Referents de Sonotips seleccionats

This section returns to the previous discussion in section 2.4.1, which briefly explored how the state obtains legitimacy for its interventions. Understanding the causes of centralisation in relation to state intervention and its economic objectives (such as controlling public spending, and promoting growth), can in turn highlight the sources of political pressures towards localism.

As mentioned previously, localism in public policy is most commonly centrally led, and this was a point also highlighted by Sharpe (1979, 20): “it seems likely that the decentralist tendencies in the politics of the West are, paradoxically, also a product of the centralisation of society and the state machine”. This section will explore how popular pressure and public opinion amounts as a source of tension inherent within centralisation: on the one hand, centralisation is a response to public opinion and a form of legitimisation, but public opinion can also be critical of centralisation. It is a tension that can explain policies that promote localism and its paradoxical emergence, and how a ‘strategic localism’ can emerge as part of a legitimising narrative that can justify top-down and centralising economic interventions. In other words, one might argue that the inconsistencies of localism reflect more the inconsistencies and diversity of public opinion, rather than (just) the exaggeration of political rhetoric per se. When tacking localism onto other policy areas which have greater priority and importance, such as economic policy, these inconsistencies become more diffuse. At the same time, the mention of localism in the context of policy making insinuates compromise and pluralism, making difficult policy decisions perhaps more acceptable, but eventually diluting and diffusing the concept further.

We have established that intervention and centralisation are inextricably linked, as state intervention has sought greater spatial centralisation of functions to increase its own capacity to undertake these functions. This shift towards greater central government control and responsibility did not occur without controversy. Neo-Marxists, particularly Jürgen Habermas and Claus Offe of the Frankfurt School, have suggested that the welfare state’s role in steering and regulating an inherently crisis-prone capitalist system meant the political and regulatory system would eventually face a growing amount of complications and contradictions (Habermas 1988, Offe 1984). In other words, state intervention, and growing responsibilities58

on issues like “employment, growth, exchange rate stability, an external trade balance, and comprehensive social security”, eventually expose the political system to its own steering problems (Offe 1996, 106, Habermas 1988). Put simply, state intervention, with the centralisation of responsibilities, is not a quick and easy fix for political or economic problems,

58 Which might be driven by competition between national political parties (Offe 1996, 106), or capitalist crises and contradictions (Offe 1984).

as it itself eventually creates problems of administration and legitimacy (or, as Offe 1984 argues, ‘crisis of crisis-management’):

Because political parties, parliaments, and the separate state agencies are incapable of solving problems arising from the malfunctions of the system as a whole, more and different kinds of issues have to be dealt with at the uppermost levels of the state executive. This is thought to pose serious problems of administrative rationality (as well as of political legitimacy) (O’Connor 1987, 129).

In this sense, we are reminded that “[the state] can neither do everything, nor know everything, nor manage everything” (Lefebvre 1991 [1974], 379). According to Offe, this accumulation and centralisation of responsibilities eventually reaches a breaking point when it is realised that public policy does not have the powers or resources required to successfully bear the responsibilities it has absorbed (Offe 1996, 106-7). In response, the state revises what can and should be the object of public policy and reduces its responsibilities (ibid.).

This break from the trend can be, at least partially, attributed to legitimation challenges and crises. In other words, when intervening and steering the capitalist system, governments might act beyond what is considered legitimate in relation to the terms of its democratic mandate (legitimation crisis) (Habermas 1988; Beetham 1991). This notion of legitimacy emphasises the political characteristics of welfare state intervention. Welfare states are also liberal democracies, conceived as an “institutional response” to the problem of state authority threatening freedoms and liberty, creating “spheres of existence and activity exempt from state control” (Offe 1996, 147-8). Liberal democracy also entails that the state derives its ultimate source of legitimate authority from the “people”, the voice of which is “institutionally embodied in the rules and procedures of democratic government and representation” (ibid., 148). State intervention therefore can be said to be influenced by popular pressure and opinion (Boddy and Fudge 1984, 23). As Jones argues, “state actors walk a difficult line between ensuring the right environment for economic growth and development but at the same time guarding against a crisis of electoral support” (2019, 29; Jessop 1990, 46). This question of popular pressure and public opinion is a source of tension inherent within centralisation: on the one hand, centralisation is a response to public opinion and a form of legitimisation, particularly in relation to ensuring equality of opportunity and efficiency of service delivery and welfare distribution (as observed by Mackintosh 1974, 118; Lyons Inquiry 2007, 101; Kilbrandon Commission 1973, para. 244; Travers and Esposito 2003, 14). As argued in the Redcliffe-Maud Report:

