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In attempting to improve the socio-economic status of Maori while simultaneously depoliticising Maori proposals for se�-determination, the state has frequently employed the meta-principle social justice in Maori Affairs policy and social policy more generally. This term conjures up strong emotions, both in those who are being treated unjustly and those who mobilise around the unjust treatment of others, thus proving useful in building solidarity and good will amongst diverse peoples. There are, however, two main problems with such recourse to social justice. First, social justice has commonly been associated with the distribution of material and social goods, failing to take into account the socio-political context in which distribution takes place. Second, social justice has traditionally been intimately tied to liberal­ democracy and, in turn, the concept of the nation-state.

To begin, it is necessary to stress that, while very few democratic governments would actively create policies that aimed to be 'unjust', what is meant by just' can differ widely. Nevertheless, social justice is most frequently associated with some abstract degree of fairness, usually in relation to the distribution of material and social goods (see Carens 2 000:8) . The criteria proposed as a basis for distributive justice are complex, involving such elements as human rights, need, desert, contribution to society and hereditary status. Which criteria are selected is important because distribution based on need, for example, is likely to be much more egalitarian than one based on desert. Yet, need-based distribution would be less egalitarian than that based on human or citizenship rights (Mullard and Spicker 1998:2 1 1) . In plural societies, deftning the criteria for justice can thus be highly problematic, due to the fact that what may be a fair policy for one group may be unjust with respect to another (Sen

1992:xi; Drake 200 1 : 1 1) .

Liberal understandings of distributive justice have traditionally been regarded as synonymous with a social justice discourse. Influenced by the works of leading

liberal theorists, particularly Rawls ( 1999:6), a 'liberal-democratic' version of social

j ustice is founded on the premise that all individuals are fundamentally alike and have the same needs with respect to material goods (income, housing, financial assets) and social positions Uobs, educational and health status) . It assumes that what we have in common as morally autonomous individuals is more important as a basis for recognition and reward than what divides us as members of fixed groups.

This liberal-democratic understanding of social justice constrains the extent of state intervention in the form of social policy because equality is usually limited to equality of potential scope for freedom (Drake 200 1 : 2 3) . 'Simple equality', in which all individuals are regarded as having the same basic needs, is thus the baseline measure advocated to alleviate such inequalities. The 'solution' to any unjust balance is to compensate or normalise disadvantaged individuals by supplying them with basic material and social goods (Gale 2000:2 55) . While the Aotearoa New Zealand welfare­ state has been much more extensive and universalist than the residualist model described, this form of distributive justice has long played an influential role in Maori Affairs policy. It was more dominant up to the 1960s and 19 70s, particularly when special Maori programmes were merged with general services, but main streaming in the 1990s was also based on this form of simple eqUality.

Important variations of this basic liberal-democratic model have been articulated as a result of continuing debate regarding the freedoms and the minimum material and social goods that individuals need as a basis for determining and justifying any unequal distribution. In particular, the over-emphasis that Rawls ( 1 999) has placed on the social goods that individuals possess and his under-emphasis on the processes by which individuals produce and acquire these goods has been disputed (Gale 2000:254-256).

This has caused liberal theorists from the political right, such as Nozick ( 1974: 90-9 1), to argue that social justice should be first concerned with fairness in the competition for goods, rather than as a matter of equalising possessions. Such 'reparative' or 'retributive' justice is based on the same principles as the liberal-

democratic version of distributive justice described above, except that compensation is endorsed for those unfairly victimised by past actions and thus hindered in their ability to competely equally for resources (Gale 2000:256-258) . The Aotearoa New Zealand Treaty claims settlement process has reflected this form of justice, in rewarding compensation to Maori claimants for colonial practices that resulted in loss of land and control over resources. Despite rhetoric highlighting the ongoing indigenous rights and Treaty rights that Maori possess, the settlement of Treaty claims has been largely based on the belief that once compensation has been rewarded, then Maori will be able to compete fairly for material goods and social positions.

A third 'social-democratic' variant of distributive justice articulated by the political left has endorsed differential treatment for disadvantaged individuals and groups so that 'equal outcomes' or 'equity', rather than equality of opportunity, might be achieved. In allowing that different people possess different needs, yet have unequal resources at their disposal to meet these needs, attainment of social justice is based on an understanding of 'complex equality' in which the differential distribution of social and material goods for different people is possible. Equity and access to equality of opportunity are the baseline measures and involve the state playing a significant role in achieving equal opportunities and outcomes (Gale 2000:255; Drake 200 1 : 24-25) .

Labour governments in Aotearoa New Zealand have traditionally attempted, and succeeded to varying degrees, to break the residual model mold with this kind of focus in the general social policy arena. In Maori Affairs, however, both National and Labour governments have endorsed a form of biculturalism based on an equity approach that accepts particularism over universalism, although these often sit in tension with each other (Fleras and Spoonley 1999 :247) . For example, the universalising concept of mainstreaming identified above as situated within a liberal-democratic justice framework was implemented at the same time that the National-led government dramatically increased the number of Maori providers delivering services for Maori in a Maori way, which reflected a more particularist approach.

