Morerecentarticulationsofthefreeexerciserightseemtotreada differ-entgroundthaninthecasesdescribedinPartIII.A. Insteadoftryingtouse theFreeExerciseClausetocarveoutaprotectedspaceintheindividualor per-sonalspherefortheexerciseofreligiousidentity,theseclaimantsargueforthe protectionof identityasexercisedbeyondthatsphereand withregardtothe rightsofothers.217 Ultimately,thefreeexerciseofidentityinaprojective fash-ionisanoxymoron,orattheveryleastincoherent;ifoneacceptsthepremise that identity is a personal phenomenon218—the individual or community’s constructionofawayofbeing,oradoptionofasystemofbeliefsandvalues—
toexerciseitinaprojectivemannerortoforceitontoothersisperse imper-missible.219
Forexample,intherecentcaseofBurwellv.HobbyLobbyStores,Inc.,220 therespondents(HobbyLobby)describednotjustaspecificbelief,butrather
theFirstAmendmentbarsapplicationof aneutral,generallyapplicablelawto religiously motivatedactionhaveinvolvednotthe FreeExerciseClausealone,butthe FreeExercise Clauseinconjunctionwithotherconstitutionalprotections,suchasfreedomofspeechandof thepress....” Emp’tDiv.,Dep’tofHumanRes.v.Smith,494U.S.872,881(1990).
Robertsv.UnitedStatesJaycees,468U.S.609(1984),discussedinPartI.B.2,wascitedas anothersuch example. Thus, if theonlyharm ofan otherwisereasonable andgenerally applicablelawisonreligiousidentity,distinctfromtheexerciseofotherrights,anexemption may not be justified. This conclusion does not necessarily follow from the protective-projectivedistinction,butitisafurtherdistinctionthatmaybemadewithintherealmof protectiveidentityclaims.
217. FrederickMarkGedickshassuggested,forexample,thatthecontroversyoverstateRFRAsis lessaboutwhetherreligiouslibertyshouldbeprotectedandmoreaboutwhereitshouldbe protected. Gedicks,supranote20,at774. Hesuggeststhatthetensionarisesfromtheeffort to“allowconservativeChristianmorals—aquintessential‘private’concernincontemporary liberaltheory—toimposethemselveson(i)thosewhodonotsharethem,in(ii)spacesof Americanlifesuchashousing,thefor-profitworkplace,andretailcommercialbusinesses, whichhavebeengovernedby‘public’values.” Id.
218. This isnot tosuggest that theformation ofidentity isinsulatedfrom outsideinfluence;
indeed,suchinfluenceisoftencriticaltoidentityformation. SeeJUDITHBUTLER,GIVING ANACCOUNTOFONESELF30(2005)(suggestingthatself-recognitionisdefinedthrough
“proximateandlivingexchanges,inthemodesbywhichweareaddressedandaskedtotake upthe questionofwho weare andwhatour relationto the otherought tobe”);PAUL RICOEUR, ONESELFASANOTHER 3 (1992) (suggesting that the definition of self is intimatelytiedtothedefinitionofotherness). Ultimately,however,theverydefinitionof identityisthequalities,beliefs,andexpressionsthatmakeapersonorgroupdifferentfrom others;toallowtheidentityofsometotrampletheidentitiesofothersthroughitsadoption intolawthuspresentsathreattoidentity’sintegrity.
219. SeeLaycock,supranote12,at200(“Religiousdissenterscanlivetheirownvalues,butnotif theyoccupychokepointsthatempowerthemtopreventsame-sexcouplesfromlivingtheir ownvalues.”).
220. 134S.Ct.2751(2014).
