RED DE MERCAS

Before evaluating the Turkish center-right in the context of democracy, it is first necessary to establish what democracy refers to through a consideration of its various interpretations. Specifically, two main lines of investigation inform our consideration:

the procedural vs. the substantive employment of democracy. The former requires universal participation (that everyone is enfranchised), the principle of equal vote and a degree of responsiveness towards general expectations during periods when the majority obtains the power to rule. The substantive interpretation of democracy, meanwhile, attends to democratic ends as well as democratic means, and entails assuring the well-established principle of the rule of law, the earnest protection of basic liberties and the prevention of the abuse of majority rights—all with an eye to social and economic equality. Defining these two categories will give clarity to our evaluation of the Turkish center-right’s approach to democracy, which was largely procedural rather than substantive.

In the minimalist explanation of procedural democracy, elections are given particular weight. Such a theory of democracy dates back to Aristotle’s reflections on democracy as a method of achieving a “well-ordered commonwealth” and refers at a basic level to allowing the people to make decisions that directly affect government (Aristotle 1981).

Schumpeter’s reinterpretation of democracy points out some of the unsatisfactory dimensions of classical democracy: that it conflated rule by the people with the obscurity of the content of the common good, of the procedures to reach that common good, of people’s willingness to reach the common good. Schumpeter also thought that classical democracy failed to specify exactly who ‘the people’ are regarding their social stratification, sex, age and so on (Schumpeter 2006:243-245). These and other shortcomings led him to propose a more comprehensive concept of democracy. To begin with—and we must keep in mind that democracy is largely procedural in the Schumpeterian approach—he argues that the main dynamic of democracy is the “free competition for a free vote” (2006:271). He also calls attention to the necessity of additional measures to make democracy more viable. ‘The people’ central to the concept of democracy, he argues, must have a developed sense of morality and capacity, which in turn links up to four further prerequisites: the scope of decision making allotted to politicians should be restricted by the parliament, decision-making procedures on particular issues should be left to specialists and to a loyal and talented bureaucracy, the democratic self-control of politicians should be guaranteed without intervening in their political power, and tolerance and respect for different opinions should be well-established (Schumpeter, 2006:290-5).

Along similar lines, for Przeworski, democracy “is but a framework within which somewhat equal, somewhat effective, and somewhat free people can struggle peacefully to improve the world according to their different visions, values, and interests”

(2010:16). He emphasizes that, in addition to certain economic, political and institutional conditions, the quality of democracy is critical to its very survival (2003:16). To describe the transformation of the concept of democracy across time, Przeworski compares two editions of the Encyclopedia Britannica (1771 and 1955) and identifies an important divergence. The former focuses on the principle of government by the people whereas the latter considers free elections, representative institutions, responsibility, the liberty and equality of the people and the method of governing as central to democracy (Przeworski, 2010:4-2). Thus, our expectations of democracy have expanded over time, pushing its definition beyond a simple electoral system.

Przeworski’s argument for increasing the quality of democracy also points to four challenges that inhibit democracy today: “(1) the incapacity to generate equality in the socioeconomic realm, (2) the incapacity to make people feel that their political participation is effective, (3) the incapacity to ensure that governments do what they are supposed to do and not do what they are not mandated to do, and (4) the incapacity to balance order and noninterference” (Przeworski, 2010:1-2). Democracy emerges from his account as an imperfect, unstable theory requiring continual improvement to address unmet needs and weaknesses (1999; 2010). Along similar lines, Rustow postulates democracy as a learning process entailing shared attitudes among both politicians and citizens, and democratic consolidation comes only after a habituation phase (Rustow 1970).

Linz and Stephan also focus on the consolidation of democracy, and note how, in the absence of behavioral, attitudinal and constitutional challenges to the democratic system, democracy has become the “only game in town” (1996:5). Consolidation assumes the existence of a state, freedoms promoting a viable civil society, an autonomous political society, rule of law, a bureaucratic structure capable of implementing democratic norms and an “institutionalized economic society” acting between the state and the market (1996:7,11). Similarly, for Diamond, the presence of a constitutional system, along with free, fair, regular and multiparty elections, assure an electoral democracy—which cannot be said to exist in a satisfactory fashion either in the absence of the rule of law, pluralism, accountability and individual freedoms or in the presence of reserved domains for military, bureaucracy or oligarchical powers (2003:34-35). Against the fetishization of elections in democracies, Terry Karl warns that elections generally exclude the preferences of a considerable proportion of the electorate compelling them to choose one among many strong alternatives—what Karl dubs the

“fallacy of electorialism” (1986).

