asked students whether they understood the task and, if necessary, explained the task again. Directly afterwards, they were asked to leave the gym and were led to a different room. There we asked them to complete the survey on a computer we handed them.)
Screenshots of the Preference Elicitation during the Survey
(The following two screenshots, Figures 1.I.1 and 1.I.2, display translated elicitation screens for performance- and name-based preferences for peers.)
Figure 1.I.1. Performance-based preferences
Figure 1.I.2. Name-based preferences
64 | 1 Self-selection of Peers and Performance
Introduction to the Second Run for the Whole Class (Class was gathered for announcement)
We will shortly start with the second run. For this purpose a partner for you has been selected. In your class, the partner has been selected randomly [based on your indication how fast you want your partner to be] [based on the classmates you nominated]. We would like to remind you that the objective is to be as fast as possible and it is only about your own time. Your teacher will receive a list with your performance, but no information about the pairs.
(The list with pairs was read out aloud to the students and students were accompanied to the waiting zone. Students were called into the gym one pair after the other. In the gym they were led to separate, but adjacent tracks. Each student was accompanied by one experimenter, who recorded their time as well their responses to four additional questions.)
Individual Introduction Directly Before the Second Run
The two of you will now run simultaneously. Your partner has been selected ran-domly [based on your indication how fast you want your partner to be] [based on the classmates you nominated].
(We then asked each subject to assess their relative performance in the first run) Please guess, who of you two was faster during the first run?
Post-run Questionnaire after the Second Run
(Directly after a pair participated in the second run, we asked each of the two subjects the following three questions in private)
(1) How much fun did you have during the second run? Please rate this on a scale from 1 – no fun at all – to 5 – a lot of fun
(2) If you were to run again, would you prefer to run alone or with a partner) (3) How much pressure did you feel form your partner during the second run?
Please rate this on a scale from 1 – no pressure at all – to 5 – a lot of pressure.
Appendix References | 65
References
Ager, Philipp, Leonardo Bursztyn, and Hans-Joachim Voth. (2016). “Killer Incentives:
Status Competition and Pilot Performance during World War II.” Working Paper. [5]
Agostinelli, Francesco. (2018). “Investing in Children’s Skills: An Equilibrium Analysis of Social Interactions and Parental Investments.” Working Paper. [9]
Aldashev, Gani, Georg Kirchsteiger, and Alexander Sebald. (2017). “Assignment Proce-dure Biases in Randomised Policy Experiments.” Economic Journal 127 (602): 873–895.
[32]
Altonji, Joseph G., Todd E. Elder, and Christopher R. Taber. (2005). “Selection on ob-served and unobob-served variables: Assessing the effectiveness of catholic schools.” Jour-nal of Political Economy 113 (1): 151–184. [31]
Aral, Sinan, and Christos Nicolaides. (2017). “Exercise Contagion in a Global Social Net-work.” Nature Communications 8 (14753): [7]
Bandiera, Oriana, Iwan Barankay, and Imran Rasul. (2009). “Social Connections and In-centives in the Workplace: Evidence From Personnel Data.” Econometrica 77 (4): 1047–
1094. [5]
Bandiera, Oriana, Iwan Barankay, and Imran Rasul. (2010). “Social Incentives in the Workplace.” Review of Economic Studies 77 (2): 417–458. [5, 9]
Bartling, Björn, Ernst Fehr, and Holger Herz. (2014). “The intrinsic value of decision rights.” Econometrica 82 (6): 2005–2039. [8, 33]
Bartling, Björn, Ernst Fehr, and Klaus M. Schmidt. (2013). “Discretion, productivity, and work satisfaction.” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 169 (1): 4–22. [8]
Becker, Anke, Thomas Deckers, Thomas Dohmen, Armin Falk, and Fabian Kosse. (2012).
“The Relationship Between Economic Preferences and Psychological Personality Mea-sures.” Annual Review of Economics 4 (1): 453–478. [32]
Belot, Michèle, and Jeroen van de Ven. (2011). “Friendships and Favouritism on the Schoolground – A Framed Field Experiment.” Economic Journal 121 (557): 1228–1251.
[9]
Betts, Julian R. (2011). “The Economics of Tracking in Education.” In. Edited by Eric A.
Hanushek, Stephen Machin, and Ludger Woessmann. Vol. 3, Handbook of the Eco-nomics of Education. Elsevier, 341–381. [33]
Bó, Pedro Dal, Andrew Foster, and Louis Putterman. (2010). “Institutions and Behavior:
Experimental Evidence on the Effects of Democracy.” American Economic Review 100 (5):
2205–2229. [8]
Booij, Adam S., Edwin Leuven, and Hessel Oosterbeek. (2017). “Ability Peer Effects in University: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment.” Review of Economic Studies 84 (2): 547–578. [8]
Bradler, Christiane, Robert Dur, Susanne Neckermann, and Arjan Non. (2016). “Em-ployee Recognition and Performance: A Field Experiment.” Management Science 62 (11):
3085–3099. [8]
Brandts, Jordi, David Cooper, and Roberto Weber. (2014). “Legitimacy, Communication, and Leadership in the Turnaround Game.” Management Science 61 (11): 2627–2645.
