The promotion of liberal norms and values is not a recent phenomenon in ASEAN. Article 2 of the Bangkok Declaration (1967), ASEAN’s founding document, states that the aim and purpose of the Association is “[t]o promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law”. Yet for decades this commitment was evident merely in intergovernmental relations, not in the domestic sphere. The recent “pursuit of liberalism”, said to be the most urgent item on ASEAN’s agenda (Katsumata, 2007), is reflected in the pledge to the principles of the rule of law, good governance and the promotion and protection of human rights as articulated in the ASEAN Charter and ASEAN’s approach to human rights. How this pledge translates into actual policy behaviour domestically is another matter. As I have indicated above, Indonesia at times shows more political will to promote such principles regionally than it demonstrates implementing these same principles domestically. This applies equally to other proponents of the liberal turn, such as the Philippines, Thailand and Malaysia. The commitment of countries inclined to resist related regional policy changes, such as Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia, towards adhering to the rule of law and the protection of human rights domestically also must at times be questioned.
Developments in several Southeast Asian countries have over the past decade nonetheless been characterised by an opening of political space. This is evident in an increasingly prominent discourse on liberal norms and values, or a pro- democracy and human rights rhetoric at the ASEAN level, accompanied by some degree of political liberalisation across most regional polities including, most recently, in Burma. Catalysts of these shifts can be found in the people power movement of the Philippines in the 1980s, which led to the overthrow of the Marcos regime in 1986, and the public protests in Thailand in the early 1990s that ushered in democratic reforms in this country (Jetschke, 1999; Mewengkang, 2012). Southeast Asia’s ‘democratic moment’ (Acharya, 1999), triggered by the reverberations of the financial crisis of the late 1990s, turned out to be a lasting transformation, no matter how rocky the road has been and, arguably, continues to be. The varied responses by regional governments to the financial crisis and international pressure helped facilitate political reforms (Acharya, 1999, p. 421).
Most notably was Indonesia’s transformation from an authoritarian regime with a politically influential military to a liberal democracy with civilian-controlled security forces and Jakarta’s subsequent efforts to build on its image as a model and proponent of liberal democracy and leading force in ASEAN regionalism. Domestic and regional factors have been highlighted as a key determinant in this regional development (Acharya, 1999; Mewengkang, 2012). The strengthening of civil society pro-democracy movements, a phenomenon Acharya (1999, p. 419) called the ‘democratic contagion’, increased the level of legitimacy and accountability of national governments and facilitated a more transparent approach to policy-making across all countries in the region (Dosch, 2008, p. 542; Mewengkang, 2012, p. 6). Dosch (2008, p. 530) considers this development a consequence of democratic norms and values diffusing from domestic to regional political spheres, in particular from ASEAN founding members Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia. However, Burma’s opening of political space that surprised regional and international observers alike was not necessarily due to ASEAN’s engagement with the regime. Instead, Naypyidaw’s concessions were motivated by domestic and extra-regional factors (Zin & Joseph, 2012).
Several individuals from the policy and intellectual community across ASEAN and within Indonesia have played a pivotal role in advancing and institutionalising ASEAN’s liberal turn. Also ‘traditional’ civil society actors contributed to the emerging liberal agenda through values-based political linkages and activism, advancing a “parallel track of regionalism” (Acharya, 2000b, p. 140; see also Carothers & Youngs, 2011, p. 24). The ASEAN-ISIS, the track-two network of regional think tanks and research institutes is said to have “been instrumental in shaping the democracy and human rights agenda” in ASEAN, led by the Jakarta- based Centre for International and Strategic Studies (CSIS) and the Manila-based Institute for Strategic and Development Studies (ISDS) (Dosch, 2008, p. 535). These actors promote a vision of ASEAN, which reflects on internationally accepted norms and values, captured in the contributions of intellectuals such as Rizal Sukma and Yusuf Wanandi, both affiliated with the CSIS and involved in Indonesia’s formulation of ASEAN policy proposals.
When Indonesia was chairing ASEAN in 2003 the government advanced a comprehensive proposal that outlined Jakarta’s policy approach towards closer security cooperation. At the 2003 ASEAN Summit in Bali the grouping had already committed to the creation of an ASEAN Community. Under then Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda and with substantial input from Rizal Sukma, the government presented a proposal that contained a range of propositions, including the creation of an ASEAN Security Community as part of the ASEAN Community and regional mechanisms for human rights and conflict resolution.20 Other ASEAN governments were initially apprehensive of Indonesia’s ‘democracy agenda’ that challenged the principles enshrined in the ‘ASEAN Way’ (Sukma, 2008, p. 138). A revised proposal was eventually adopted, but this episode highlighted the sensitivities around the regional preferences expressed in the ‘ASEAN Way’, as well as regional governments’ cautious approach to aligning too closely with what they perceived as a Western, or American agenda (Carothers & Youngs, 2011, p. 17). This tension was most evident in the drafting of the ASEAN Charter, which had been mandated in the ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action (Djani, 2009, p. 139).