James E. Alcock
I am disappointed by the contributions to this volume made by those who advo-cate for parapsychology, for those authors appear to misunderstand completely why mainstream science continues to be unpersuaded by their claims. Rather than acknowledging the legitimacy of scientists’ reservations and addressing them in a reasoned manner, they instead rail at “the unfairness of it all” and at times resort to condescending attributions about those who carry the message. None even considers the possibility that their quest might be in vain, that psi may not actually exist. This is hardly an open-minded attitude. Contrast this with the offerings from the counteradvocates: not one of them, despite their strong reser-vations at present, absolutely rules out the possibility that psi exists. Neither do they stoop to ad hominem attacks, but focus instead on the methodological prob-lems inherent in parapsychological research.
And whether parapsychologists like it or not, it is only the weakness of parapsy-chological data that keeps parapsychology from scientific acceptance. Bay at the moon if one wants, rail at the critics if one wishes, but it changes nothing. It is not scientific bigotry that is responsible for parapsychology’s exclusion, nor is it, as Chris Carter would have us believe, a deep-seated fear of the paranormal. It is the data. Moreover, even if we wanted to do so—and this is certainly not the case—
there is nothing that Ray Hyman or Michael Shermer or Christopher French or Richard Wiseman or I could do to keep parapsychology from scientific acceptance if there were solid, replicable data. Science ultimately responds to reliable data.
The theory of relativity—which was expressed not in the vague generalities typical
of parapsychological theories, but in precise mathematical language—was much maligned at first; it was powerful empirical data that led to its acceptance within mainstream science. Similarly, scientists accept the weirdness of the quantum world, not because it fits well with common experience, for it most certainly does not, but because of reliable data that support its precisely articulated theory.
Carter, in his chapter for this volume, disagrees with my view for he is con-vinced that parapsychology has already produced strong, replicable data, and that, were it not for pernicious or misguided critics, it would assume its rightful place in the hall of science. He rejects, virtually by fiat, earlier critiques made by Hyman and myself, and suggests that we are reacting in a hysterical manner to protect our “scientific assumptions,” which are challenged by putative evidence of psi. Space does not permit a detailed response to his litany of criticisms, which are generally polemical rather than substantial. However, it appears that Carter simply fails to comprehend the nature and the seriousness of the problems that I have outlined. A few examples:
1. He naively views the affiliate status granted to the Parapsychology Asso-ciation by the American AssoAsso-ciation for the Advancement of Science in 1969 as countering my statement that parapsychology has been rebuffed by science. However, he is wrong to interpret that gesture, which was brought about by the efforts of then-president Margaret Mead, as an indication that science has accepted the reality of the paranormal. Fur-thermore, one cannot have it both ways. If parapsychology has not been rebuffed by science as he claims, then surely he has no dispute with the counteradvocates, and there would be no need for this present volume of writings.
2. He totally misunderstands my concern about the negative definition of psi, and quotes Dean Radin’s view that psi is positively defined as a means by which information can be gained from a distance without the use of the ordinary senses. This of course means that one must first rule out
“the use of the ordinary senses,” which is, of course, the very essence of a negative definition.
3. He misunderstands my concerns about the leap from statistical conclu-sions to attributions of psi. All that statistical testing can tell us is that something is unlikely to have occurred by chance alone. To assume that the cause in a given parapsychological experiment was paranormal is totally arbitrary. The cause of a statistical deviation could be anything:
undetected methodological flaws; calculation errors; or even a mischie-vous Zeus. Suppose my alternate hypothesis were that Zeus from time to time brings about statistical deviations in order to tease researchers:
I doubt that anyone would accept a statistical deviation as evidence for the existence of Zeus. The simple finding that chance is an unlikely explanation does not in itself add validity to a paranormal explanation.
4. Again with reference to my criticism of the reliance on a statistical approach, Carter shows more statistical naı¨vete´ by referring to Burton
Camp’s 1937 statement about the use of statistics in parapsychological research of the day. First of all, Camp referred only to the statistical pro-cedures being used, and this has nothing to do with the interpretation of statistical deviations, which is the basis of my concern. Moreover, it would make no sense to cite Camp even if procedures were the issue:
it is akin to saying that Transworld Airlines passed a safety audit back in 1937, and so there is no need to have any concern about their safety procedures today.
