Recomendaciones

The following summary snapshots of higher education systems in Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka provide the context for the detailed analyses of higher education access, quality, relevance, governance, and financing in South Asia that is contained in chapters 4 to 9.

Bangladesh

The higher education system in Bangladesh is large, unwieldy, and quite traditional. It enrolls nearly 2 million students to produce a GER of 14%.8 _{During the past decade, public higher education grew slowly at 4% per}

annum, while private higher education surged. In 2008, private institutions enrolled 53% of all university and college students. Staff–student ratios have improved—perhaps too much—over the past decade, declining from 1:18 to 1:15 as academic staff have been hired more quickly than the rate of enrollment growth. No data are available on student graduation rates in higher education. The system encompasses 34 public universities, 54 private universities, an open university, and 1,454 public and private degree colleges affiliated with the far- flung National University.

The National University is an administrative structure that defines standard curricula, administers uniform student examinations, and awards degrees to more than 1.1 million students annually. In addition, the University Grants Commission strictly controls curricula in the public and private universities. This produces relatively homogenous course structure and content across all higher education institutions, with procedures and surrounding regulatory mentality that stifle innovation. No national quality assurance agency exists to monitor the quality of the education provided. That, together with the rapid proliferation of private institutions and highly politicized public universities, leads many observers to decry a decline of education quality in recent years. The quality problem is reportedly most acute in the newer universities located outside the major cities of Chittagong and Dhaka.

Politics seems to pervade all aspects of university life. Academic staff, nonacademic staff, and student unions regularly disrupt the academic calendar and block most attempts at reform. Such political disruptions of campus life also create “session jams” in which new student intakes must be postponed for as long 3 years until existing students, who have fallen behind due to numerous strikes and demonstrations, can complete their degree programs.

7 _{The rankings consider a survey of academic reputation by university peers, a survey of institutional reputation by employers, research papers}

by staff, citations per paper, and international flows of students and staff. www.topuniversities.com/university-rankings/asian-university -rankings/2011

8 _{If only university enrollments (485,937) are considered, then the GER would be 3.6%. Note that total university enrollments as reported by}

the Ministry of Education are roughly 20,000 higher than the total given by the University Grants Commission. The commission’s figures have been used in this report with the exception of Appendix 1. However, they have been complemented by Ministry of Education statistics on degree enrollments in public and private colleges, which do not fall under the purview of the University Grants Commission. See Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of Education. 2009. Statistical Report 2009. Dhaka. Table 1.1.

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Inno

vative Strategies in Higher Education for Accelerated Human Resource De

The government’s policy framework for higher education is not well developed and is largely out of date. The principal reference is the Strategic Plan for Higher Education in Bangladesh: 2006–2026, now nearly 7 years old, which remains mostly unimplemented. Notably, the national education policy statement of 2010 devoted just three pages to its chapter on higher education and proposed strategies that seem more like a statement of good intentions. One can only conclude that higher education is not currently a government priority.

The state invests only about 2.2% of GDP in education. It accords even less priority to higher education, assigning it only 11.0% of the education sector recurrent budget. Nevertheless, public institutions are funded almost entirely by the state. In the public universities, expenditure per student is low ($664). In the publicly funded colleges and Open University, it is much lower. But public university education, including graduate programs, is provided essentially free of charge. Highly charged political dynamics on campus preclude the possibility of introducing student tuition fees in the foreseeable future. Current methods for determining budget allocations to the public universities are neither rational nor transparent. Budgets are reportedly determined on the basis of historical precedent as modified by negotiation and pressure from the vice-chancellors. Thus, budgeting has no strategic purpose, and university strategic planning is not generally practiced.

In its present form, university governance is as much a mechanism for control as for leadership. University vice-chancellors are appointed by either the President or Prime Minister and their loyalties tend to lie with them before university stakeholders. Most members of the University Grants Commission are appointed either directly by government or indirectly by government in the case of the three vice-chancellors and three ministry representatives who also serve on the commission. University councils, however, draw one-quarter of their members from government appointees and three-quarters from internal constituencies such as staff and students. Consequently, the end users and consumers of university outputs (graduates and research) are weakly represented in the governance structures for higher education. From a management standpoint, the National University is bureaucratic and inefficient. University leaders readily recognize this and note that several attempts at reform have failed.

