to resolve the problem on who should sit as ARMM officials in the interim [in order to achieve synchronization in the 2013 elections]: (1) allow the [incumbent] elective officials in the ARMM to remain in office in a hold over capacity until those elected in the synchronized elections assume office; (2) hold special elections in the ARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire when those elected in the [2013] synchronized elections assume office; or (3) authorize the President to appoint OICs, [their respective terms to last also until those elected in the 2013 synchronized elections assume office.]
3.1. 1st option: Holdover is unconstitutional since it would extend the terms of office of the incumbent ARMM officials
We rule out the [hold over] option since it violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. This provision states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. [emphases ours]
Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution; they cannot extend their term through a holdover. xxx.
If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term mandated by Congress, the net result is for Congress to create a new term and to appoint the occupant for the new term. This view – like the extension of the elective term – is constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that would effectively extend the term of the incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory. Congress cannot also create a new term and effectively appoint the occupant of the position for the new term. This is effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into the constitutional appointment power of the President. Hence, holdover – whichever way it is viewed – is a constitutionally infirm option that Congress could not have undertaken.
Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been statutory basis for it (namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054) in the past, we have to remember that the
rule of holdover can only apply as an available option where no express or implied legislative intent to the contrary exists; it cannot apply where such contrary intent is evident.
Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had the intention of suppressing the holdover rule that prevailed under RA No. 9054 by completely removing this provision. The deletion is a policy decision that is wholly within the discretion of Congress to make in the exercise of its plenary legislative powers; this Court cannot pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation, except where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results.
3.2. 2nd option: Calling special elections is unconstitutional since COMELEC, on its own, has no authority to order special elections.
The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature. [N]o elections may be held on any other date for the positions of President, Vice President, Members of Congress and local officials, except when so provided by another Act of Congress, or upon orders of a body or officer to whom Congress may have delegated either the power or the authority to ascertain or fill in the details in the execution of that power.
Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the scheduled August 2011 elections and setting another date – May 13, 2011 – for regional elections synchronized with the presidential, congressional and other local elections. By so doing, Congress itself has made a policy decision in the exercise of its legislative wisdom that it shall not call special elections as an adjustment measure in synchronizing the ARMM elections with the other elections.
After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can act to the contrary by ordering special elections instead at the call of the COMELEC. This Court, particularly, cannot make this call without thereby supplanting the legislative decision and effectively legislating. To be sure, the Court is not without the power to declare an act of Congress null and void for being unconstitutional or for having been exercised in grave abuse of discretion. But our power rests on very narrow ground and is merely to annul a contravening act of Congress; it is not to supplant the decision of Congress nor to mandate what Congress itself should have done in the exercise of its legislative powers.
Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot be extended through a holdover, the term cannot be shortened by putting an expiration date earlier than the three (3) years that the Constitution itself commands. This is what will happen – a term of less than two years – if a call for special elections shall prevail. In sum, while synchronization is achieved, the result is at the cost of a violation of an express provision of the Constitution.
3.3. 3rd option: Grant to the President of the power to appoint ARMM OICs in the interim is valid.
The above considerations leave only Congress‘ chosen interim measure – RA No. 10153 and the appointment by the President of OICs to govern the ARMM during the pre-synchronization period pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law – as the only measure that Congress can make. This choice itself, however, should be examined for any attendant constitutional infirmity.
At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the limitations on or qualifications to the exercise of this power should be strictly construed; these limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. The appointing power is embodied in Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, which states:
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. [emphasis ours]
This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President can appoint. These are:
First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other public ministers and consuls;
officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
Since the President‘s authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No. 10153, it falls under the third group of officials that the President can appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, the assailed law facially rests on clear constitutional basis.
If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to appoint OICs under Section 3 of RA No. 10153 is the assertion that the Constitution requires that the ARMM executive and legislative officials to be ―elective and representative of the constituent political units.‖ This requirement indeed is an express limitation whose non-observance in the assailed law leaves the appointment of OICs constitutionally defective.
