VINZONS-CHATO vs. FORTUNE TOBACCO
G.R. No. 141309
June 19, 2007 Facts:
On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted RA 7654, which provided that locally manufactured cigarettes which are currently classified and taxed at 55% shall be charged an ad valorem tax of 55% provided that the maximum tax shall not be less than Five Pesos per pack. Prior to the effectivity of RA 7654, Liwayway issued a rule, reclassifying “Champion,” “Hope,” and “More”, all manufactured by Fortune, as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign brand subject to the 55% Ad Valorem tax. Thus, when RA 7654 was passed, these cigarette brands were already covered. In a case filed against Liwayway with the RTC, Fortune contended that the issuance of the rule violated its constitutional right against deprivation of property without due process of law and the right to equal protection of the laws. For her part, Liwayway contended in her motion to dismiss that respondent has no cause of action against her because she issued RMC 37- 93 in the performance of her official function and within the scope of her authority. She claimed that she acted merely as an agent of the Republic and therefore the latter is the one responsible for her acts. She also
contended that the complaint states no cause of action for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith.
Issue:
Whether or not an independent civil action under Article 32 of the Civil Code would prosper against the petitioner.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner can be subject to a civil action under Article 32 of the Civil Code. The general rule is that a public officer is not liable for damages which a person may suffer arising from the just performance of his official duties and within the scope of his assigned tasks. An officer who acts within his authority to administer the affairs of the office which he/she heads is not liable for damages that may have been caused to another, as it would virtually be a charge against the Republic, which is not amenable to judgment for monetary claims without its consent. However, a public officer is by law not immune from damages in his/her personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which, being outside the scope of his authority, are no longer protected by the mantle of immunity for official actions. Under Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code, civil liability may arise where there is bad faith, malice, or gross negligence on the part of a superior public officer. And, under Sec. 39 of the same Book, civil liability may arise where the subordinate public officer’s act is characterized by willfulness or negligence.
The decisive provision is Article 32, it being a special law, which prevails over a general law, the Administrative Code. A quasi-delict has been defined as the commission or omission of an act by one, without right, whereby another receives some injury, directly or indirectly, in person, property or reputation. There are cases in which it has been stated that civil liability in quasi-delict is determined by the conduct and not by the mental state of the offender, and there are circumstances under which the motive of the defendant has been rendered immaterial. The reason sometimes given for the rule is that otherwise, the mental attitude of the alleged wrongdoer, and not the act itself, would determine whether the act was wrongful. Presence of good motive, or rather, the absence of an evil motive, does not render lawful an act which is otherwise an invasion of another’s legal right; that is, liability in tort in not precluded by the fact that defendant acted without evil intent.
INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS) COJUANGCO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 119398 July 2, 1999
Facts:
Eduardo Cojuangco is a known businessman-sportsman owing several racehorses which he entered in the sweepstake races on March 6, 1986 to
September 18, 1989. Several of his horses won the races on various dates, landing first, second or third places, respectively, and winning prizes together with the 30% due for trainer and grooms. Unfortunately, the winnings were being withheld on the advice of Presidential Commission on Good Government Commissioner Ramon A. Diaz.
The Chairman of PCSO and the Private Respondent, Fernando O. Carrascoso, offered to give back the winnings but it was refused by the petitioner for the reason that the matter is already in court. The trial court held that Carrascoso had no authority to withhold the winnings since there was no writ of sequestration evidencing the orders of PCGG. Carrascoso feared that if he did not withhold the winning he would be liable for neglect of duty. Carrascoso maintained that bad faith did not attend his acts therefore he is not liable for damages. In fact, Carrascoso stated that he returned the principal amount of the winning evidencing his good faith. Petitioner begs to differ.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to damages for the violation of his constitutional rights to due process.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that petitioner is entitled for damages in accordance with Article 32 of the Civil Code. Article 32(6) of the Civil Code provides that any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstruct, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages, in this case the right against deprivation of property without due process of law.
Carrascoso's decision to withhold petitioner's winnings could not be characterized as arbitrary or whimsical, or even the product of ill will or malice. He had particularly sought from PCGG a clarification of the extent and coverage of the sequestration order issued against the properties of petitioner. Although it is true that a public officer shall not be liable by way of moral and exemplary damages for acts done in the performance of official duties, the Court nevertheless states that bad faith is not necessary in praying for damages in Article 32 of the Civil Code. Under the Article, it is not necessary that the public officer acted with malice or bad faith.To be liable, it is enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of
petitioner, even on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of one's duties.
A little exercise of prudence would have disclosed that there was no writ issued specifically for the sequestration of the racehorse winnings of petitioner. There was apparently no record of any such writ covering his racehorses either. The issuance of a sequestration order requires the showing of a prima facie case and due regard for the requirements of due process.The withholding of the prize winnings of petitioner without a properly issued sequestration order clearly spoke of a violation of his property rights without due process of law.
INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS) MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY vs. CASTILLO
G.R. No. 182976 January 14, 2013
Facts:
Respondents are spouses engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling fluorescent fixtures, office steel cabinets and related metal fabrication under the name and style of Permanent Light Manufacturing Enterprise. In the afternoon of April 19, 1994, Joselito Ignacio and Peter Legaspi , Fully Phased Inspectors of Meralco sought permission to inspect Permanent Lights electric meter. Ignacio and Legaspi, together with an employee of Permanent Light, proceeded to check the electric meter. Upon inspection, the MERALCO inspectors noticed that the electric meter was tampered and right there and then took down the meter. It was found out that indeed the meter has been tampered with.
Permanent Light agreed to pay the deficient bills. MERALCO installed a new electric meter. The respondents alleged that the electric meter registered unusually high readings. The petitioners are now requesting that the old electric meter be re-installed since it shows a more accurate reading. The respondents also pray for damages since the electric meter was allegedly removed without following the required procedure. The RTC ruled in favor of respondents entitled to damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision stating that the petitioner abused its rights when it disconnected the electricity of Permanent Light. The petitioners raise the issue of damages to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not MERALCO is liable for damages in for the violation of the constitutional rights of the respondent.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that Permanent Light is entitled to exemplary damages for the violation of their constitutional rights. The Supreme Court based its judgment on Section 4 of Republic Act 7832 which provides that taking down of tampered electric meter should be personally witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or a duly authorized representative of the Energy Regulatory Board. MERALCO failed to show evidence that there was an officer of the law or a duly authorized representative of ERB therefore there is no prima facie evidence that the meter is tampered and they have no right to disconnect the electric meter. Besides, even if there is prima facie evidence of illegal use of electricity, Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7832 provides that even if flagrante delicto, there must be still be a written notice or warning to the owner of the house or the establishment concerned. In light or the following the Supreme Court awards exemplary damages to Permanent Light for the recompense of their injured rights. Article 32 of the Civil Code provides for awards of damages in cases where the rights of individuals, including the right against deprivation of property without due process of law are violated.
INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (QUASI-DELICTS/TORTS)