battles, 1941, p164.

453

DOD Archives, War Diaries Box 404, November 1941, 20 November 1941.

454

NCA, H.G. Symmons Diary, Part 2, 21 October 1941.

455

NCA, J. Holland, Memories of the Middle East: June 1941 to April 1943, Bir El Gobi 1941.

456

As the enemy’s guns began finding their range to their targets, more shells exploded in and around the Carbineer’s positions. Through the noise and dust the men regularly called out to each other to confirm their status as still alive. It was after one particular heavy bombardment on 22 November457 that Carbineer Doug Drummond did not answer to his name. In an instant the whole section leapt from their slit trenches and rushed to Doug’s hole in the earth. He lay face down and as Cliff Portsmouth kneeled down to get a closer look, Doug pointed to his left leg, just behind the knee. His trouser leg was faintly smoking with a small piece of recently red hot shell splinter resting on top of it. It was a great relief to both Doug and the rest of the section that blood had not been drawn and that all survived yet another attack.458

Unaware that the tanks, on which the success of the operation depended, had been dispersed, C Company dug in for an uneasy night, not looking forward to the prospect of a first light move in the direction of Sidi Rezegh. Their move was delayed until dawn since the division and brigade commanders both felt that the troops were insufficiently trained to operate at night.459 At daybreak on Sunday 1st Brigade continued its careful advance in the direction of 5th Brigade to their north. Throughout the day the men were aware of a tremendous battle being fought and that they were heading straight for it. A cautious Brigadier Pienaar ordered his men to dig in as the sun began to set. They hardly settled down when the heaviest artillery bombardment yet crashed down onto their positions.460 That night C Company, covering the northern perimeter of their brigade defensive box,461 also began receiving something other than enemy shells. Out of the darkness the remnants of 5th Brigade fled through the Carbineer lines, away from the German tanks that surrounded and then overran the defending South Africans.462 After the war General Crüwell, German commander of the Afrika Korps, describe the destruction of the South Africans as a battle of annihilation where in spite of the tenacity of the defenders and the skill with which they handled their weapons, they were no match for the concentrated firepower of the Germans.463 As news of the destruction of 5th Brigade reached Division HQ, the Carbineers were ordered to abandon their positions and move westward to Taieb El Esem where they were to set up a defensive box and prepare to meet the enemy.464

It soon became clear that Operation Crusader was not the grand success its planners envisioned. The breakout from Tobruk failed, the British tank elements were badly mauled and the South Africans lost one whole brigade. On the contrary the Germans maintained

457

DOD Archives, War Diaries Box 404, November 1941, 22 November.

458

NCA, J. Holland, Memories of the Middle East: June 1941 to April 1943, Bir El Gobi 1941.

459

J.A.I. Agar-Hamilton and L.C.F. Turner, The Sidi Rezeg Battles, 1941, p227.

460

NCA, H.G. Symmons Diary, Part 2, p66.

461

DOD Archives, War Diaries Box 404, November 1941, 23 November.

462

J.A.I. Agar-Hamilton and L.C.F. Turner, The Sidi Rezeg Battles, 1941, p276.

463

J. Strawson, The Battle for North Africa, p83.

464

their momentum and continued their relentless drive east destroying everything in their way. This in turn caused panic among the dispersed infantry and support vehicles and lead to a headlong rush back in the direction of the Wire.465 Once more a horde of fleeing men and vehicles passed through C Company’s lines with drivers shouting at the defenders to drive as hard as they could because there was untold horror behind them. When asked where they should go they received the answer that anywhere would be fine as long as they did so without delay.466 German and Italian forces pursued the fleeing Eighth Army while by- passing the South Africans at Taieb el Esem. This Westward rush to safety became known as the Matruh Stakes, and it soon transpired, that 1st Brigade was completely surrounded and cut off from the rest of the Eighth Army.467

Throughout the morning several attacks by tanks and motorised infantry were made and the Carbineers were locked in a life and death struggle with the same enemy that eliminated 5th Brigade a few days earlier.468 C Company’s men hugged the ground and only chanced a very quick peek to see whether the enemy infantry have debussed from their vehicles and were moving in for the kill. They were extremely impressed with the anti-tank gunners who remained standing by their guns while the infantry lay flat on their stomachs.469 The attacks grew in ferocity, to such an extent that commanders were ordered to destroy all secret documents.470 Much later in the afternoon the enemy laid down a smoke screen and seemed to be forming up behind it in preparation for the final assault. All available artillery was urgently called upon to suppress the enemy concentration and the feared attack never materialised.471 The Carbineer casualties for the day amounted to one man with shell shock and one Non-European driver that was hit by shrapnel.472 By the end of the day the enemy withdrew and the men of C Company realised that in their brigade stood its ground against enemy armour and emerged victorious.473

The 1st Brigade then received orders to withdraw south towards Field Maintenance Centre 65 where they remained till the end of the month.474 From here strong patrols consisting of armoured cars and infantry were sent out in the direction of Sidi Rezegh to ascertain the enemy’s intentions. It was during one such a patrol that the men of number 12 platoon discovered how much fight was still left in their enemy. While cautiously moving away from the relative safety of their defences the first warning of a pending attack was received from

465 _{J.A.I. Agar-Hamilton and L.C.F. Turner, The Sidi Rezeg Battles, 1941, p292.}

466 _{NCA, H.G. Symmons Diary, Part 2, p76.}

467