After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged constitutional problem is more apparent than real and becomes very real only if RA No. 10153 were to be mistakenly read as a law that changes the elective and representative character of ARMM positions. RA No. 10153, however, does not in any way amend what the organic law of the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets outs in terms of structure of governance. What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is to “appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office.” This power is far different from appointing elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated term ending on the assumption to office of the officials elected in the May 2013 elections.
[T]he legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054. RA No. 10153, in fact, provides only for synchronization of elections and for the interim measures that must in the meanwhile prevail. And this is how RA No. 10153 should be read – in the manner it was written and based on its unambiguous facial terms. Aside from its order for synchronization, it is purely and simply an interim measure responding to the adjustments that the synchronization requires.
PECSA VS. PECSA FACTS:
Petitioner Lorna G. Pesca and respondent Zosimo A. Pesca first met sometime in 1975 while on board an inter-island vesselbound for Bacolod City. After a whirlwind courtship, they got married on 03 March
1975. They did not live together as petitioner wasstill a student in college and respondent, a seaman, had to leave the country on board an ocean-going vessel barely a month after themarriage. Six months later, the young couple established their residence in Quezon City until they were able to build their own housein Caloocan City where they finally resided. It was blissful marriage for the couple during the two months of the year that they couldstay together - when respondent was on vacation. The union begot four children, 19-year old Ruhem, 17-year old Rez, 11-year oldRyan, and 9-year old Richie.It started in 1988, petitioner said, when she noticed that respondent surprisingly showed signs
of "psychological incapacity" toperform his marital covenant. His "true color" of being an emotionally immature and irresponsible husband became apparent. He wascruel, violent and a habitual drinker. At one time, he chased petitioner with a loaded shotgun and threatened to kill her in thepresence of the children. The children themselves were not spared from physical violence.Finally, on 19 November 1992, petitioner and her children left the conjugal abode. Two months later, petitioner decided toforgive respondent, and she returned home to give him a chance to change. But, to her dismay, things did not so turn out asexpected. Indeed, matters became worse. Petitioner filed a complaint with the barangay authorities, and a case was filed againstrespondent for slight physical injuries. He was convicted by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City and sentenced to elevendays of imprisonment.Petitioner and her children left the conjugal home for good and stayed with her sister. Petitioner sued respondent before theRegional Trial Court for the declaration of nullity of their marriage invoking psychological incapacity. Petitioner likewise sought thecustody of her minor children and prayed for support pendente lite. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court anddeclared the marriage between petitioner and respondent valid and subsisting. Petitioner, in her plea to this Court, would have thedecision of the Court of Appeals reversed on the thesis that the doctrine enunciated in Santos vs.
Court of Appeals, promulgated on 14 January 1995, as well as the guidelines set out in Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina, promulgated on 13 February 1997, shouldhave no retroactive application and, on the assumption that the Molina ruling could be applied retroactively, the guidelines thereinoutlined should be taken to be merely advisory and not mandatory in nature. In any case, petitioner argues, the application of theSantos and Molina dicta should warrant only a remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings and not its dismissal
Issue: Whether or not psychological incapacity is present in this case RULING:
The phrase "psychological incapacity" borrowed from Canon law, is an entirely novel provision in our statute books, and, untilthe relatively recent enactment of the Family Code, the concept has
escaped jurisprudential attention.At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of the contract, so as to warrant adeclaration of nullity of
the marriage. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated with psychologicalincapacity.The Court reiterates its reminder that marriage is an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family6that the Statecherishes and protects. While the Court commiserates with petitioner in her unhappy marital relationship with respondent, totallyterminating that
relationship, however, may not necessarily be the fitting denouement to it. In these cases, the law has not quitegiven up, neither should we.
Petition is denied.
