RECOMENDACIONES Ninguna

What counts as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ pluralism? When does pluralism, understood as embodying or reflecting modes and forms of societal differences in kind or degree, develop into a liability rather than an asset with reference to society and state in MENA?

In Getting to pluralism: Political actors in the Arab World, Hamzawy and Ottaway point that the imbalance of power between ruling establishments, secular parties and non- violent Islamist movements limits the degree of pluralism, and argue that “pluralist politics in the Arab world is not yet democratic politics.”147 Though not clearly defined, ‘pluralist politics’ encompasses mainly the proliferation of political parties, and the report presents an understanding that political pluralism is good.

The implicit positive connotations related to the concept ‘pluralism’ is affirmed by Linz and Stepan who, in their study on problems of democratic transition highlight ‘pluralism’ as one of four central variables along with ‘ideology’, ‘mobilization’ and

‘leadership’ that define variances in the five regime ideal types they outline.148 The authors do not, however, clarify what they imply by ‘pluralism’. They differentiate, for instance, between forms and degrees of ‘political pluralism’ as opposed to ‘social pluralism’.

Nevertheless, there is an implicit understanding as to the characteristics of what ‘pluralism’ which is not immediately clear: Democracy is, for instance, typologized as including

[r]esponsible political pluralism reinforced by extensive areas of pluralist autonomy in economy, society, and internal life of organizations. Legally protected pluralism [that is] consistent with ‘societal corporatism’, but not with ‘state corporatism’149

If pluralism in a democracy is to be a yardstick against which types of pluralism in other political regimes is to be compared, then Linz’s and Stepan’s definition is not clear on what ‘societal corporatism’ and ‘state corporatism’ encompass. Nor are the authors keen on defining ‘pluralism’, although the term is central in their typology. However, they apply the term in their discussions on different states illuminating the distinctions they seek to

147

Marina Ottaway and Amr Hamzawy, Getting to pluralism: political actors in the Arab world (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009), 12.

148

See table 3.1. entitled “Major modern regime ideal types and their defining characters” where Linz and Stepan differentiate between five ideal types of political regimes: democracy, authoritarianism, totalitarianism, post-totalitarianism and sultanism. Linz and Stepan, Problems of democratic transition and consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and post-communist Europe: 44.

149

Ibid., 40. The authors state moreover that “we believe that such important categories as “consociational democracy” and “majoritarian democracy” are subtypes of democracy and not different regime types. Democracy as a regime type seems to us to be of sufficient value to be retained and not to need further elaboration”.

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establish between ‘democratic’, ‘authoritarian’ and ‘sultanistic’ regimes with reference to ‘pluralism’.

An authoritarian regime is, for instance, according to Linz and Stepan, a “[p]olitical system with limited, not responsible political pluralism … [o]ften quite extensive social and economic pluralism [where] most pluralism had roots in society before the establishment of the regime.” With reference to sultanistic regimes, the authors point that pluralism is characterized by no rule of law, low institutionalization, high fusion of private and public in which “[e]conomic and social pluralism does not disappear but is subject to unpredictable and despotic intervention. No group or individual in civil society, political society, or the state is free from sultan’s exercise of despotic power.”150

Based on the distinction the authors make between pluralism in these three types of political regimes, states in the Middle East fall somewhere between ‘authoritarian’ and ‘sultanistic’, depending on how the authors define ‘societal’ and ‘state’ corporatism. To the degree that pluralism in terms of ‘societal corporatism’ includes religious group autonomy in personal law, I would argue that this type of pluralism should be classified as an aspect of authoritarian political regimes. Pluralism in the Middle East is, furthermore, authoritarian rather than ‘sultanistic’ for two main reasons: first, ‘social pluralism’ in terms of more or less institutionalized forms of religious differentiation is extensive and was, as Linz and Stepan point, in place before the establishment of the political regime; second, there exists ‘rule of law’, even in states where rulers act as sultans such as in the Gulf states. But, in as far as family law permeates the fabrics of societal pluralism in most states in the Middle East, it is a legal arena which, in some states, can be seen as battleground between different

contenders regarding who has or shall have the authority to interpret and regulate family law.

The institutionalization of religious pluralism in multireligious states such as Lebanon, Jordan and Syria, and the codification of family law as state law in most states in MENA impel a theoretical and analytical distinction between different types of pluralism, including a differentiation between the boundaries and point of intersection between ‘political pluralism’, ‘societal pluralism’ and ‘religious pluralism’ in society. Societal divisions that arise as a result of the prevalence of religious pluralism and the embedment of legal pluralism as part of state law in illiberal polities in the Middle East are, in other words, of a categorically

150

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different sort than societal divisions based on religious, geographical or linguistic lines in liberal societies such as contemporary western democracies.

Indeed, “[p]lural regimes may not always be as plural as the definition would indicate.”151 It is therefore worthwhile to dwell on the term ‘pluralism’ and emphasize the importance pertaining to how ‘pluralism’ is defined, and the impact of the clarification of nuances that follow from its definition in liberal and illiberal polities.

3.3.2 Consociationalist and multiculturalist group-based citizenship: a critique