Traditional structures and controlling procedures limit the system’s relevance to national development needs. They discourage initiative and make innovation difficult. Very little research is undertaken, since only 0.2% of the higher education budget is spent on this activity. Some 63% of enrollments are concentrated in the arts, social sciences, and business studies. Although strong labor market demand for engineers is reported, only 7% of students study engineering.

The country’s higher education system appears to be somewhat out of touch with issues and trends at the international level. Staff have limited understanding of how the globalized knowledge economy functions and the key role that universities can play in boosting a country’s economic competitiveness. Likewise, the contemporary notions of public–private partnerships and university–industry links are not broadly understood or put into practice. The main problem confronting higher education in Bangladesh seems to be a lack of accountability for performance due to pervasive politicization of the system. This exists among university leaders and officers, as well as teaching staff and students. Until this problem is solved, quality and relevance are unlikely to improve.

Nepal

The development of higher education in Nepal is being stunted by the lack of sufficient attention from the government, politicization of university appointments and campus life, and a rigid controlling government bureaucracy that dampens innovation. The country’s higher education system revolves around its first and largest higher education institution, the 50-year-old Tribhuvan University, which enrolls 159,394 students, or 90% of the total, and comprises a seemingly unmanageable number of 60 branch campuses and 826 affiliated private

and community managed colleges. The affiliation requirement for all colleges allows Tribhuvan University to

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Higher Education in South Asia and Be

levy service charges on its associated colleges, generating an important source of income.9 _{These charges can be}

onerous, amounting to as much as 10% of the private college’s annual revenues. In addition, Tribhuvan University imposes a standard curriculum on its colleges and administers all student examinations. The affiliation mechanism imposes homogeneity in teaching at all colleges, and effectively inhibits innovation in pedagogy and curriculum. Within Tribhuvan University, two distinct subsystems of higher education coexist. One comprises instruction in sciences, engineering, and medicine. It attracts the best students, admits them through a competitive entrance exam, charges them significant fees to supplement government allocations, is characterized by high graduation rates, and sends its graduates into the labor market—often overseas—with success. The other subsystem encompasses instruction in arts, humanities, and social sciences. Its students are generally less capable, admissions are open and require aspirants only to have completed secondary education, almost no student fees are charged, the dropout rate is high, and its graduates are frequently unable to obtain employment.

After Tribhuvan University come seven other much smaller universities. One is a well-regarded nonprofit, nongovernment institution. Another four are nominally public, but cover a significant portion of their operating costs through student tuition fees. The other two are located in the underserved western part of the country, but are quite new and currently boast little more than an appointed vice-chancellor with a government mandate and high expectations from citizens.

The government’s lack of attention to higher education is manifested in (i) the steadily declining share of the education budget, which is no more than 10% at present and represents an expenditure per public university student of just $233, possibly among the lowest in the world; (ii) the absence of a national policy or strategy for higher education; and (iii) its reluctance to confront the politically contentious student and staff trade unions, which regularly disrupt the academic calendar, extend the time necessary for students to graduate, and effectively block any effort at higher education reform.

In Nepal, higher education remains a poorly utilized resource. A higher education GER of 10% is probably too low to support the gains in economic competitiveness necessary to raise Nepal’s performance among the community of nations. National development priorities highlight agriculture, hydropower, and tourism, but university graduates in agriculture, animal science, and forestry number roughly 325 per year, only 1% of total graduates. Electrical engineers are almost as scarce. Private college proposals to initiate courses in tourism, hotel management, and hospitality languish for years awaiting approval from their affiliated universities. Moreover, in spite of the rhetoric about the need to boost agriculture and tourism, no additional funding has flowed into the universities to produce the skilled human resources and research necessary to support these priorities.

Overall, enrollments in science, engineering, agriculture, and medicine comprise less than 15% of the total, and constraints on physical facilities prevent their expansion. Public–private partnerships are virtually unknown and fail to attract government incentives. This limits the opportunities for universities to pursue knowledge sharing and technology transfer links with industry. The obstacles to modernizing higher education and aligning it with the needs of the knowledge economy are unlikely to be overcome without a change in government’s stance in relation to the role of higher education in the nation’s future development.