asetofbeliefsandvaluesthatguidethecompany’sbusinessdecisions. In es-sence,thebriefdescribedanidentity—albeitacorporateidentity. Initsbrief filedintheSupremeCourt,thecorporationanditsfoundersdescribeda cor-porateidentitysteepedinreligiousvalues.221 Asaresult,theyengageincertain corporatebehaviors—forexample,closingalloftheirbusinessesonSundays, refusingtosellliquororotherproducts(suchasshotglasses)thatmaypromote alcohol use, and providing cost-freeaccess to religious counseling.222 The ownersalso refusedto providehealth insurancetoitsemployeesthat would coverdrugs usedtoterminateapregnancyordrugsand devicesdesignedto preventimplantationoftheembryointhewomb,whichgaverisetotheHobby Lobbylitigation.223 Thebriefdescribesthedecisiontoexcludesuchproducts fromthecompany’shealthplanas“exercis[ing]theirfaith.”224
InHobbyLobby,theCourtultimatelyheldthat theReligiousFreedom RestorationAct(RFRA)allowedHobbyLobby,acloselyheldcorporation,to denyits employeeshealthcoverageofcontraceptionto whichtheemployees wouldotherwisebeentitledbasedonthereligiousobjectionsofthecompany’s owners.225 Erwin Chemerinsky and Michele Goodwin have observed that
“HobbyLobbywasthefirsttimeinAmericanhistorythattheSupremeCourt foundasubstantialburdenonfreeexerciseofreligionwhereapersonismerely requiredtotakeactionthatmightenableotherpeopletodothingsthatareat oddswiththeperson’sreligiousbeliefs.”226
Theactivitiesdescribedin theHobbyLobbyowners’briefarenot reli-giousinnature;nordidtheownersassertaninabilitytoassociatewithor fol-low the Christian faith. Instead, their complaint seemed to be that the Affordable Care Act’s (ACA’s) contraceptive-coverage mandate prevented themfromexpressingtheircorporatereligiousidentitythroughtheirbusiness practices. OnemightthenthinkoftherightbeingarticulatedbyHobby Lob-byastherighttoprojectreligiousidentity:thatis,tobringtheapplicationof thelawintolinewithone’sconceptionoftheworldandthevaluesthat accom-panyit,evenifthatexerciseofidentitycomesattheexpenseofothers’abilityto
221. BriefforRespondents,Sebeliusv.HobbyLobbyStores,Inc.,134S.Ct.2751(2014)(No.
13-354),2014WL546899,at*8–9(explainingthattheowners“organizedtheirbusinesses withexpressreligiousprinciplesinmind”).
222. Id.at8–9.
223. Id.at9.
224. Id.at31.
225. Burwellv.HobbyLobbyStores,Inc.,134S.Ct.2751,2759(2014).
226. Chemerinsky & Goodwin, supra note 191, at 1133. They also note that, “[m]ost importantly,HobbyLobbywasthefirsttimeinAmericanhistorythattheSupremeCourtheld thatpeople,basedontheirreligiouspractices,caninflictharmonothers.” Id.at1134.
exercisetheirlegalrights.227 YetastheCourthasemphasizedthroughoutits earliercases,whileindividualsexercisingreligiousidentityshouldbeafforded someprotectionfromgovernmentaction,theyshouldnothavetheauthority todictategovernmentpolicyortocontrolhowthesepoliciesapplytoothers.228
AsJusticeKennedywroteinhisconcurrenceinHobbyLobby,the accommoda-tionofreligiouslibertymaynot“undulyrestrictotherpersons,suchas employ-ees,inprotectingtheirowninterests.”229
TwoobviousdistinctionsregardingHobbyLobbymustbeaddressedhere:
1)thenovelquestionwhetheraprivately-heldcorporationcanassumea reli-giousidentity;and2)theassertionofreligiousidentitynotinthecontextofthe FirstAmendment,butunderstatutorylawsuchasRFRA(inconjunctionwith RLUIPA’s definition of “exercise of religion” as “any exercise of religion, whetherornotcompelledby,orcentralto,asystemofreligiousbelief”). Asto thefirstpoint(andviewedthroughthelensofreligiousidentity),thetwo cor-porations at issue—Conestega Wood andHobby Lobby—were admittedly notreligiousorganizations,butbusinesses formed“in accordancewith[the]
religiousbeliefs andmoral principles”230of theirfoundingmembers and in-tendedtoberun“inamannerconsistentwithBiblicalprinciples.”231 Thus,the conductofthebusinesseswasatleastonedegreeremovedfromconcerns di-rectlyimplicatingidentity:arestrictionimposedonbusinessconductisnota harmtoidentity,butratheranobstacletotheowners’aimtoruntheirbusiness inaccordancewiththeirreligiousidentity. Inessence,then,theclaimbythe Conestega WoodandHobbyLobbyownersmightbeviewedasadirect re-questthattheCourtprotectthisspecificinstanceofprojectiveidentity;sucha
227. TheHobbyLobbyowners’claimisdistinguishablefromtheclaimmadebyAlfredSmithin EmploymentDivision,DepartmentofHumanResourcesv.Smith. SeesupraPartII.A. The analysisinSmithisinappositetothediscussionhere,whichfocusesnotontheinteraction betweenthestateandtheindividualengaginginreligiousexercise,butinsteadonthenature oftheexerciseitself. ThisArticledoesnotaimtoproposeanalternativeframeworktothat posedbySmith,oranyofthe cases thatfollow inthe samevein,but insteadsuggestsa preliminaryinquiryintowhethertheclaimbeingmadeisaprotectiveorprojectiveclaimof religiousidentity. Aclaimthatfallsintotheprotectivecategorywouldpotentiallyfallwithin theprotectionoftheFirstAmendment—inwhichcasecourtsmay stillrequirebalancing against government interests. In contrast, those in the projective category would, by definition,falloutsidetherealmofconstitutionalprotectionandwouldnotrequirefurther discussion.
