1. PLANTEAMIENTO DEL PROBLEMA
2.3. RECREACIÓN AMBIENTAL EN EL CONTEXTO ESCOLAR
In June 1997 John Howard could confidently state that
We do remain particularly concerned about the human rights situation in East Timor. A confrontational approach, however, and refusal to accept its place as an integral part of Indonesia, will not bring the right results for those we wish to assist.1
He was restating a 20 year old bipartisan orthodoxy in Australian parliamentary politics, an orthodoxy which seemed secure. And yet just over two years later,
Australian military forces were deployed to secure the independence of East Timor, a situation previously declared to be impossible and contrary to Australia’s interests. While all commentators agree on the dramatic nature of this policy reversal,2 there is little consensus as to its causes. Some writers have emphasised the role played by popular pressure on the Howard government, while others have stressed the intrinsic moral imperative for intervention. The second half of this chapter examines this debate, and argues that both of the predominant ways of explaining Australia’s involvement in East Timor are inadequate. First, however, it is necessary to examine in some detail the process by which the Howard government arrived at its final position on East Timor.
1
Transcript of address by John Howard hosted by the Foreign Policy Association, New York, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, 30.06.1997 (accessed 14.03.2007,
http://www.pm.gov.au/media/Speech/1997/fpa.cfm). This was also the position of the Foreign Affairs White Paper, released in August 1997, In the national interest: Australia’s foreign and trade policy White Paper, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1997, p. 62.
2
From varying perspectives see James Cotton, ‘The East Timor commitment and its consequences,’ in
The national interest in a global era: Australia in world affairs 1996-2000, ed. James Cotton and John Ravenhill, South Melbourne, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 213; Clinton Fernandes, Reluctant saviour: Australia, Indonesia and the independence of East Timor, Melbourne, Scribe Publications, 2004, p. 1.
Pressure mounts for a change in policy
By late 1997 pressure was beginning to mount for the Howard government to reassess its policy on East Timor. The East Timorese independence movement was given a significant boost in 1996, when José Ramos-Horta, Fretilin’s (Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor) international spokesperson, and Carlos Belo, the Bishop of Dili, were jointly awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. The award conferred legitimacy and drew media attention around the world. By early 1997 the United States was becoming increasingly critical of the Suharto government, in particular over human rights abuses in East Timor, as well as the blatantly undemocratic parliamentary elections held in May. The US also began fostering ties with
opposition groups it saw as becoming powerful in a post-Suharto Indonesia.3 This approach, however, was rejected by Australia, and in June Howard explicitly justified his stance by reference to Indonesia’s economic progress and political stability.4
However, the Australian press began to pay increasing attention to East Timor. There was a steady stream of articles and editorials about East Timor throughout 1997, prompted by events such as the visits of United Nations (UN) officials to East Timor, or criticisms of Indonesia by the US government.5 Bishop Belo especially began to be portrayed as a morally worthy leader.6 But attention was focused on human rights abuses, rather than the possibility of a fundamental settlement to East Timor’s predicament. This began to change when South African President Nelson Mandela visited Indonesia in September, and met jailed resistance leader Xanana Gusmão. Significantly, this visit came shortly after chaotic Indonesian parliamentary elections, and at the beginning of Indonesia’s economic crisis, when questions were starting to be asked over Suharto’s future. In this context, the possibility of resolving the East
3
As discussed in the previous chapter, US concerns over human rights were linked to a wider reform agenda for Indonesia. See David Sanger, ‘In the shadow of scandal, U.S. challenges a Suharto project,’ The New York Times, 14 June 1997, p. 5; Tim Weiner, ‘US has spent $26 million since ‘95 on Suharto opponents,’ The New York Times, 20 May 1998, p. 11; Louise Williams, ‘Australia cool on Soeharto critics,’ The Sydney Morning Herald, 20 March 1997, p. 10; Louise Williams, ‘Australia stands by Soeharto, says envoy,’ The Sydney Morning Herald, 18 April 1997, p. 8; Louise Williams, ‘US attacks Jakarta poll,’ The Sydney Morning Herald, 2 June 1997, p. 1.
4
Transcript of address by John Howard hosted by the Foreign Policy Association, New York.
5
For example see Jennifer Hewitt, ‘Rights review lashes Jakarta,’ The Age, 1 February 1997, p. 15; Colleen Ryan, ‘US-Indonesia rift widens over East Timor call,’ The Australian Financial Review, 12 June 1997, p. 12; Patrick Walters, ‘Police hold 48 in Timor UN rally,’ The Australian, 24 March 1997, p. 6.