… for all the clamour against increasing centralisation, there is constant pressure for this to be done. The centre has become more aware of local problems and more susceptible to local pressures, and so less willing to leave local problems to local solution. The individuals can nowadays more easily make his grievances heard at the centre, and so is more prone, failing local satisfaction, to appeal to the centre for redress (Redcliffe-Maud Commission 1969, 11-12, para. 32).

This was also an argument made in several interviews [32, 41, 43]. As one of the interviewees remarked:

… there’s that kind of fundamental tension in the system at the moment that even if things are localised, there will be a demand at some stage when something goes wrong for the minister to do something. And I think that’s why we often see things kind of flipping back the other way [41].

Notably, a survey on attitudes surrounding ‘postcode lottery’ was conducted in the Future of England Survey, which saw that on the whole, the majority favoured consistency in provision over local choice for services such as refuse collection, planning approvals, transport, housing and education (see Cox and Jeffrey 2014, 12). Wills (2016a, 45) attributes this public opinion to the move towards standardisation during the latter half of the 20th century, and how this has become an expectation amongst the electorate, coupled with little popular experience of local political capacity, has led to “an entrenched centralisation in the English geo-constitution”.

On the other hand, public opinion can also be critical of centralisation – from this view, there is, as Jane Wills observes, an enduring tension between standardisation/efficiency and democracy/sentiment (Wills 2016a, 61). Perhaps paradoxically, the same survey cited above (Future of England) suggests that 39% want more power for their local authority, compared to 14% who disagree (Ibid.). These views see regulations as “potential encroachments on independence and decision-making capacities, and as sources of inefficiency, lack initiative, and inflexibility” (Offe 1996, 80). This perspective on encroachment reflects the earlier discussion in Chapter 2 with regards to the external legitimation challenges facing the state, and

the norms surrounding local government autonomy. Lefebvre similarly observed this tension:

The state’s tendency to establish centres of decision armed with all the tools of power and subordinated to a single main centre, the capital, thus encounters stiff resistance. Local powers (municipalities, departments, regions) do not readily allow themselves to be absorbed. … A certain ‘pluralism’ persists, therefore, but one which has no great significance so long as open conflict does not erupt among the forces in contention – that is to say, among the various groups, classes, or fractions of classes that have taken up defensive or offensive postures (Lefebvre 1991 [1974], 378-9).

These debates indicate that localism cannot be studied in isolation to centralism, or, for the purposes of this chapter, state intervention. This ‘confusion’ amongst the public wanting some both spatial uniformity and independence, and the enduring tension between standardisation and democracy, suggests that we cannot see localism as the opposite to centralism. Rather, such an understanding is a misreading of both public opinion and the politics of policy making. From this viewpoint, one might argue that localism is a small cog in relation to other, more pressing, policy questions (in other words, a form of ‘low politics’, as argued by Bulpitt 1983). From this perspective, localism or localist concerns barely register on policy agendas. However, periodically, localist ideas are prioritised and operationalised discursively through renewed policy and regulatory regimes, as decisionmakers seek to create a legitimate framework within which state interventions can play out. Therefore, rather than opposites, centralism and localism are mutually supportive as they pertain to central government policy agendas. This observation is supported by state-centric governance theory, which argues against seeing government and governance as mutually exclusive alternatives, or even opposite endpoints. As Bell and Hindmoor argue: “Governments choose when to engage communities and what to engage them

about. Even when governing in partnership with communities, governments retain the authority to revise governance rules and abandon engagement processes” (Bell and Hindmoor 2009, 160-1; see also Bevir 2013, 29). As they later add; “By seeing government as one point on a governance continuum, we lose sight of the integral role governments play in all governance relationships and the strength that governments potentially derive from their relationships with non-state actors” (Bell and Hindmoor 2009, 191).

