At the close of the Cold War, Indonesia was the only state in Southeast Asia that operated submarines.46 In the two decades that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union, several arguments were made to increase the size of the submarine fleet, even to as many as thirty-five hulls according to a former Indonesian military chief in 2002.47 Negotiations started up again in the mid-1990s only to be derailed by the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis; later negotiations gained momentum after the state recovered from the crisis and Indonesia is on track to take delivery of a new submarine by 2020.48
In the mid-1990s, negotiations took place with Germany for up to a half dozen more Type-209 submarines that only resulted in the delivery of two second hand hulls in September 1997, which were never refit nor integrated into the fleet because the program was defunded and cancelled.49 In 2005, another proposed deal with Germany for additional Type-209 submarines via a trade agreement was discussed but never came to fruition.50 Next, in 2007, Indonesia signed an agreement to purchase two Kilo-class submarines as part of a US$1.2 billion military loan from Russia.51 Indonesian Defense Ministry Spokesman, Brigadier General Edy Butar Butar, confirmed the Russian deal and gave a brief explanation: “we still have two submarines we bought from Germany a long time ago, and now we are waiting for two submarines from Russia; so I would really like
45 Pramono, “History of the Indonesian Submarine.” 46 Mak, “ASEAN Naval Build Up.”
47 “TNI Chief Pledges Not to Repeat Mark-Ups,” Jakarta Post, June 25, 2002, ProQuest, http://search.proquest.com/docview/288158412?accountid=12702.
48 McCaffrie, “Submarines for South-east Asia,” 33.
49 Ibid.; Stephen Saunders, ed., Jane’s Fighting Ships: 2005–2006 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2006): 333.
50 “Germany Offers Submarines to Indonesian Military,” Xinhua News Agency, April 5, 2005, ProQuest, http://search.proquest.com/docview/452789436?accountid=12702.
51 “Indonesian Purchase of Russian Submarines seen Pressuring Australia,” BBC Monitoring Asia
to have more than four submarines.”52 In parallel with the Russian proposal, Indonesia entered into negotiations for three Chang Bogo-class submarines from South Korea’s Daewoo Shipbuilding Marine Engineering and announced the deal in December 2011, which stipulated that Indonesia’s PT PAL would build one of the submarines indigenously.53 The Russian deal fizzled but the South Korean deal appears to be on track with the first hull to be delivered between 2018 and 2020.54
In the case of post–Cold War submarine negotiations, Indonesian leaders considered deterrence and enforcement as rationales for submarine procurement, although the evidence overwhelmingly pointed to deterrence over enforcement.
Deterrence as a rationale for submarine purchases requires an adversary that defense planners considered in their analysis. Since 1991, the most likely adversarial candidates have been Australia and Malaysia. With respect to Australia, the United Nations (UN) mission in East Timor (UNMISET) in 1999 resulted in the loss of Indonesian territory under an Australian-led UN coalition.55 Shortly after the UNMISET, Indonesia’s low-intensity conflict with Malaysia over the islands of Ligitan and Sipadan, which were awarded to Malaysia in a 2002 UN International Court of Justice (ICJ), resulted in what Indonesia perceived as the loss of its sovereign territory.56 These outcomes were significant blows to what Indonesia viewed as its primary national security objective, namely defending the territorial integrity of its archipelagic state.57
One example of a deterrence-minded approach to submarine acquisitions by Indonesia is present in its 2007 “Tri Dharma Eka Karma,” a cross-service doctrine that
52 Ibid.
53 “Submarines for Indonesia,” Defense Industry Daily, last modified February 18, 2014, http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/submarines-for-indonesia-07004/; McCaffrie, “Submarines for South-east Asia,” 33; Stephen Saunders, ed., Jane’s Fighting Ships: 2013–2014 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2014), 354.
54 McCaffrie, “Submarines for South-east Asia,” 33; Saunders, Jane’s Fighting Ships: 2013–2014, 354.
55 “East Timor – UNMISET – Background,” United Nations, accessed June 18, 2015, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmiset/background.html.
56 John G. Butcher, “The International Court of Justice and the Territorial Dispute Between Indonesia and Malaysia in the Sulawesi Sea,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 35, no. 2 (2013): 248.
expressed an overall desire to protect state sovereignty and territorial integrity, in which the navy and submarines have an important role. The document required that the military consider “force protection strategies with ‘deterrence’ and ‘denial’ capabilities.”58 Although the doctrinal statements maintain the primacy of internal defense, the explicit acknowledgement of deterrence and denial as a means of achieving homeland defense necessitate a force projection capability that would likely include submarines.
