1.2. Los inicios de la exportación
1.2.4. Recursos necesarios para la exportación
We tested
corporate greenwashing through suspicion of strategic behavior depends on the level of dispositional skepticism (the proposed moderator) by means of
procedure Preacher
corrected and accelerated intervals), revealed a 95% confidence interval that did not include zero (lower CI
Mediation
We performed a series of regression analyses to examine whether suspicion of strategic behavior mediated the effect of communicated motive on perceived greenwashing. As the results a
both perceived greenwashing ( = .48, p
perceived corporate greenwas = .44,
remained statistically significant, but was significantly reduced ( magnitude of this indirect
(partial) mediation. Preacher
intervals), which revealed a 95
= .22; upper CI = 1.17). Thus, in further support of Hypothesis
the regression and bootstrap analyses indicate that the effect of communicated motive on perceived corporate
behavior (see Figure
Figure 4.3.
Suspicion of strategic behavior (partially) mediating the effect of communicated motive on perceived corporate greenwashing in Experiment
Moderated media
We tested
corporate greenwashing through suspicion of strategic behavior depends on the level of dispositional skepticism (the proposed moderator) by means of
procedure Preacher
corrected and accelerated intervals), revealed a 95% confidence interval that did not include zero (lower CI
Mediation
We performed a series of regression analyses to examine whether suspicion of strategic behavior mediated the effect of communicated motive on perceived greenwashing. As the results a
both perceived greenwashing (
p < .001). In addition, suspicion of strategic behavior had a significant effect on perceived corporate greenwas
= .44, p
remained statistically significant, but was significantly reduced ( magnitude of this indirect
(partial) mediation. Preacher &
intervals), which revealed a 95
= .22; upper CI = 1.17). Thus, in further support of Hypothesis
the regression and bootstrap analyses indicate that the effect of communicated motive on perceived corporate
behavior (see Figure
Figure 4.3.
Suspicion of strategic behavior (partially) mediating the effect of communicated motive on perceived corporate greenwashing in Experiment
Moderated media
We tested
corporate greenwashing through suspicion of strategic behavior depends on the level of dispositional skepticism (the proposed moderator) by means of
procedure Preacher &
corrected and accelerated intervals), revealed a 95% confidence interval that did not include zero (lower CI
Mediation
We performed a series of regression analyses to examine whether suspicion of strategic behavior mediated the effect of communicated motive on perceived greenwashing. As the results a
both perceived greenwashing (
< .001). In addition, suspicion of strategic behavior had a significant effect on perceived corporate greenwas
< .001). The effect of communicated motive on perceived greenwashing remained statistically significant, but was significantly reduced (
magnitude of this indirect (partial) mediation.
& Hayes, 2008) using intervals), which revealed a 95
= .22; upper CI = 1.17). Thus, in further support of Hypothesis
the regression and bootstrap analyses indicate that the effect of communicated motive on perceived corporate
behavior (see Figure
Suspicion of strategic behavior (partially) mediating the effect of communicated motive on perceived corporate greenwashing in Experiment
Moderated media
We tested whether the indirect effect of communicated motive on perceived corporate greenwashing through suspicion of strategic behavior depends on the level of dispositional skepticism (the proposed moderator) by means of
procedure to test for moderated mediation & Hayes, 2008)
corrected and accelerated intervals), revealed a 95% confidence interval that did not include zero (lower CI
We performed a series of regression analyses to examine whether suspicion of strategic behavior mediated the effect of communicated motive on perceived greenwashing. As the results a
both perceived greenwashing (
< .001). In addition, suspicion of strategic behavior had a significant effect on perceived corporate greenwas
< .001). The effect of communicated motive on perceived greenwashing remained statistically significant, but was significantly reduced (
magnitude of this indirect (partial) mediation.