Here, it is important to recognise that, just as recurring as the interventions themselves, has been the criticisms and debate surrounding state intervention and centralisation, particularly its impact on the autonomy local authorities. As one Green Paper argued; “Central Government’s right to concern itself with the level of local authority revenue expenditure – current spending and capital spending financed by revenue – is not always so readily accepted” (DoE 1986, 2).

At the same time, governments operate under “continuous fiscal stress” (Bell and Hindmoor 2009, 13). One might describe this periodic emergence as a dialectic between centralisation and localisation: between, on the one hand, “Whitehall retrenchment to the centre, oblivious to the consequences on the ground”, and on the other hand, “a resurgent localism, quite rightly resentful at being promised devolution that turns out to be largely centralisation at the expense of local autonomy” (ODPM Committee 2006, Ev 110).

Therefore, in order to understand localism and its paradoxical emergence, it is useful to outline empirically legitimating communicative discourses governments oversaw in conjunction with policies which resulted, or had the potential to result, in public debate and concern about

‘centralisation’. These discourses can be viewed in the narratives, rhetoric, policies, and reform governments oversee in response to public debate and concern and can be viewed through the paper trail of policy papers, statutes, and parliamentary debates. The question is whether economic justifications for state intervention/centralisation fall in line with public opinion and belief about local government: in which case, these interventions are widely considered legitimate. In other moments, however, these incursions are not widely seen as sufficiently justified – and the legitimacy of these interventions can be widely criticised and condemned.

As explored above, there is a difficulty facing central government in balancing the two overriding economic objectives of encouraging growth while also controlling public spending and debt. These strategies face heightened impetus during times of political and economic challenges. However, while the temptation has been repeatedly to intervene into local government in different ways, the unpopularity of doing so, and the political risks, are potentially high. This has created a historical pattern where interventions to uphold economic growth, or to avoid recessions, seem to, perhaps paradoxically, emerge in the context of empowerment and localist rhetoric. As one interviewee argued with regards to policy of the Coalition Government; “at the heart of that contradiction was, you know, a government that was espousing growth and localism. Because it was very clear that growth requires change and, you know, localism that if you like is opposed to change” [30]. Another argued, “I don't think localism is in any way strong enough to trump economic policies” [16]. As observed in a Select

Committee report in relation to the 1997-2010 Labour Government, while some of its policies59

could be considered good progress in relation to greater local autonomy and discretion, its top-down approaches in relation to regional bodies created a dissonance, signalling that these examples of good progress simply amounted to “rhetorical lip service paid to decentralisation of power” (CLG Committee 2009, 12).

Here, I propose a concept of ‘strategic localism’, to better understand localism as a legitimising narrative in response to top-down economic interventions. In simple terms, both the localisation and centralisation of power are bids to gain legitimacy, for different reasons. Given the tradition and norms of local empowerment as explored in section 2.3, the incursion of central power can only be justified if it leads to positive economic benefits and effective redistribution, where state centralisation can be a positive force of “protecting the weak against the strong” (Mill 1977 [1862], 589). Here, as Bell and Hindmoor (2009, 15) suggest, the state retains political legitimacy because people still generally expect governments to solve policy problems and steer society. Similarly, as Scharpf (1994, 32) argues, “hierarchical coordination is normatively acceptable only to the extent that authority is exercised to further the common interest of the body politic”. However, if these policy interventions fail, or if they are insufficient justification for incursion, there is then a growing need to demonstrate commitment to re-localisation of power and the empowerment of citizens or risk a legitimation challenge in the form of a shift in public opinion and withdrawal of popular support (Beetham 1991). In these circumstances, localism shifts from an ideology/belief-system (an “ends”), to a more short-term political strategy (a “means”). In other words, there is a difference between, on the one hand, normative localist discourse, and on the other, strategic localist discourse. This distinction falls in line with two of the four Weberian categories of social action: one the one hand, value-rational action, “determined by a conscious belief in the value for its own sake of some ethical, aesthetic, religious or other form of behaviour, independently of its prospects of success” (Weber 1978, 24-5), and on the other, instrumentally rational action, “determined by expectations of the behaviour of objects … these expectations are used as ‘conditions’ or ‘means’ for the attainment of the actor’s own rationally pursued and calculated ends” (1978, 24).

