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In December 1943, as the Soviet troops were approaching the Polish-Soviet border, it became evident that Soviet army’s entry into Poland was going to be particularly problematic.

Officially, the British government did not recognise any territorial changes concerning Poland since August 1939 and this declaration was emphasised in the Polish broadcasts.40 _{However, as}

Maclaren observed, since diplomatic relations between Poland and Russia had been suspended, ‘on the eve of the Soviet troops crossing the pre-war Polish frontier, Poland will be under invasion by a non-friendly power’. 41 _{However, Maclaren, was wrong in stating that Soviets}

were crossing the pre-war Polish frontier. The only territorial changes which had occurred since 1921 concerned the occupation of Poland by Germany and the USSR, starting in September 1939. The so-called Ribbentrop-Molotov line, dividing the country between the two

occupations was annulled in 1941 after diplomatic relations between Poland and the USSR were restored. From that point on, according to international law, the Red Army was crossing the Polish-Soviet border. Nonetheless, since 1941, Stalin had been questioning the Riga line, the pre-war Polish-Soviet frontier, which in his view, had been ‘imposed’ on the USSR (see chapter 3).42

Given the constant disagreement regarding the frontier, it is interesting how little was known in the BBC in 1944 about the origins of the Curzon line. Macdonald recollects when in 1943 (month not given) the Polish eastern border was under attack he had suggested that Newsome circulate a memo about its history.43 _{Although Newsome agreed, it was soon announced on the}

loud speakers in all offices that it had been withdrawn. According to Macdonald, the complaint came from left wing staff in Bush House ‘but there was no attempt to meet my facts, to prove me wrong’.44 _{In January 1944, however, a memo written by Maclaren explaining the origin of}

the Curzon line was circulated in the BBC. According to this paper, the border established by the Riga Treaty (the Riga line) in 1921 was not a clear agreement between Poland and Russia.45

39 _Ibid.

40 _{BBC WAC, E2/128/2, Central Directives: PWE/PID, 22 December1943.}

41 _{NA, FO 371/39422, PWE Central Directives, Special Guideline on the Polish Frontier, 3 January 1944.} 42 _{Kacewicz, G. V., Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the Polish Government in Exile, 1939-1945,}

Studies in Contemporary History, Vol.3 (London: Springer, 1979).

43 _{MPC, Macdonald’s notes, undated.} 44 _Ibid.

Yet, there was no reference to the fact that the Curzon line did not differ much from Ribbentrop-Molotov line.

MacLaren, aware of the political implications of the Soviet army crossing of the Riga line, emphasised that the Polish broadcasts should refer instead to ‘1939 Polish frontier’ rather than saying that the Red Army had entered Poland.46 _{In this situation, it was also acknowledged that}

discussion of the Polish-Soviet boundary could no longer be avoided. The ban was lifted, but the directives highlighted that special attention should be paid to British government support for this ‘ambivalent settlement’.47 _{Significantly, the Polish Service was recognised as an influential}

medium having influence on Polish citizens’ attitudes and conduct towards their ‘liberators’. On 3 January 1944 the PWE issued a Special Directive for the Polish Service emphasising the need to ‘encourage disciplined restrain and maintenance of calmness under provocation’.48

Moreover, the BBC Polish broadcasts should be supportive and free of ‘fears or doubts’ as ‘this line (was) one-sided but inevitable’ despite the fact that that population in Poland had been ‘the subject of provocation’ caused by the massacre at Katyń and knew about the UPP and Polish communist activities in Poland.49 _{The directive stressed that the ‘total national unity of Poles’}

with its government in London must be highlighted in the Polish Service programmes.50 _Given

that the Polish Underground was seen as the main obstacle in reaching agreement with Stalin on the frontier issue, the broadcasts were also ‘to encourage’ dialogue between the Polish officials in London and the leaders of the Polish Underground.51

The Polish government in London followed the guidelines, and as before, Polish officials’ speeches played an important role in maintaining public morale. In addressing the Polish nation on 5 January 1944, Mikołajczyk maintained that the Red Army should be welcomed but stressed, at the same time, that ‘we should have preferred to meet the Soviet troops not merely as allies of our allies, fighting against the common enemy, but as our own allies as well’.52 _The

Polish Premier, in referring to the history of the Polish-Soviet border, emphasised that the Soviet troops had entered Polish territory and it was expected that liberated land would be returned to the Polish government-in- exile, the only legitimate government of Poland,

recognised by the United Kingdom and the USA. His views, however, apparently differed from those of the Director of the European Service, Noel Newsome, who continued to argue that Stalin was right in his territorial demands, while leading British newspapers, notably The Times

46 _{NA, FO 371/ 39422, PWE Directive for Polish Service, week 3-9 January 1944.} 47 _Ibid.

48 _{Ibid, Special Directive for Polish Service, 3 January 1944.} 49 _Ibid.

50 _Ibid. 51 _Ibid.

52 _{Mikołajczyk, S., The Rape of Poland: Pattern of Soviet Aggression (New York: Whittlesey House,}

argued that ‘200 years has shown that Russian-German friendship inspired by fear of Polish claims means enslavement for Polish people’.53