Hayes, 2008) using intervals), which revealed a 95
= .22; upper CI = 1.17). Thus, in further support of Hypothesis
the regression and bootstrap analyses indicate that the effect of communicated motive on perceived corporate
behavior (see Figure
Suspicion of strategic behavior (partially) mediating the effect of communicated motive on perceived corporate greenwashing in Experiment
Moderated media
whether the indirect effect of communicated motive on perceived corporate greenwashing through suspicion of strategic behavior depends on the level of dispositional skepticism (the proposed moderator) by means of
to test for moderated mediation Hayes, 2008)
corrected and accelerated intervals), revealed a 95% confidence interval that did not include zero (lower CI
We performed a series of regression analyses to examine whether suspicion of strategic behavior mediated the effect of communicated motive on perceived greenwashing. As the results a
both perceived greenwashing (
< .001). In addition, suspicion of strategic behavior had a significant effect on perceived corporate greenwas
< .001). The effect of communicated motive on perceived greenwashing remained statistically significant, but was significantly reduced (
magnitude of this indirect
(partial) mediation. This finding was supported by a Hayes, 2008) using
intervals), which revealed a 95
= .22; upper CI = 1.17). Thus, in further support of Hypothesis
the regression and bootstrap analyses indicate that the effect of communicated motive on perceived corporate
behavior (see Figure 4.3).
Suspicion of strategic behavior (partially) mediating the effect of communicated motive on perceived corporate greenwashing in Experiment
Moderated mediation
whether the indirect effect of communicated motive on perceived corporate greenwashing through suspicion of strategic behavior depends on the level of dispositional skepticism (the proposed moderator) by means of
to test for moderated mediation Hayes, 2008)
corrected and accelerated intervals), revealed a 95% confidence interval that did not include zero (lower CI = .25; upper CI = 1.16) and identified that the indirect effect was We performed a series of regression analyses to examine whether suspicion of strategic behavior mediated the effect of communicated motive on perceived greenwashing. As the results a
both perceived greenwashing (
< .001). In addition, suspicion of strategic behavior had a significant effect on perceived corporate greenwas
< .001). The effect of communicated motive on perceived greenwashing remained statistically significant, but was significantly reduced (
magnitude of this indirect
This finding was supported by a Hayes, 2008) using
intervals), which revealed a 95
= .22; upper CI = 1.17). Thus, in further support of Hypothesis
the regression and bootstrap analyses indicate that the effect of communicated motive on perceived corporate
3).
Suspicion of strategic behavior (partially) mediating the effect of communicated motive on perceived corporate greenwashing in Experiment
tion
whether the indirect effect of communicated motive on perceived corporate greenwashing through suspicion of strategic behavior depends on the level of dispositional skepticism (the proposed moderator) by means of
to test for moderated mediation Hayes, 2008). This bootstrap analysis (
corrected and accelerated intervals), revealed a 95% confidence interval that did not = .25; upper CI = 1.16) and identified that the indirect effect was We performed a series of regression analyses to examine whether suspicion of strategic behavior mediated the effect of communicated motive on perceived greenwashing. As the results a
both perceived greenwashing (β
< .001). In addition, suspicion of strategic behavior had a significant effect on perceived corporate greenwashing (controlling for the effect of communicated motive) < .001). The effect of communicated motive on perceived greenwashing remained statistically significant, but was significantly reduced (
magnitude of this indirect effect was significant (Sobel This finding was supported by a Hayes, 2008) using
intervals), which revealed a 95% confidence interval that did not include zero (lower CI = .22; upper CI = 1.17). Thus, in further support of Hypothesis
the regression and bootstrap analyses indicate that the effect of communicated motive on perceived corporate
Suspicion of strategic behavior (partially) mediating the effect of communicated motive on perceived corporate greenwashing in Experiment
whether the indirect effect of communicated motive on perceived corporate greenwashing through suspicion of strategic behavior depends on the level of dispositional skepticism (the proposed moderator) by means of
to test for moderated mediation . This bootstrap analysis (
corrected and accelerated intervals), revealed a 95% confidence interval that did not = .25; upper CI = 1.16) and identified that the indirect effect was We performed a series of regression analyses to examine whether suspicion of strategic behavior mediated the effect of communicated motive on perceived greenwashing. As the results above already showed, communicated motive affected