6
For example see Paul Mcgeough, ‘Timor apostle,’ The Sydney Morning Herald, 5 April 1997, p. Spectrum 1.
Timor issue, for example by giving it autonomous status, began to be considered.7 After Suharto’s fall, there were increasing calls in the press for the East Timor issue to be solved permanently, as part of the shift to democracy.8 By November, even Greg Sheridan, a prominent supporter of the Suharto government, had come to see change in Timor as inevitable.9
In Australian politics, the first shift in East Timor policy was not made by the government, but rather by Laurie Brereton, Labor Party spokesperson on Foreign Affairs.10 In August 1997 Brereton proposed a policy which stated that
It is Labor’s considered view that no lasting solution to the conflict in East Timor is likely in the absence of a process of negotiation through which the people of East Timor can exercise their right of self-determination.11
This position was ratified in January 1998 at the Labor Party federal conference, by which time Indonesia’s economic and political crisis had begun in earnest.
The change in Labor’s policy was not without cost, igniting a vicious and public argument in party circles. Brereton intensified his rhetoric on the issue in February 1999, publicly denouncing both the Labor and Liberal parties’ records on East Timor over the previous quarter century as a ‘long and tragic history’, singling out former Labor Prime Ministers Whitlam, Hawke and Keating for criticism.12 Whitlam responded sharply, stating that
The shadow minister for foreign affairs is the least educated foreign minister or shadow foreign minister that the Liberals or Labor Party have ever had… I will not be blackguarded by the shallow, shabby, shonky foreign affairs spokesman on our side in the Federal Parliament.13
7
For example see Editorial, ‘Mandela and Gusmao,’ The Age, 16 September 1997, p. 16; Louise Williams, ‘Timor freedom leader spurns release: ‘I’m more use in jail’,’ The Sydney Morning Herald, 12 September 1997, p. 1.
8
For example, see Editorial, ‘A breakthrough on East Timor,’ The Canberra Times, 7 August 1998, p. 10; Editorial, ‘One more chance to heal East Timor,’ The Australian, 2 June 1998, p. 12; Editorial, ‘Timor moves,’ The Sydney Morning Herald, 11 June 1998, p. 16; Lindsay Murdoch, ‘Now, can East Timor finally be freed?’ The Age, 27 May 1998, p. 13.
9
Greg Sheridan, ‘East Timor independence is only a matter of when,’ The Australian, 13 November 1998, p. 13.
10
See James Cotton, East Timor, Australia and regional order: Intervention and its aftermath in Southeast Asia, London, Routledge Curzon, 2004, p. 17; Fernandes, Reluctant saviour, p. 31.
11
Cited in Don Greenlees, ‘Labor policy ups ante for autonomy in East Timor,’ The Australian, 18 October 1997, p. 5.
12
Paul Daley, ‘Whitlam’s Timor stance ‘tragic’,’ The Age, 5 February 1999, p. 4.
13
Cited in Paul Daley, ‘Liberal glee over Labor Timor spat,’ The Age, 3 March 1999, p. 6. See also Greg Sheridan, ‘Gough’s rapier wit skewers Brereton,’ The Australian, 24 February 1999, p. 1.
There was also some opposition within parliamentary Labor to Brereton’s forthright stance, particularly from then backbencher Kevin Rudd, who opposed Brereton’s position in January 1999 that UN peacekeepers should be present in East Timor before the ballot, a division played upon by the Liberals.14 Labor’s embarrassingly public debates were evidence of the deep divisions within the party over the issue, as well as the extent to which figures such as Whitlam and Keating had staked their personal reputation on the issue. But they also revealed the importance Brereton placed on updating what he thought was an increasingly out of date policy.
Brereton, convener of the group ‘Parliamentarians for East Timor’, was undoubtedly prompted by political principles, as well as a desire to bring Labor policy into line with what probably the majority of Labor supporters had always felt was the correct position. But more significantly, he was also attempting to move Labor policy into alignment with the new domestic situation in Indonesia. Labor leaders Kim Beazley and Gareth Evans, former Defence and Foreign Affairs ministers respectively, supported Labor’s policy shift, although they continued to defend their previous record.15 Brereton highlighted the need to build links with democratic groups opposed to Suharto, as well as playing up the possibility of a new settlement in East Timor post-Suharto, particularly since leaders such as Abdurrachman Wahid
supported a change of policy.16 Labor was attempting to show that it had a more realistic policy than the Howard government in relation to Indonesia’s changed situation, stressing the ‘underlying continuity between Whitlam’s approach… and that of the Howard government today…’17 It was a position borne out over the next eight months.