228. SeecasesdiscussedlaterinthisPart—forexample,theCourt’sdecisioninRoy,whichrefused toallowareligiousobjectiontotheuseofSocialSecuritynumberstoaffectthegovernment’s abilitytousethosenumbers inadministeringAidto Families withDependentChildren (AFDC)orfoodstamps.
229. HobbyLobby,134S.Ct.at2787(Kennedy,J.,concurring).
230. Id.at2764.
231. Id.at2766.
claimwouldclearlybenon-cognizableundertheframeworksuggestedinthis Article. ItisalsodistinctfromclaimslikethatmadebytheLutheranchurchin Hosanna-Tabor,whichaimedtopreservetheintegrityoftheinstitution’s reli-giousidentity.232 Thedistinctionbetweenthesetwocasesislessaboutthe cat-egorizationof thetwoentities aschurchand corporation,given theCourt’s recognition inHobbyLobby that corporationscanassume areligious identi-ty.233 Instead,itreferstothefactthatthechurchinHosanna-Taborwasusing identitytoexercisecontroloveritsinternalcompositionandthoseresponsible forshapinginstitutionalidentitybyinstructingothersaboutthechurch’score mission234—aprotectiveuseofreligiousidentity. Incontrast,theHobbyLobby owners’ use of religious identity was projective—attempting to impose the corporation’sreligiousbeliefsonothersandcontrolemployees’personalaccess tocontraceptives,whichhasnodirectbearingonthereligiousidentityofthe corporation.
AstothefactthattheownersinHobbyLobby assertedclaimsbasedon RFRAaswellastheFirstAmendment,andgivenRFRA’smoregeneral ar-gumentsabouttheproperrelationshipbetweenidentityandthelaw,thisArticle wouldapplythesameframeworktoRFRAasitwouldtheFirstAmendment.
Viewedthroughtheidentitylens,theverypremiseofRFRAs,bothstateand federal,appearstobethattheprotectionofreligiousidentitynecessarilyand explicitlyrequiresthesubordinationofsecularlaw. Anotherwayofthinking ofthem,incertaincases,mightbeasstatutoryaccommodationofprojective identityclaims.235 TotheextentthatRFRAsallowreligiousidentitytoactasa
232. Whilesuchaclaimmayseemsimilarinnature,forexample,totheclaimmadebytheBoy Scouts in Boy Scouts v. Dale, the claim in that case was ultimately based on the First Amendmentrightto expressiveassociation; the ownersof ConestogaWoodandHobby Lobbymadenosuchparallelclaim(suchasthatthereisarighttocorporateassociation).
233. IraC.Lupu&RobertW.Tuttle,ReligiousExemptionsandtheLimitedRelevanceofCorporate Identity, in THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 376, 392 (Micah Schwartzmanetal.eds.,2016)(notingthatafterHobbyLobby“corporateentities,including businesses,havethelegalrighttoadoptandmanifestareligiousidentity”).
234. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n,132U.S.694,707–08(2012)(explainingthattheterminatedemployeeatissuewas electedbythecongregationtofulfillcorereligiousfunctionsoftheChurchandthather“job dutiesreflectedaroleinconveyingtheChurch’smessageandcarryingoutitsmission”).