β = .59,
< .001). In addition, suspicion of strategic behavior had a significant effect on hing (controlling for the effect of communicated motive) < .001). The effect of communicated motive on perceived greenwashing remained statistically significant, but was significantly reduced (
effect was significant (Sobel This finding was supported by a
Hayes, 2008) using 10000 resamples (bias corrected and accelerated % confidence interval that did not include zero (lower CI = .22; upper CI = 1.17). Thus, in further support of Hypothesis
the regression and bootstrap analyses indicate that the effect of communicated motive on perceived corporate greenwashing was mediated by suspicion of strategic
Suspicion of strategic behavior (partially) mediating the effect of communicated motive on perceived corporate greenwashing in Experiment
whether the indirect effect of communicated motive on perceived corporate greenwashing through suspicion of strategic behavior depends on the level of dispositional skepticism (the proposed moderator) by means of
to test for moderated mediation . This bootstrap analysis (
corrected and accelerated intervals), revealed a 95% confidence interval that did not = .25; upper CI = 1.16) and identified that the indirect effect was We performed a series of regression analyses to examine whether suspicion of strategic behavior mediated the effect of communicated motive on perceived bove already showed, communicated motive affected
= .59, p
< .001). In addition, suspicion of strategic behavior had a significant effect on hing (controlling for the effect of communicated motive) < .001). The effect of communicated motive on perceived greenwashing remained statistically significant, but was significantly reduced (
effect was significant (Sobel This finding was supported by a
10000 resamples (bias corrected and accelerated % confidence interval that did not include zero (lower CI = .22; upper CI = 1.17). Thus, in further support of Hypothesis
the regression and bootstrap analyses indicate that the effect of communicated greenwashing was mediated by suspicion of strategic
Suspicion of strategic behavior (partially) mediating the effect of communicated motive on perceived corporate greenwashing in Experiment
whether the indirect effect of communicated motive on perceived corporate greenwashing through suspicion of strategic behavior depends on the level of dispositional skepticism (the proposed moderator) by means of
to test for moderated mediation . This bootstrap analysis (
corrected and accelerated intervals), revealed a 95% confidence interval that did not = .25; upper CI = 1.16) and identified that the indirect effect was We performed a series of regression analyses to examine whether suspicion of strategic behavior mediated the effect of communicated motive on perceived bove already showed, communicated motive affected
p < .001) and suspicion of strategic behavior ( < .001). In addition, suspicion of strategic behavior had a significant effect on
hing (controlling for the effect of communicated motive) < .001). The effect of communicated motive on perceived greenwashing remained statistically significant, but was significantly reduced (
effect was significant (Sobel This finding was supported by a
10000 resamples (bias corrected and accelerated % confidence interval that did not include zero (lower CI = .22; upper CI = 1.17). Thus, in further support of Hypothesis
the regression and bootstrap analyses indicate that the effect of communicated greenwashing was mediated by suspicion of strategic
Suspicion of strategic behavior (partially) mediating the effect of communicated motive on perceived corporate greenwashing in Experiment
whether the indirect effect of communicated motive on perceived corporate greenwashing through suspicion of strategic behavior depends on the level of dispositional skepticism (the proposed moderator) by means of
to test for moderated mediation . This bootstrap analysis (
corrected and accelerated intervals), revealed a 95% confidence interval that did not = .25; upper CI = 1.16) and identified that the indirect effect was We performed a series of regression analyses to examine whether suspicion of strategic behavior mediated the effect of communicated motive on perceived bove already showed, communicated motive affected < .001) and suspicion of strategic behavior ( < .001). In addition, suspicion of strategic behavior had a significant effect on
hing (controlling for the effect of communicated motive) < .001). The effect of communicated motive on perceived greenwashing remained statistically significant, but was significantly reduced (
effect was significant (Sobel This finding was supported by a
10000 resamples (bias corrected and accelerated % confidence interval that did not include zero (lower CI = .22; upper CI = 1.17). Thus, in further support of Hypothesis
the regression and bootstrap analyses indicate that the effect of communicated greenwashing was mediated by suspicion of strategic
Suspicion of strategic behavior (partially) mediating the effect of communicated motive on perceived corporate greenwashing in Experiment 4.3.