Shifts in Australian policy, May 1998 to August 1999
Although it initially rejected Labor’s new East Timor policy, the Howard
government was finally also forced to react to the changing situation in Indonesia. While the Liberal Party avoided such sharp internal conflict as Labor, their policy shift was eventually nearly as dramatic, and was no less a repudiation of positions
14
Cotton, ‘The East Timor commitment and its consequences,’ p. 18; Fernandes, Reluctant saviour, pp. 61-62.
15
Lincoln Wright, ‘Labor’s brawl on E. Timor,’ The Canberra Times, 5 February 1999, p. 1.
16
Anthony Burke, ‘Labor could be set for a backflip on East Timor,’ The Canberra Times, 22 December 1997.
17
Cited in Daley, ‘Whitlam’s Timor stance ‘tragic’.’ See also Paul Daley, ‘No danger, new man,’ The Age, 13 February 1999, p. 6.
formerly declared to be fundamental to Australia’s foreign policy. The pressure for change came in part from the discussion of the issue in the Australian media and from Labor’s new stance.18 But more importantly, Howard and Downer departed from previous policy by making direct contact with a number of East Timorese leaders, as detailed in the following two pages. These contacts revealed that the problems in East Timor were unlikely to be resolved without a genuine act of self- determination. This reality on the ground, coupled with Habibie’s decision to force the pace in reaching a settlement, forced the Australian government to continually reassess and refine its East Timor policy between May 1998 and the ballot on independence in August 1999.
When Habibie came to power in May 1998, there was no immediate change in the Australian approach to Timor. Downer’s first statement on the issue called for a ‘greater degree of participation by the public in the political process’ across
Indonesia, and proposed that in East Timor there should be a reduction in the military presence and a greater degree of control by local people. But, as Downer himself emphasised, this was no more than both sides of Australian politics had been saying for years, and he refused to call for the release of East Timorese political prisoners.19 By June this attitude had started to shift. A diplomatic cable from June 23rd shows that while Australia wanted the issue settled internally, it was thought that this could only be achieved through genuine negotiation with East Timorese independence leaders.20 Accordingly, the government began making tentative approaches both to their Indonesian counterparts and, for the first time, to leading independence figures. In June, John McCarthy became the first Australian Ambassador to visit East Timor since the Indonesian occupation. Unlike previous visits by Australian officials to East Timor, McCarthy did not only speak to supporters of integration, but also sought out leaders of the independence campaign,
18
As discussed by Fernandes, Reluctant saviour, p. 31.
19
Robert Garran, ‘Downer overlooks Timorese prisoners,’ The Australian, 25 May 1998, p. 6.
20
The cable is partially reproduced in David Goldsworthy, ‘East Timor,’ in Facing North: A century of Australian engagement with Asia: Volume 2: 1970s to 2000, ed. Peter Edwards and David Goldsworthy, Carlton, Melbourne University Press, 2003, p. 225.
focusing on trying to understand the practicalities of costing and
administrating a new country, and seeking ideas from locals on how they view neighbourhood relations under such a scenario.21
This was followed by a visit by Australia’s military attaché in November, the first such visit since 1984, in part to investigate a massacre which took place that month in the town of Alas, but also to renew contacts with Indonesian military personnel.22 A crucial issue was the role to be played by Xanana Gusmão, universally recognised as the key East Timorese leader. In August, Downer reversed his previous position, and called for the release of Gusmão, saying that he ‘has a central role in the resolution of the East Timor issue.’23 Meanwhile, Ambassador McCarthy had been regularly meeting Gusmão in prison, from which he reportedly ‘came away
impressed with [Gusmão’s] leadership qualities and his realism.’24 Part of this realism was to agree not to prejudice the interests of oil companies already operating in the Timor Sea, an agreement subsequently used by Australia to pressure East Timor during negotiations over resources in the area (see Chapter Five).25 McCarthy was not Gusmão’s first Australian visitor, however; a representative of mining giant BHP had already paid his respects, and also received assurances over the security of the company’s interests in an autonomous or independent East Timor.26
In July, after consulting with his counterpart Ali Alatas, Downer initiated a survey of opinion amongst key East Timorese leaders with a variety of positions on
independence.27 The results, delivered in August, did not bode well for either the Indonesian or Australian positions. Integration with Indonesia, even with special autonomous status, remained unacceptable to the majority of East Timorese as a permanent solution. Moreover, almost everyone consulted agreed that a genuine act
21
Lansell Taudevin, East Timor: Too little too late, Potts Point, Duffy & Snellgrove, 1999, pp. 155. Taudevin, an Australian aid worker, was an unofficial source of intelligence for the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) in East Timor.