De castro vs JBC
FACTS: The movants present their arguments on the main issue at several levels. Some argue thatthe disputed constitutional provisions – Article VII, Section 15 and Article VIII, Section 4(1) –are clear and
speak for themselves on what the Constitution covers in banningappointments during the election period.23 One even posits that there is no conflict becauseboth provisions can be given effect without one detracting against the full effectiveness of the other,24 although the effect is to deny the sitting President the option to appoint in favorof a deferment for the incoming President’s action. Still others, repeating their originalarguments, appeal to the principles of interpretation and latin maxims to prove their point.Issues:Whether or not Section 15, Article VII of the Phil Consti. does not lead to an interpretationthat exempts judicial appointments from the express ban on
midnight appointmentsRULING: The court denies the motions for reconsideration for lack of merit, for all the matters beingthereby raised and argued, not being new, have all been resolved by the decision of March17, 2010. Nonetheless, the Court opts to dwell on some matters only for the purpose
of clarification and emphasis.Most of the movants contend that the principle of stare decisis is controlling, andaccordingly insist that the Court has erred in disobeying or abandoning Valenzuela ruling,It has been insinuated as part of the polemics attendant to the controversy we are resolvingthat because all the Members of the present Court were appointed by the incumbentPresident, a majority of them are now granting to her the authority to appoint the successorof the retiring Chief JusticeHad the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to theappointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. Theycould not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easilyand surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equallyapplicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, mostlikely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that theprohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within twomonths before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or ActingPresident’s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.We cannot permit the meaning of the Constitution to be stretched to any unintended pointin order to suit the purposes of any quarter
Ty v Banco Filipino,
G.R. No. 188302
THE PETITION
The petitioner argues that the CA erred in refusing to apply G.R. No. 137533 under the principle of res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment and stare decisis, and ignoring the November 26, 2007 minute resolution in G.R. No. 177865[64] and the April 7, 2009 consolidated decision in G.R. Nos. 130088, 131469, 155171, 155201, and 166608[65] that reiterated the Court’s pronouncement in G.R. No.
137533.
THE CASE FOR THE RESPONDENT
The respondent submits that the petitioner is estopped from amending the issues since she never raised the pendency of the consolidated cases of G.R. Nos. 130088, 131469, 155171, 155201 and 166608 in her CA petition, which was based only on the Court’s rulings in G.R. No. 137533 and G.R. No. 177865.
THE ISSUE
The core issues boil down to whether the Court’s ruling in G.R. No. 137533 applies as stare decisis to the present case
OUR RULING
We grant the petition.
The case at bar presents the same issue that the Court already resolved on April 7, 2009 in G.R. Nos.
130088, 131469, 155171, 155201 and 166608, wherein we applied the Court’s November 22, 2002 decision in G.R. No. 137533, one of several ejectment cases filed by Tala Realty against the respondent arising from the same trust agreement in the reconveyance case subject of the present petition, that the trust agreement is void and cannot thus be enforced. We quoted therein the Court’s ruling in G.R. No.
137533, thus:
The Bank alleges that the sale and twenty-year lease of the disputed property were part of a larger implied trust "warehousing agreement." Concomitant with this Court's factual finding that the 20-year contract governs the relations between the parties, we find the Bank's allegation of circumstances surrounding its execution worthy of credence; the Bank and Tala entered into contracts of sale and lease back of the disputed property and created an implied trust "warehousing agreement" for the
reconveyance of the property. In the eyes of the law, however, this implied trust is inexistent and void for being contrary to law.[66]
An implied trust could not have been formed between the Bank and Tala as this Court has held that
"where the purchase is made in violation of an existing statute and in evasion of its express provision, no trust can result in favor of the party who is guilty of the fraud."[67]
x x x [T]he bank cannot use the defense of nor seek enforcement of its alleged implied trust with Tala since its purpose was contrary to law. As admitted by the Bank, it "warehoused" its branch site holdings to Tala to enable it to pursue its expansion program and purchase new branch sites including its main branch in Makati, and at the same time avoid the real property holdings limit under Sections 25(a) and 34 of the General Banking Act which it had already reached x x x .
Clearly, the Bank was well aware of the limitations on its real estate holdings under the General Banking Act and that its "warehousing agreement" with Tala was a scheme to circumvent the limitation. Thus, the Bank opted not to put the agreement in writing and call a spade a spade, but instead phrased its right to reconveyance of the subject property at any time as a "first preference to buy" at the "same
Clearly, the Bank was well aware of the limitations on its real estate holdings under the General Banking Act and that its "warehousing agreement" with Tala was a scheme to circumvent the limitation. Thus, the Bank opted not to put the agreement in writing and call a spade a spade, but instead phrased its right to reconveyance of the subject property at any time as a "first preference to buy" at the "same