The reference magnetist holds that the way in which expressions are used in a language constrains the possible interpretations of that language (recall that, as far as possible, an interpretation of a language ought to make the sentences of the global folk theory come out as true on that interpretation). The eligibility of the referent then decides between competing interpretations. Reference magnetism is therefore characterised by a trade-off between the eligibility of the referent (which is, on Lewis‘ view, entirely independent of the speakers of the language) and charity to use. In line with Lewis, Sider (2011: 31) defines charity to use as ‗the number (on some suitable measure) of sentences believed...by the speakers of the linguistic community that come out as true under that interpretation‘. The trade-off between use and eligibility generates some indeterminacy, but it will be far less pervasive than is the case when there is no externalist constraint.
It is a strange consequence of reference magnetism that speakers of a language might be in the dark about the referents of their own expressions, as they do not have access to the facts about which, out of the competing interpretations that are consistent with charity to use, is the most eligible. It seems important not just that our words do refer determinately, but that we have some mechanism for discovering what the determinate referents of our expressions are.
The problem is that any access we have (or take ourselves to have) to the facts about eligibility generate theory internal constraints on reference. Truly external constraints are constraints that are opaque to us. If naturalness theory is to be adopted, then it should form part of our core theory in a given domain. Platitudes about e.g. mass would include ‗mass is a perfectly natural property‘. Reference magnetism dictates that we find the interpretations of the language such that the platitudes of global folk theory -- which includes platitudes about the naturalness of mass – come out as true on those interpretations. Of course, if reference magnetism is true then it is also the case that the eligibility of mass is making it easier for us to refer to mass than to other properties in the vicinity. But the point is that the work the eligibility
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of mass is doing to fix the referent of our expression ‗mass‘ is entirely independent from our theorising. In that case, we are in no position to appeal to it in order to discover how our expressions do in fact refer.
Consider the following example. Ordinary English speakers often assent to the following sorts of sentences:
(1) The only fruit I like is apple, but my favourite food is tomato
(2) I‘ve eaten no fruit today, but I had three types of vegetable for dinner and a cheese and tomato sandwich for lunch
(3) I‘m not growing any fruit this year, just cucumbers and tomatoes
A speaker of English unsure whether or not the predicate ‗is a fruit‘ properly includes tomatoes in its extension might take the readiness with which speakers assent to (1)-(3) to establish that the extension of the predicate ‗is a fruit‘ does not include tomatoes. But suppose our English speaker is impressed by reference magnetism, and so she takes her discovery about the use of the predicate to be just one side of the story. Her next step is to try to establish the eligibility of the referent that her study of use had turned up for the expression ‗is a fruit‘. She further examines platitudes surrounding fruit, and determines that the biological kind fruit is more natural than the kind fruit minus tomatoes.
Our speaker might take her discovery to indicate that the property being a fruit (call it F) is more natural than the property being a non-tomato fruit (call it T), and therefore to think that the referent of the predicate ‗is a fruit‘ is property F. But nothing about this is theory external (the results of her investigation might have gone the other way, so that she took ‗is a fruit‘ to pick out property T). Our speaker will now adjust her use of the expression ‗fruit‘ in accordance with her apparent discovery, and perhaps eventually platitudes surrounding fruit will change. It is our speaker herself who judges the degree to which the properties in question are natural.
There are two options here. We might think that this is the last word, and so reference magnetism fails to provide any external constraint on reference. Speakers of a language might adjust the use of their expressions in accordance with their judgements about naturalness, and this might in turn affect the meaning of those expressions, but only because it impacts on the use of the expressions. Chalmers
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(manuscript: 3) calls this weak reference magnetism. Contrast this with strong reference magnetism, where the eligibility of the referent really does play a theory-external role (independent of what speakers of the language believe about the eligibility of particular interpretations).
Speakers who are mistaken about naturalness judgements will, if naturalness really does play a theory- external role, make systematic and undetected errors about what their terms mean. This becomes more troubling when we consider questions about, for example, whether definitions such as ‗mares are female horses‘ can be trumped by naturalness considerations. If they can, we might have very little idea about what the terms of our language refer to and thus an extremely unexplanatory and counterintuitive theory of reference. If naturalness cannot play a trumping role in such cases then reference magnetism is not a global metasemantic thesis, but rather operates like local descriptivism so that the reference of some expressions is fixed by description and the reference of others by naturalness (Chalmers, manuscript: 5.)
My view is that reference magnetism is a novel approach to reference, but one that does not quite have the resources required to overcome the problems with constraining reference (only one of which I have discussed here). If my arguments here are successful, they further undermine the motivation for naturalness theory, and the hope of appealing to naturalness to characterise the structure of reality.
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