I argue that strategic localism manifests itself in at least two forms. These two forms I have identified over the course of my empirical research are, firstly, a legitimating discursive strategy that governments may use to ‘appease’ opponents of centralisation, which is the focus of this chapter, and secondly a populist discursive strategy, where political parties galvanise existing discontent and populist sentiments to make claims over the lack of people power (this will be further elaboration on in Chapter 6). Regardless of these specific analytical labels, generally there needs to be a clearer distinction between, on the one hand, the uses and means of localism, and on the other, with its values and ends. From a more general perspective in democratic theory, Dewey argues the democratic means and ends should be understood as interdependent (see Dewey 1993 [1938]; 1993 [1939]; Medearis 2015, 71-2). As Dewey argues:

59 Examples cited include general powers of well-being introduced in the Local Government Act 2000, greater local discretion through Local Area Agreements and Multi Area Agreements, as well as adoption of the ‘place-shaping’ concept developed in the Lyons Inquiry, brought in through the Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007.

The conflict between the methods of freedom and those of totalitarianism, insofar as we accept the democratic ideals to which our history commits us, is within our own institutions and attitudes. It can be won only by extending the application of democratic methods, methods of consultation, persuasion, negotiation, cooperative intelligence in the task of making our own politics, industry and education – our culture generally – a servant and an evolving manifestation of democratic ideas. … If there is one conclusion to which human experience unmistakably points, it is that democratic ends demand democratic methods for their realisation (1993 [1939], 205).

While normative perspectives on localism seem to suggest that the means should reflect its ends (for example, a bottom-up process of empowerment), historical observation as well as more recent empirical evidence shows this is rarely the case: localism is often a promise made by the political centre (Bulpitt 1983, 173; Bogdanor 2009, 242-3; Cochrane 1989b, 110). This includes the recent Coalition Government’s Localism agenda, which has been described as aloof to the needs and wants of local citizens and local government. As one interviewee pointed out,

“[localism has] been a kind of top down and kind of … carefully managed I guess- process by Whitehall. And the public has largely been absent from many conversations around devolution and localism” [41]. Localism and Devolution therefore “encode exactly the kind of power structure that they purport to undermine” [43]. The implication is that localism, and its ‘ideal’

form, remains a highly abstract and contested concept. While the means of localism, in its manifestation in government reform and rhetoric, seem to signal localism’s values and ends, it is evident that the ultimate goal – and end – is not usually normative, but rather strategic, and usually concerns quite specific elements of central government economic policy. This is a method of overcoming the tension explored earlier which can be summarised as a tension between standardisation and (local) democracy. It is important, therefore, that studies on localism distinguish between these two forms of localism, which is the framework which will be applied to the historical analysis below. I elaborate on these two forms below.

Normative localism: values and ends

Following on from the previous discussion in section 2.3, normative localism is a diffuse belief-system, ideology, and tradition which borrows from multiple schools of thought that generally argues that localism, and empowering local people towards self-governance, is inherently good and democratic, while centralism is corrosive and undemocratic. Normative localism loosely imagines localism as a holistic way of doing – a way of life and a method of policy making that emphasises community empowerment, volunteering, and direct forms of democracy. This approach then sees localism’s means as reflective of its ends: achieving grassroots empowerment through a process of grassroots self-empowerment. While there is a rich lineage of liberal thinkers developing an idea of localism, its idealistic and normative outlook has made it susceptible to populist uses. Steve Hilton, a Conservative advisor and ‘positive’ populist recently argued: “the goal of decentralization shouldn’t be a specific outcome. It should be a sense of greater participation and ultimately greater democracy and people power” (Hilton 2018, 178). Particularly when operationalised in rhetoric as a solution to some kind of political problem, normative localism is not clear on the ‘how’s’ in terms of achieving it in practice. It

is an idea which is claimed to be “grounded in British thought, culture and practice” (Norman 2010, 200), yet has little theoretical or practical anchoring (Mackenzie 1961, 5).

Strategic localism: implementation, justification, and assurance

While strategic localism invokes and references normative localism, it is far from the same. As rightly argued by Jane Wills, there is an enduring tension between efficiency and standardisation, on the one hand, and sentiment and local democracy on the other (2016a, 61).

Strategic localism has been invoked as a way to overcome this tension during certain periods.

Strategic localism has been invoked as a way to overcome this tension during certain periods.