Another example of deterrence exists in statements made about Malaysia in the decade after the ICJ’s 2002 ruling on the islands of Ligitan and Sipadan. In 2005, Indonesian First Admiral Abdul Maliki Yusuf stated that the Indonesian Navy (TNI-AL) would continue sending warships in the vicinity of two islands to dispute a Malaysian oil exploration contract to Shell, and did not rule out deploying a submarine to the area: “it is imperative that we also enforce our presence and sovereignty there.”59 Although Admiral Yusuf mentions enforcement, which is the second argument in this case, the deployment of a submarine to directly respond to Malaysian activity points to deterrence—in which submarines are powerful assets. In a 2009 analysis of Indonesia’s security outlook and defense policy, Rizal Sukma articulated the concerns of some senior Indonesian officials with respect to the territorial dispute with Malaysia and how submarines could be involved:
Indonesia’s procurement policy to a certain degree reflects national security concerns, such as the need to protect Indonesia’s territorial sovereignty and border security. It is also driven by territorial disputes with neighbouring countries, especially Malaysia. When expressing the Navy’s interest in purchasing submarines, for example, the Head of Information Department of the Navy First Admiral Iskandar Sitompul explicitly referred to the “Malaysia factor” and stressed the need for Indonesia to acquire submarines with better deterrent effects than the Malaysian-owned Scorpene, such as the Russia’s Kilo class. He argued
58 Leonard C. Sebastian and Iisgindarsah, “Assessing 12-Year Military Reform in Indonesia: Major Strategic Gaps for the Next Stage of Reform,” Working Paper, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, no. 227 (2011), 7, http://dr.ntu.edu.sg/bitstream/handle/10220/7538/WP227.pdf?sequence=1.
59 “Indonesia Sends Navy in Dispute With Malaysia: Maritime Borders,” Vancouver Province, March 3, 2005, LexisNexis Academic,
http://www.lexisnexis.com.libproxy.nps.edu/lnacui2api/api/version1/getDocCui?lni=4FM4-SY80-TWD3- C2FW&csi=270944,270077,11059,8411&hl=t&hv=t&hnsd=f&hns=t&hgn=t&oc=00240&perma=true.
that Indonesia “must possess submarines with greater deterrent effect. If they [Malaysians] know we have that, they will be scared.”60
Sukma’s analysis and the statements by Admirals Sitompul and Yusuf revealed that the territorial dispute—which was settled only in part by the ICJ ruling—loomed large in the thinking of some senior officials and that the decision to purchase additional submarines equipped with better technology was one response to this ongoing dispute.
Enforcement is the second, albeit weaker, hypothesis to explain Indonesian submarine acquisitions strategy since 1991. Statements made by Indonesian officials during post–Cold War negotiations reflected an attitude that reinforced the importance of protecting Indonesian territory, including claims in disputed areas. In the case of enforcement, submarines provide either visible or perceived presence in areas that the state holds, or claims to hold, sovereignty over—be it the natural resources therein or the waterway itself. Although territorial disputes may escalate and require that the submarine’s role transition from enforcement to deterrence, there is some evidence that submarine purchases were considered for the purposes of enforcement.
In April 2005, Aqlani Maza, an arms procurement agent for the Indonesian Ministry of Defense, stated that “Indonesia as an archipelagic country needs to acquire submarines” under a proposed agreement with Germany for more Type-209 hulls.61 A deal with Germany never came to fruition, however, Maza made the case that submarines were necessary because of the physical geography of Indonesia. Enforcement is necessary to protect vital sea lanes, territorial waters, EEZs, and territorial claims against a less-defined threat, and Indonesia’s massive coastline and the areas that it disputes— Ligitan and Sipadan among others—mandated that submarine be considered for this purpose. Furthermore, the statements made by Admiral Yusuf reflected enforcement imperatives that submarines could fulfill in addition to deterrence.
60 Rizal Sukma, “Indonesia’s Security Outlook, Defence Policy and Regional Cooperation,” in Asia
Pacific Countries’ Security Outlook and Its Implications for the Defense Sector, The NIDS Joint Research
Series, no. 5 (2010); 19. http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/joint_research/series5/pdf/5–1.pdf. 61 “Germany Offers Submarines.”
Another official announcement that supported an enforcement agenda came in December 2010 from Deputy Naval Chief of Staff, Vice Admiral Marsetio, when he addressed a group of fellow Indonesian military officers: “We need to increase the number of submarines…[to] 39 submarines.” Marsetio continued, “as the world’s largest archipelagic country, Indonesia saw the urgency to have submarines in adequate numbers to protect its maritime sovereignty…[and] the addition of the 39 submarines would hopefully help the Indonesian Navy keep the country’s marine territory intact.”62 Given the budget difficulties of past years, this target is unlikely to be met but Admiral Marsetio’s statements were significant because of the enforcement language.