5. In response to my statement that paranormal “anomalies” are never observed in modern physical research, he counters with Helmut Schmidt’s research. This misses the point completely, for Schmidt’s so-called anomalies did not occur in the course of normal physical research. He deliberately set up situations in which he hoped to demonstrate paranor-mal effects. Moreover, none of his research was without significant meth-odological flaws or independently replicable (Alcock, 1987).
These are but a few examples of Carter’s obvious failure to understand and address my concerns.
Turning to Radin’s chapter, he acknowledges that repeatability is the “single most important criterion for distinguishing science from religious faith.” He then refers to two classes of repeatability. The first of these corresponds to what is gen-erally meant by “repeatability” within science: the replication of experiments car-ried out under controlled conditions. However, his second “class” of repeatability is described as “reports of human experience and the ways that people have tried to study them.” It is not clear just how that refers in any meaningful sense to the repeatability sought by scientists. In any case, it is this that is the focus of Radin’s chapter.
What Radin provides is a light historical narrative; he refers to various historical reports as well as to a various twentieth century studies, and treats each as though it constitutes persuasive evidence of the paranormal. However, the empirical studies that he addresses have all received substantial criticism over the years, and none are accepted—I daresay even by most parapsychologists—as providing the long-sought scientific demonstration of the reality of psi. Then, in an amazing triumph of hope over experience, Radin suggests that in only a few years’ time, before 2015, some psi applications and methods may already be in “common use.” Such a blinkered view of the state of parapsychology makes critical dialogue impossible.
I need to add a few words about the contributions from the counteradvocates:
Shermer’s anecdotal account of his experience as a psychic carries an impor-tant lesson for those who are impressed by anecdotal testimony about paranormal events: it is frightfully easy to lead others to believe that one has psychic powers.
Had Shermer not made the effort to disabuse them, those who were taken in would no doubt forever remember his “feats” as evidence of psychic phenomena.
He makes the important observation that while there may be people out to fool us, we are very capable of fooling ourselves, and this leaves us very vulnerable
to deception and error. This is of course why it is so important to treat Radin’s historical accounts with great caution: no matter how trustworthy an individual, and notwithstanding his or her scientific credentials, personal experience is often a poor guide to reality, and it is particularly so when dealing with putative para-normal/supernatural phenomena.
French encourages the continuation of parapsychological research, despite its many problems. He provides a good discussion of many of those problems, and he focuses as well on the great divide between advocates and counteradvocates.
He hopes for more constructive communication. However, his hopes are not borne out in this volume, in my opinion, for the advocates represented here sim-ply reject the message and revile the messenger.
Hyman addresses the failure of parapsychology to demonstrate a scientific basis for its supposed phenomena despite over a century of dedicated effort. He reminds us of the importance that science places on being able to predict outcomes of experiments, and he points out that parapsychology relies not upon prediction, but post-diction: Rather than successfully predicting what will occur in an experi-ment, success is claimed through post hoc interpretations. And while parapsychol-ogists have increasingly turned to meta-analysis to support the existence of psi, he discusses the serious difficulties that the meta-analytic approach presents. He points out that parapsychological theories do not connect with parapsychological research: they do not establish boundaries as to what is considered evidence for psi, and they are not constrained by the outcomes of psi experiments. Thus, they are not useful scientific theories.
Until advocates of parapsychology can take seriously the concerns of counter-advocates, parapsychology will continue to spin its wheels. However, judging by the contributions of the advocates to this volume, it is much easier to make attri-butions about the characters of the critics than it is to deal appropriately with the substance of the criticism. If, as I believe likely, there is no psi, then perhaps that is all that is left in defence of their beliefs.
REFERENCE
Alcock, J. E. (1987). A comprehensive review of major empirical studies in parapsychology involving random event generators and remote viewing. In D. Druckman &
J. Swets (Eds.), Enhancing human performance: Issues, theories and techniques (Vol. 2, pp. 99–102). Washington, DC: National Academy Press.