A social-democratic framework leads to social policy based o n a social

citizenship model of welfare provision that incorporates the belief that citizens should be universally entitled to access to social services and benefits to achieve well-being (Drake 200 1 : 24-25) . W hile acknowledgment is made that different needs may require differential distribution, the social-democratic model thus poses no threat to the assumption that justice be achieved within a common institutional framework.

This is because both liberal- and social-democratic, as well as reparative, forms of distributive justice presuppose a bounded world within which distributions take place and that world is the political community defined as the nation-state (Walzer 1 996:242) . Indeed, Kymlicka (200 1 : 225, emphasis in the original) notes that 'liberal nationlists', who seek to explain the link between liberal democracy and nationhood, argue social justice "can best be achieved - or perhaps only achieved - within national political units". Calls for social justice have thus ironically led to

greater injustice, in that they have marginalised Maori desires to be recognised as sovereign peoples. Certainly, international evidence has suggested that policies based on the goals of distributive justice frequently contradict the rights of indigenous peoples (see Kymlicka 200 1 : 134- 135) .

A fourth form of social justice, emerging from the political left in the latter years of the twentieth century, has not always directly addressed this assumption about the inseparability of social justice and the nation-state, but has certainly opened it up for debate. Various models (e.g. Young 1990; Taylor 1 992; Fraser 1 998) exist that might be said to constitute a form of 'recognitive justice'. They each attempt to represent justice not just as an abstract, formulaic defmition, but as a concrete, social artifact or variable property of specific spheres of activity within each particular society (Carens

2000:8; Gale 2000 : 2 59; Drake 200 1 :9) .

A recognitive model argues that social justice should be measured in terms of what people do, rather just what they have. This is important, because distributive justice tends to focus simply on scarce resources (jobs and income,), while ignoring the structures, including the cultural politics of social institutions, that have defmed and

created scarcity in the first place (see Chapter Seven) . Recognitive justice accounts for these contextual factors, as well as taking differences seriously, recognising the collective rights of groups, supporting models of self-determination and making a commitment to inclusiveness through meaningful participation in decision-making processes (see Gale 2000:260) . It does not necessarily move away from a distributive approach in terms of the content of policy programmes, but recognitive justice at least focuses on the appropriate decision-making processes for deciding policy direction.

Alongside a recognitive model of justice sit new theories of rights. These reflect growing support, even amongst liberal theorists, for a revisioning of citizenship that

acknowledges the cultural pluralism and diversity that typify contemporary society (Shafir 1998:26) . Kymlicka (200 1 : 42) has noted that the collective rights of minorities

have been increasingly recognised and protected by liberal-democratic governments around the world under a form of 'liberal culturalism', but that the notion of

permanent communalism is theoretically incompatible with the individualistic focus of

traditional liberal theory (Van Dyke 1995: 1 88) . This is because such theory holds that

belonging to a collectivity consciously demands some discipline and sacrifice and thus limits individual freedom and choice (Sardar 1999:49). Kymlicka (200 1 :5;42-45) has

suggested that current practice regarding minority rights evolved in a theoretical vacuum with no clear understanding of long-term goals or underlying principles.

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Adopted as adhoc compromises to particular problems (for exampl�, indigenous or minority group protest) , for reasons of stability rather than justice, these have often failed to adequately address the issues raised, particularly by national minorities.

A crucial element in emerging debate about recognitive justice and minority rights is increasing consensus "that in order to unlock the inclusive potential of citizenship, the concept must be freed from its association with the nation-state" (Faulks 2000:8). In other words, there should be recognition that conflation of the cultural-political idea of nation with the civic elements of citizenship acts as an exclusionary discourse for indigenous peoples and other national minorities who constitute 'nations within' (Faulks 2000:30). Instead, 'differentiated' (Carens 2000),

'multicultural' (Castles and Davidson 2000) , 'nested nationalities' (Miller 2000) or

'multinational' (Kymlicka 200 1) forms of citizenship have been promoted, based on the belief that these are more likely to encourage civic cohesion than current alternatives (see Carens 2000: 195). Debate continues, however, as to whether the traditional priority on universal, individual rights should be supplemented by explicit, group­ differentiated, cultural rights (see Chapter Eight) .

Despite a growing literature concerned with such issues, Aotearoa New Zealand goverments have remained concerned with distributive justice and have not made subtantial movement towards a recognitive model of social justice, despite increasing 'recognition' of the Treaty rights of Maori. Fisk ( 1989:4) has indicated that the pattern of justice adopted by the state will be the one that serves its need for stability in relation to the pressures it faces. Yet, inevitably, the pursuit of justice sets the state at odds with itself because it is often in conflict with its other, often economic, goals. The pattern of justice is often therefore narrow and grudging, resulting in a situation where it may "disarm dissent without eliminating dissatisfaction" (Fisk 1989: 13).

This certainly appears to have been the case in Aotearoa New Zealand, where reference to social justice in relation to Maori has aimed to depoliticise Maori claims to self-determination by situating them within a framework of equal opportunity or equity that draws upon traditional citizenship discourses. Calling for social justice has thus been an important means by which the state has built solidarity and support for policies focused on 'closing the gaps' between Maori and non-Maori. Yet, it has simultaneously depoliticised Maori calls for self-determination which, ironically, may be the only real 'solution' to such disparities.