whether the indirect effect of communicated motive on perceived corporate greenwashing through suspicion of strategic behavior depends on the level of dispositional skepticism (the proposed moderator) by means of
to test for moderated mediation . This bootstrap analysis (
corrected and accelerated intervals), revealed a 95% confidence interval that did not = .25; upper CI = 1.16) and identified that the indirect effect was We performed a series of regression analyses to examine whether suspicion of strategic behavior mediated the effect of communicated motive on perceived bove already showed, communicated motive affected < .001) and suspicion of strategic behavior ( < .001). In addition, suspicion of strategic behavior had a significant effect on
hing (controlling for the effect of communicated motive) < .001). The effect of communicated motive on perceived greenwashing remained statistically significant, but was significantly reduced (
effect was significant (Sobel This finding was supported by a
10000 resamples (bias corrected and accelerated % confidence interval that did not include zero (lower CI = .22; upper CI = 1.17). Thus, in further support of Hypothesis
the regression and bootstrap analyses indicate that the effect of communicated greenwashing was mediated by suspicion of strategic
Suspicion of strategic behavior (partially) mediating the effect of communicated motive on 3.
whether the indirect effect of communicated motive on perceived corporate greenwashing through suspicion of strategic behavior depends on the level of dispositional skepticism (the proposed moderator) by means of
to test for moderated mediation (Preacher . This bootstrap analysis (
corrected and accelerated intervals), revealed a 95% confidence interval that did not = .25; upper CI = 1.16) and identified that the indirect effect was We performed a series of regression analyses to examine whether suspicion of strategic behavior mediated the effect of communicated motive on perceived bove already showed, communicated motive affected < .001) and suspicion of strategic behavior ( < .001). In addition, suspicion of strategic behavior had a significant effect on
hing (controlling for the effect of communicated motive) < .001). The effect of communicated motive on perceived greenwashing remained statistically significant, but was significantly reduced (
effect was significant (Sobel
This finding was supported by a bootstrapped mediation analysis 10000 resamples (bias corrected and accelerated % confidence interval that did not include zero (lower CI = .22; upper CI = 1.17). Thus, in further support of Hypothesis
the regression and bootstrap analyses indicate that the effect of communicated greenwashing was mediated by suspicion of strategic
Suspicion of strategic behavior (partially) mediating the effect of communicated motive on
whether the indirect effect of communicated motive on perceived corporate greenwashing through suspicion of strategic behavior depends on the level of dispositional skepticism (the proposed moderator) by means of
(Preacher . This bootstrap analysis (using
corrected and accelerated intervals), revealed a 95% confidence interval that did not = .25; upper CI = 1.16) and identified that the indirect effect was We performed a series of regression analyses to examine whether suspicion of strategic behavior mediated the effect of communicated motive on perceived bove already showed, communicated motive affected < .001) and suspicion of strategic behavior ( < .001). In addition, suspicion of strategic behavior had a significant effect on
hing (controlling for the effect of communicated motive) < .001). The effect of communicated motive on perceived greenwashing remained statistically significant, but was significantly reduced (
effect was significant (Sobel z = 2.70,
bootstrapped mediation analysis 10000 resamples (bias corrected and accelerated % confidence interval that did not include zero (lower CI = .22; upper CI = 1.17). Thus, in further support of Hypothesis
the regression and bootstrap analyses indicate that the effect of communicated greenwashing was mediated by suspicion of strategic
Suspicion of strategic behavior (partially) mediating the effect of communicated motive on
whether the indirect effect of communicated motive on perceived corporate greenwashing through suspicion of strategic behavior depends on the level of dispositional skepticism (the proposed moderator) by means of
(Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes using 10000 resamples, and bias corrected and accelerated intervals), revealed a 95% confidence interval that did not = .25; upper CI = 1.16) and identified that the indirect effect was We performed a series of regression analyses to examine whether suspicion of strategic behavior mediated the effect of communicated motive on perceived bove already showed, communicated motive affected < .001) and suspicion of strategic behavior ( < .001). In addition, suspicion of strategic behavior had a significant effect on
hing (controlling for the effect of communicated motive) < .001). The effect of communicated motive on perceived greenwashing remained statistically significant, but was significantly reduced (
= 2.70,
bootstrapped mediation analysis 10000 resamples (bias corrected and accelerated % confidence interval that did not include zero (lower CI = .22; upper CI = 1.17). Thus, in further support of Hypothesis 4.