22
Cotton, ‘The East Timor commitment and its consequences,’ pp. 111-113; John Martinkus, A dirty little war, Sydney, Random House Australia, 2001.
23
Robert Garran, ‘Downer call to free rebel,’ The Australian, 20 August 1998, p. 5.
24
East Timor: Final report of the Senate foreign affairs, defence and trade references committee, Australian Parliament, 2000, p. 176; Goldsworthy, ‘East Timor,’ p. 226. See also Lindsay Murdoch, ‘Australia in secret E Timor peace role,’ The Age, 18 July 1998, p. 1.
25
Interview with José Teixeira, 21.11.2007, Dili.
26
Following Indonesian government protests, this employee was relocated from Jakarta. Cotton, East Timor, Australia and Regional Order, p. 17; David Jenkins, ‘BHP talks to jailed guerilla leader,’ The Sydney Morning Herald, 20 August 1998, p. 8.
27
See Goldsworthy, ‘East Timor,’ p. 226; Don Greenlees and Robert Garran, Deliverance: the inside story of East Timor’s fight for freedom, Crows Nest, Allen & Unwin, 2002, pp. 82-83.
of self-determination was needed to gain popular acceptance of any change in East Timor’s status.28 As such, Habibie’s proposal of unilaterally declared autonomy would not solve the issue. This knowledge seems to have had a major impact on the conduct of Australian policy from late 1998.29
In November, staff from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) were instructed to draw up potential options for a dramatically changed Australian policy on East Timor. Attention focused on the example of New Caledonia. Under the Matignon Accords of 1988, France had granted autonomy to its colony, along with a promise of an eventual act of self-determination, which is due to occur sometime after 2014. Early in December, Howard and Downer decided that Australia would encourage Indonesia to accept a similar arrangement in which, after an intervening period of autonomy lasting ‘many years’, the East Timorese would be offered a choice between independence and permanent autonomous status.30 This was a major turning point in Australian foreign policy. As early as May 25th, Howard had
indicated that he was not averse to an act of self-determination.31 But to actually push for such an act was to abandon Australian policy since 1975. The new support for an act of self-determination was conveyed to Habibie in a letter from Howard on December 21st.32 Unsurprisingly, it could not be kept secret for long. Knowing that the Indonesian press was about to go public with the story, Downer announced Australia’s new position on January 12th 1999, saying that
The rapidly evolving situation in Indonesia and on the ground in East Timor demands a constructive response to the question of the future of East Timor… I am of the view that the long term prospects for reconciliation in East Timor would be best served by the holding of an act of self-
determination at some future time, following a substantial period of autonomy.33
28
A summary of the consultation’s results is published in East Timor in Transition 1998-2000: An Australian policy challenge, Canberra, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2001, pp. 177-179.
29
And perhaps also the thinking of Indonesian officials, with whom the result of the consultation were shared. See the evidence of a DFAT official, East Timor: Final report of the Senate foreign affairs, defence and trade references committee, p. 176.
30
See East Timor in Transition 1998-2000, pp. 29-32; Cotton, East Timor, Australia and Regional Order, p. 18; Goldsworthy, ‘East Timor,’ p. 227-229; Greenlees and Garran, Deliverance, pp. 84-87.
31
Gervase Greene, ‘Howard in freedom call on East Timor,’ The Age, 26 May 1998, p. 4.
32
The text of the letter is reproduced in East Timor in Transition 1998-2000, pp. 181-182.
33
Despite the dramatic break with past policy, Australia’s somewhat cautious proposal soon became outdated, as Habibie announced in late January that he wanted East Timor’s future settled by the year 2000. Australia was not directly involved with planning the act of self-determination, the details of which were agreed between Indonesia, Portugal and the UN. These arrangements were announced on May 5th, with the UN assuming responsibility for organising the ballot.34 However, Australia