As the scope of democratic expectations gradually increased in the academic realm, at the same time, the emphasis of discussions turned to the substantive side.

Pseudodemocracy (Highhey and Gunther, 1992), quasidemocracy (Haggard and Kaufman, 1992), protodemocracy (Kohli, 1993), facadedemocracy (Lipset, 1994) and similarly skeptical terms for democracy underscore that free and fair elections alone are not enough to evaluate the degree of democracy in a particular context. Rather, many dynamics—the absence or weakness of civil liberties, public participation in decision-making procedures, accountability of rulers, the rule of law, a well-established checks

and balances system, institutional maturity, a coherent political culture, economic well-being, the existence of reserved domains and arbitrary rule—must be considered.

Despite advocating procedural democracy in his 1956 dated Preface to Democratic Theory, Dahl argues that the substantive aspects of democracy are as significant as the

procedural ones, but he notes that in the contemporary world, emphasis is usually on broadened procedural tenets (1989). Nevertheless, his former position leads Dahl to coin the term polyarchy. Evaluating many existing democracies, Dahl distinguishes polyarchy from democracy²³ as a more realistic system defining polyarchy as a consensus on the presence of opposition, participation and civil liberties (1971). Dahl asserts the need to secure for citizens the right to formulate and make clear their choices, which should be equally valued in the eyes of government (1971:3). Without reducing polyarchy to a basic definition of procedural democracy as the presence of free and fair elections, Dahl argues that inclusive suffrage, the right to be elected, freedom of expression, freedom of association and access to alternative sources of information should be present in a polyarchy (1989:221). Defending polyarchy, O’Donnell adds the stipulation that one should also consider accountability and the rule of law in comparing existing systems (2010). Fishkin also underscores the importance, in the context of voting, of extensive political participation for a well- running democracy (1995:28). He also offers a schematic definition of substantive democracy based on five prerequisites:

equal access to accurate information, a substantive balance of divergent thoughts, diversity, equal consideration of all positions and conscientiousness (1995).

23 To Dahl, democracy consists of two dimensions, contestation and inclusion (1971).

Unsatisfied with the narrow procedural perception of democracy, which he terms

“politics as zookeeping”, Benjamin Barber calls for a more participatory “strong democracy” that

[R]ests on the idea of a self-governing community of citizens who are united less by homogeneous interests than by civic education and who are made capable of common purpose and mutual action by virtue of their civic attitudes and participatory institutions rather than their altruism or their good nature. Strong democracy is consonant with -indeed it depends upon- the politics of conflict, the sociology of pluralism, and the separation of private and public realms of action (1984:117).

Regarding the presence of various conceptualizations, Gutmann comes up with six alternative definitions of democracies considering their institutional strength, inclusiveness and provision of justice. The six definitions are Schumpeterian, populist, liberal, participatory, social and deliberative democracies (1993). Lijphart also distinguishes between majoritarian and pluralist democracies regarding their institutional framework and cultural structures. He sees pluralist democracies as better able to provide a broader space for participation, inclusion and consensus (Lijphart, 1999). In addition to the institutional prerequisites for a well-running democracy, Putnam emphasizes the crucial role of social capital, which transforms gradually alongside institutional changes (1993). Similar to the scholarship on procedural democracy, students of substantive democracy have also pointed to a number of dimensions that impact the outcomes of democracy, including economics, gender equality, ethnic dimensions, social conditions and participation factors (e.g. Basette, 1980; Cohen 1997; Phillips, 1999; Benhabib, 1996).

In general, whereas procedural approaches to democracy are a methodological tenet, a substantive perspective stresses the outcomes of democracy. While the former carries the risk of leading to a tyranny of the majority, substantive approaches are often criticized as inefficient. Substantive democracy tends to be more inclusive and egalitarian than procedural democracy. As we shall see in the following sections, this distinction sheds important light on the relationship of the Turkish center-right to democracy.