235. Consider,forexample,Indiana’sRFRA,whichallowedfor-profitbusinessestoassertfree exerciserights(inthesamewayasindividualsorchurchesmight). Also,considerthemore generalnotionthatan individualwhoseexerciseofreligion issubstantiallyburdenedmay assertthatviolation(orimpendingviolation)asadefenseincourt. Onecancertainlyimagine projectiveexercisesofidentity—perhapsallofthem—thatwouldbesubstantiallyburdened byexistinglawgoverningthesamesubstantivearea.
“veto”ofsecularlaw,236ratherthanmerelyallowingindividualstoavoidan ob-ligation,theyareinherentlyflawed.
Anothercasethatprovidesausefulpointforanalysisandcontrastof pro-tectiveandprojectiveclaimsisUnitedStatesv.Lee.237 InLee,anAmish em-ployersoughtanexemptionforhimselfandhisemployeesfromthecollection and paymentof SocialSecuritytaxeson thegrounds thathis religiousfaith prohibitedparticipationingovernmentalsupportprograms.238 Boththecourt belowandtheSupremeCourtacceptedtheplaintiff’scontentionthatsuch be-haviorwasprohibitedbyhisreligion.239 TheCourtwasunwilling,however,to provideanyexemptionbeyondthatwhichCongresshadalreadygrantedtothe self-employed. Inexplainingitsdecision,theCourtwrote:
Whenfollowersofaparticularsectenterintocommercialactivityas amatterofchoice,thelimitstheyacceptontheirownconductasa matterofconscienceandfaitharenottobesuperimposedonthe statutory schemes which are binding on others in that activity.
Grantinganexemptionfromsocialsecuritytaxestoanemployer op-eratestoimposetheemployer’sreligiousfaithontheemployees.240
The Court’sreasoningin Lee—andthedistinction drawnbetween the self-employedAmishandthoseofAmishfaithwhoemployothers—is reflec-tiveof and aligns withthe argumentsmadein this Article. In essence,the CourtsuggeststhatthoseseekinganexemptioninLee—thosewho have ac-cepted certain limits “on their own conduct as a matter of conscience and faith,”241orwhohaveachievedaspecificreligiousidentity242—cannotactto as-sertthatidentitybeyondtheindividualrealm. Hadtheemployerbeen self-employed, the claim could be articulated more simply: The government is compelling theindividualtoengagein behaviorthat directlycontradictshis
236. See Ira Lupu & Robert Tuttle, Symposium: Religious Opt-Outs or Religious Vetoes?, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 15, 2015, 9:33 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/12/
symposium-religious-opt-outs-or-religious-vetoes [https://perma.cc/6BAA-YM64] (arguing inthecontextofZubikv.Burwell,136S.Ct.1557(2016),thatassertionsofreligiousfreedom shouldnever“beallowedtofunctionasareligiouslymotivatedvetoofapolicydesignedto protectothers”);id.(“Noproperconceptionofreligiousfreedomcanjustify[suchagreat]
degreeof interferencewith democraticallydetermined measures foradvancingthepublic welfare.”).
237. 455U.S.252(1982).
238. Id.at254–55.
239. Id.at255,257(“Wethereforeacceptappellee’scontentionthatbothpaymentandreceiptof socialsecuritybenefitsisforbiddenbytheAmishfaith.”).
240. Id.at261.
241. Id.
242. Seesupranote56andaccompanyingtext(describingachievedreligiousidentityas“theresult ofconsciouschoicesmadeoverthecourseofone’slife”).