the regression and bootstrap analyses indicate that the effect of communicated greenwashing was mediated by suspicion of strategic
Suspicion of strategic behavior (partially) mediating the effect of communicated motive on
whether the indirect effect of communicated motive on perceived corporate greenwashing through suspicion of strategic behavior depends on the level of dispositional skepticism (the proposed moderator) by means of
, Rucker, & Hayes 10000 resamples, and bias corrected and accelerated intervals), revealed a 95% confidence interval that did not = .25; upper CI = 1.16) and identified that the indirect effect was We performed a series of regression analyses to examine whether suspicion of strategic behavior mediated the effect of communicated motive on perceived bove already showed, communicated motive affected < .001) and suspicion of strategic behavior ( < .001). In addition, suspicion of strategic behavior had a significant effect on
hing (controlling for the effect of communicated motive) < .001). The effect of communicated motive on perceived greenwashing remained statistically significant, but was significantly reduced (β = .38,
= 2.70, p =
bootstrapped mediation analysis 10000 resamples (bias corrected and accelerated % confidence interval that did not include zero (lower CI 4.2, the results of both the regression and bootstrap analyses indicate that the effect of communicated greenwashing was mediated by suspicion of strategic
Suspicion of strategic behavior (partially) mediating the effect of communicated motive on
whether the indirect effect of communicated motive on perceived corporate greenwashing through suspicion of strategic behavior depends on the level of dispositional skepticism (the proposed moderator) by means of
, Rucker, & Hayes
10000 resamples, and bias corrected and accelerated intervals), revealed a 95% confidence interval that did not = .25; upper CI = 1.16) and identified that the indirect effect was We performed a series of regression analyses to examine whether suspicion of strategic behavior mediated the effect of communicated motive on perceived bove already showed, communicated motive affected < .001) and suspicion of strategic behavior ( < .001). In addition, suspicion of strategic behavior had a significant effect on
hing (controlling for the effect of communicated motive) < .001). The effect of communicated motive on perceived greenwashing
= .38,
p = .0
bootstrapped mediation analysis 10000 resamples (bias corrected and accelerated % confidence interval that did not include zero (lower CI 2, the results of both the regression and bootstrap analyses indicate that the effect of communicated greenwashing was mediated by suspicion of strategic
Suspicion of strategic behavior (partially) mediating the effect of communicated motive on
whether the indirect effect of communicated motive on perceived corporate greenwashing through suspicion of strategic behavior depends on the level of dispositional skepticism (the proposed moderator) by means of the bootstrapping
, Rucker, & Hayes 10000 resamples, and bias corrected and accelerated intervals), revealed a 95% confidence interval that did not = .25; upper CI = 1.16) and identified that the indirect effect was We performed a series of regression analyses to examine whether suspicion of strategic behavior mediated the effect of communicated motive on perceived bove already showed, communicated motive affected < .001) and suspicion of strategic behavior ( < .001). In addition, suspicion of strategic behavior had a significant effect on
hing (controlling for the effect of communicated motive) < .001). The effect of communicated motive on perceived greenwashing