[8]
Bursztyn, Leonardo, Florian Ederer, Bruno Ferman, and Noam Yuchtman. (2014). “Un-derstanding Mechanisms Underlying Peer Effects: Evidence From a Field Experiment on Financial Decisions.” Econometrica 82 (4): 1273–1301. [9]
66 | 1 Self-selection of Peers and Performance
Carrell, Scott, Bruce Sacerdote, and James West. (2013). “From Natural Variation to Optimal Policy? The Importance of Endogenous Peer Group Formation.” Econometrica 81 (3): 855–882. [8, 33, 60]
Cassar, Lea, and Stephan Meier. (2018). “Nonmonetary Incentives and the Implications of Work as a Source of Meaning.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 32 (3): 215–38. [33, 36]
Chan, Tszkin Julian, and Chungsang Tom Lam. (2015). “Type of Peers Matters: A Study of Peer Effects of Friends Studymates and Seatmates on Academic Performance.” Working Paper. [7, 8, 20]
Chen, Roy, and Jie Gong. (2018). “Can self selection create high-performing teams?” Jour-nal of Economic Behavior & Organization 148: 20–33. [7, 37]
Chevalier, Judith A., M. Keith Chen, Peter E. Rossi, and Emily Oehlsen. (Forthcoming).
“The value of flexible work: Evidence from uber drivers.” Journal of Political Economy, [8]
Cicala, Steve, Roland Fryer, and Jörg Spenkuch. (2018). “Self-Selection and Comparative Advantage in Social Interactions.” Journal of the European Economic Association 16 (4):
[7, 20]
Corgnet, Brice, Joaquín Gómez-Miñambres, and Roberto Hernán-González. (2015).
“Goal Setting and Monetary Incentives: When Large Stakes Are Not Enough.” Manage-ment Science 61 (12): 2926–2944. [8]
Deci, Edward, and Richard Ryan. (1985). Intrinsic motivation and self-determination in human behavior. Springer Science & Business Media. [6, 8, 33, 36]
Deci, Edward, and Richard Ryan. (2000). “The “what” and “why” of goal pursuits: Human needs and the self-determination of behavior.” Psychological Inquiry 11 (4): 227–268. [6, 33]
Dohmen, Thomas, Armin Falk, David Huffman, Uwe Sunde, Jürgen Schupp, and Gert G. Wagner. (2011). “Individual Risk Attitudes: Measurement, Determinants, and Be-havioral Consequences.” Journal of the European Economic Association 9 (3): 522–550.
[12]
Duflo, Esther, Pascaline Dupas, and Michael Kremer. (2011). “Peer Effects, Teacher Incen-tives, and the Impact of Tracking: Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation in Kenya.”
American Economic Review 101 (5): 1739–1774. [8, 33]
Elsner, Benjamin, and Ingo Isphording. (2017). “A Big Fish in a Small Pond: Ability Rank and Human Capital Investment.” Journal of Labor Economics 35 (3): 787–828. [20, 58]
Falk, Armin, and Michael Kosfeld. (2006). “The Hidden Costs of Control.” American Eco-nomic Review 96 (5): 1611–1630. [8, 33]
Friebel, Guido, Matthias Heinz, Mitchell Hoffman, and Nick Zubanov. (2019). “What Do Employee Referral Programs Do?” Working Paper. [37]
Fu, Chao, and Nirav Mehta. (2018). “Ability Tracking, School and Parental Effort, and Student Achievement: A Structural Model and Estimation.” Journal of Labor Economics 36 (4): 923–979. [33]
Garlick, Robert. (2018). “Academic Peer Effects with Different Group Assignment Policies:
Residential Tracking versus Random Assignment.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 10 (3): 345–369. [8, 33]
Gibbons, Frederick, and Bram Buunk. (1999). “Individual Differences in Social Compar-ison: Development of a Scale of Social Comparison Orientation.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 76 (1): 129–147. [12]
References | 67
Gill, David, Zdenka Kissová, Jaesun Lee, and Victoria Prowse. (2019). “First-Place Loving and Last-Place Loathing: How Rank in the Distribution of Performance Affects Effort Provision.” Management Science 65 (2): 494–507. [20, 58]
Gneezy, Uri, and Aldo Rustichini. (2004). “Gender and Competition at a Young Age.” Amer-ican Economic Review 94 (2): 377–381. [10, 60]
Golsteyn, Bart, Arjan Non, and Ulf Zölitz. (2017). “The Impact of Peer Personality on Academic Achievement.” Working Paper. [8, 20]
Harrison, Glenn, and John List. (2004). “Field Experiments.” Journal of Economic Litera-ture 42 (4): 1009–1055. [6]
Heckman, James, and Rodrigo Pinto. (2015). “Econometric Mediation Analyses: Identify-ing the Sources of Treatment Effects from Experimentally Estimated Production Tech-nologies with Unmeasured and Mismeasured Inputs.” Econometric Reviews 34 (1-2): 6–
31. [18, 42, 43]
Herbst, Daniel, and Alexandre Mas. (2015). “Peer Effects on Worker Output in the Labo-ratory Generalize to the Field.” Science 350 (6260): 545–549. [7]
Huettner, Frank, and Marco Sunder. (2012). “Axiomatic arguments for decomposing good-ness of fit according to Shapley and Owen values.” Electronic Journal of Statistics 6:
1239–1250. [25]
Irving, Robert. (1985). “An Efficient Algorithm for the “Stable Roommates” Problem.” Jour-nal of Algorithms 6 (4): 577–595. [13]
Jackson, C. Kirabo, and Elias Bruegmann. (2009). “Teaching Students and Teaching Each Other: The Importance of Peer Learning for Teachers.” American Economic Journal: Ap-plied Economics 1 (4): 85–108. [9]
Kiessling, Lukas, Jonas Radbruch, and Sebastian Schaube. (2019). “Determinants of Peer Selection.” Working Paper. [7, 17]
Koch, Alexander K., and Julia Nafziger. (2011). “Self-regulation through Goal Setting*.”