religiousfaith. Unliketheself-employedindividualwhorefusestoparticipate inthesocialsecuritysystem,however,inthisinstancetheemployer’sassertion ofreligiousidentityis“impose[d]”onhisemployees.243
EstateofThorntonv.Caldor,244decidedinthecontextof the Establish-ment Clause, provides another demonstration of the Court’s willingnessto provideprotectionforprotectiveclaimsofreligiousidentity,while withhold-ingsuchprotectionfromclaimsthatprojectindividualidentityontoothersor requirethepublicspheretoconformtoindividualizednotionsofidentity. At issueinThorntonwas aConnecticutstatutethat provided: “Nopersonwho statesthataparticulardayoftheweekisobservedashisSabbathmaybe re-quiredbyhisemployertoworkonsuchday. Anemployee’srefusaltoworkon hisSabbathshallnotconstitutegroundsforhisdismissal.”245 TheCourtheld thestatuteunconstitutional,drawingadistinctionbetweenthe accommoda-tionofidentityintheindividualcaseandalawthat“imposesonemployersand employeesanabsolutedutytoconformtheirbusinesspracticestothe particu-larreligiouspracticesoftheemployeebyenforcingobservanceoftheSabbath theemployeeunilaterallydesignates.”246
Aside from the fact that the Connecticut statute “impermissibly ad-vance[d]aparticularreligiouspractice”247—hencetheviolationofthe Estab-lishmentClause—itwasalsooffensiveinthatitallowedtheindividualandhis orherdefinitionofreligiousidentitytodictateothers’actions(here,the em-ployer’sabilitytodismissthosewhocannotadheretospecificworking condi-tions, including working on Saturday or Sunday).248 While the pursuit of
243. Lee,455U.S.at261.
244. 472U.S.703(1985).
245. Id.at706(quotingCONN.GEN.STAT.§53–303e(b)(1985)).
246. Id.at709.
247. Id.at710. AlsoproblematicwasthefactthattheConnecticutstatuterequiredthestateto
“decidewhichreligiousactivitiesmaybecharacterizedasan‘observanceofSabbath’inorder toassessemployees’sincerity.” Id.at708.
248. OnemightbeinclinedtoseetheConnecticutstatuteasprotectiveinattemptingtocarveout, asageneralrule,accommodationforindividualobserversoftheSabbath. Theproblemwith the statute, in the Court’s view, was its absolutist imposition of one particular accommodationacross the board, withoutregard forthe employer’s interestsorwhether anothertypeofaccommodationmightbettersuitthoseinterests:
TheStatethuscommandsthatSabbathreligiousconcernsautomatically controloverallsecularinterestsattheworkplace;thestatutetakesnoaccount oftheconvenienceorinterestsofthe employerorthoseofotheremployees whodonotobserveaSabbath. Theemployerandothersmustadjusttheir af-fairstothecommandoftheStatewheneverthestatuteisinvokedbyan em-ployee.
Thereisnoexceptionunderthestatuteforspecialcircumstances,suchas the Friday Sabbath observer employed in an occupation with a Monday
religious identityis deserving ofprotection under theReligionClauses, the Courtemphasizedthat“[t]heFirstAmendment...givesnoonetherightto insistthatinpursuitoftheirowninterestsothersmustconformtheirconduct tohisownreligiousnecessities.”249
The Court’s decision in Bowen v. Roy250 also suggests that projective claimsofreligiousidentityareimpermissibleinsofarastheyrequireothersto conformtoindividualizedconceptionsofidentity. InBowen,theCourt reject-edaclaimbyNativeAmericanparentsthatthegovernment’sinsistenceon us-ingtheir daughter’ssocial securitynumber forpurposesof administeringits Aidto FamilieswithDependentChildrenandFoodStampprogramwould violatetheirreligiousbeliefs.251 TheCourtheldthatthefederalgovernment’s useof thechild’ssocialsecuritynumberdid“notitselfinanydegreeimpair Roy’s ‘freedomtobelieve,express,andexercise’hisreligion.”252 TheCourt wentontoexplain:“JustastheGovernmentmaynotinsistthatappellees en-gageinanysetformofreligiousobservance,soappelleesmaynotdemandthat theGovernmentjoinin theirchosenreligious practices byrefraining from
throughFridayschedule—aschoolteacher,forexample;thestatuteprovides fornospecialconsiderationifahighpercentageofanemployer’sworkforce as-sertsrightstothesameSabbath. Moreover,thereisnoexceptionwhen honor-ing the dictatesof Sabbathobserverswould cause the employersubstantial
throughFridayschedule—aschoolteacher,forexample;thestatuteprovides fornospecialconsiderationifahighpercentageofanemployer’sworkforce as-sertsrightstothesameSabbath. Moreover,thereisnoexceptionwhen honor-ing the dictatesof Sabbathobserverswould cause the employersubstantial