Scandinavian Journal of Economics 113 (1): 212–227. [8]
Kosfeld, Michael, and Susanne Neckermann. (2011). “Getting More Work for Noth-ing? Symbolic Awards and Worker Performance.” American Economic Journal: Microeco-nomics 3 (3): 86–99. [8]
Lavy, Victor, and Edith Sand. (Forthcoming). “The Effect of Social Networks on Students’
Academic and Non-cognitive Behavioural Outcomes: Evidence from Conditional Ran-dom Assignment of Friends in School.” Economic Journal, [7]
Lazear, Edward, and Paul Oyer. (2012). “Personnel Economics.” In The Handbook of Orga-nizational Economics. Princeton University Press, 479–519. [37]
Lazear, Edward, and Kathryn Shaw. (2007). “Personnel Economics: The Economist’s View of Human Resources.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 21 (4): 91–114. [37]
Levitt, Steven, John List, Susanne Neckermann, and Sally Sadoff. (2016). “The Behav-ioralist Goes to School: Leveraging Behavioral Economics to Improve Educational Per-formance.” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 8 (4): 183–219. [8, 36]
Manski, Charles. (1993). “Identification of Endogenous Social Effects: The Reflection Prob-lem.” Review of Economic Studies 60 (3): 531–542. [7]
Mas, Alexandre, and Enrico Moretti. (2009). “Peers at Work.” American Economic Review 99 (1): 112–145. [5, 9]
Murphy, Richard, and Felix Weinhardt. (2018). “Top of the Class: The Importance of Or-dinal Rank.” Working Paper. [20, 58]
68 | 1 Self-selection of Peers and Performance
Oster, Emily. (2019). “Unobservable Selection and Coefficient Stability: Theory and Evi-dence.” Journal of Business & Economic Statistics 37 (2): 187–204. [30, 31]
Owens, David, Zachary Grossman, and Ryan Fackler. (2014). “The Control Premium:
A Preference for Payoff Autonomy.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 6 (4):
138–161. [8, 33]
Rotter, Julian B. (1966). “Generalized Expectancies for Internal Versus External Control of Reinforcement.” Psychological Monographs: General and Applied 80 (1): 1–28. [12]
Sacerdote, Bruce. (2001). “Peer Effects with Random Assignment: Results for Dartmouth Roommates.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 116 (2): 681–704. [5]
Sacerdote, Bruce. (2011). “Peer Effects in Education: How Might They Work, How Big Are They and How Much Do We Know Thus Far?” In. Edited by Eric A. Hanushek, Stephen Machin, and Ludger Woessmann. Vol. 3, Handbook of the Economics of Education. El-sevier, 249–277. [7]
Schneider, Simone, and Jürgen Schupp. (2011). “The Social Comparison Scale: Testing the Validity, Reliability, and Applicability of the IOWA-Netherlands Comparison Orien-tation Measure (INCOM) on the German Population.” DIW Data DocumenOrien-tation, [12]
Sutter, Matthias, and Daniela Glätzle-Rützler. (2015). “Gender Differences in the Willing-ness to Compete Emerge Early in Life and Persist.” Management Science 61 (10): 2339–
2354. [10]
Sutter, Matthias, Stefan Haigner, and Martin G. Kocher. (2010). “Choosing the Carrot or the Stick? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations.” Review of Economic Studies 77 (4): 1540–1566. [8]
Tincani, Michela. (2017). “Heterogeneous Peer Effects and Rank Concerns: Theory and Evidence.” Working Paper. [7, 20]
Weinhardt, Michael, and Jürgen Schupp. (2011). “Multi-Itemskalen im SOEP Jugend-fragebogen.” DIW Data Documentation, [12]
.