Reflexión en torno a la imagen

I will now turn to the approaches and engagement of the western donor commu- nity in the Congo and discuss the state building and democratisation effort in the Congo as a project of discipline to normalise the Congo into a docile democracy. However, in practice the donor community shies away from engaging politically in this very political process and thus fails to implement what it argues. And sec- ondly, the liberal peace also ignores the political demands of Congolese agencies which see the liberal peace as a political project for emancipation and self- determination. Subsequently, the liberal peace is disconnected from local agen- cies. However, both narratives do relate to each other, and are relevant to put to- gether, in the way they engage with the other as actor and position themselves. Poverty reduction strategy and country assistance framework as depoliticised problem solving approach

The post-war transition period in the Congo (2003-2006) mainly aimed to stabi- lise the country and reinstall a regime with a legitimate government. It aimed to do the groundwork on which democratisation and state-building could take place in partnership with the newly elected government. The post-war effort for recon- struction, democratisation, state building and development in the DRC derives from the July 2006 Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy Paper (PRGSP). The PRGSP was prepared after a participatory consultation process, in which 35,000 people throughout the country participated (IMF 2007, 15). However, this con- sultation was conducted in a period when large parts of the country were still af- fected by violent conflict, which puts question marks to the claims made on in- clusiveness of the process (and subsequently the claims of ‘local ownership’ of the strategies in the strategy paper), as well as to the impact this reality may have had on the responses given by participants. Aimed at improving living condi- tions, the strategy is first and foremost concerned with poverty reduction, devel- opment and economic growth.

The first of the five identified pillars of the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) is the promotion of good governance and the consolidation of peace through strengthened institutions (IMF 2007, 49), with a focus on administrative, political and economic good governance. Administrative governance is focused on reor- ganisation of the public sector, in terms of census, designing organigrams and anti-corruption measures. However, despite some minor comments about the need for enhanced institutional capacities, the primary concern is with the setting up a public sector, not with its quality of service, capabilities or defined roles (IMF 2007, 50-53). The section on political governance is dedicated to decentral-

isation measures only, and ignores concerns about national political governance institutions (IMF 2007, 53-54).

Following the PRGSP, the short-term priority plan for 2007 drawn up by the new Government (Contrat de Gouvernance mars-décembre 2007) carefully avoids the discussion about corruption and anti-corruption measures, the link between politics and corruption. For example, although Parliament is promised more access to information to perform its oversight duties, there are no strategies mentioned whatsoever to combat corruption within political governance (Government of the DRC 2007, 9, IMF 2007, 51-52). Neither is there mention of the perseverance of corruption in political governance as an obstacle to good governance. The political process as a whole as well as practices that shape these political processes are ignored in the document. It prefers a narrow interpretation of institution building as institutional structures that emphasises poverty reduc- tion and development without accepting that these are essentially political pro- cesses.

This negligence of politics is continued in the ‘Country Assistance Frame- work’ (CAF), the joint donor response to the PRGSP that forms the common strategic approach to international assistance to the DRC for 17 multi-and bilat- eral donors, together worth ca. 85% of donor funds available to DRC.13 _Because

the needs and strategies as outlined in the PRGSP are broad, CAF suggests a se- quencing strategy, which prioritises security and transparency (CAF 2007, 15). Consequently, the strategy about governance reforms is reduced to Security Sec- tor Reform (SSR), transparency, management of public finances and natural re- sources, decentralisation and reform of public enterprises and civil service. There is no recognition of the fact that these processes and issues are inherently politi- cal and require political processes to function. Nor are the inherently problematic nature of political processes in the DRC and corruption within the political pro- cess recognised as potential risks that could threaten reforms (CAF 2007, 23-26). The donor community shies away from the political context in which these re- forms are to take place, and takes political norms and subjectivities for granted.

The strategy in post-war DRC is a clear example of Chandler’s depoliticised problem-solving approach (Chandler 2006, 8). A concern with this approach that focuses on technical issues and procedures is that it does not touch on the internal logics and practices of politics in Congo, the structures of power, domination and accountability. It sets up institutions, but does not engage with the political role these institutions play in governance processes. It engages in capacity building, but does not consider to what political end these built capacities will be used, or

13 _{CAF is a joint Assistance Framework of the European Commission, the African Development Bank,} the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations, Belgium, Canada, China, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States.

whether they will be used at all. The strategy is concerned with a transition to statehood, rather than the state’s functioning (Richmond and Franks 2009, 204- 5). It is telling that the indicator for the objective to improve the oversight role of key institutions is merely the percentage of parliamentarians that have received training on parliamentary oversight (CAF 2007, 87), not a qualitative assessment of Parliament’s performance. Because donor engagement shies away from the political context in which the reforms are to take place, the political decision making process itself remains relatively untouched by state building pro- grammes.

State building in the Congo: The case of the National Assembly

This thesis is particularly concerned with the site of the Congolese National As- sembly and the final two chapters will all focus on local agencies on the spatial site of the National Assembly. I will therefore take a closer look at the state building effort at the National Assembly, how this important political institution is approached in isolation of politics in the state building programme as well as in isolation of the politics of local agencies.

Although further in the report it is mentioned that the PRSGP requires strengthening of institutional capacities of the state as well as its non- governmental partners (NGOs) (IMF 2007, 94), not once in the whole document is the National Assembly or Parliament mentioned as a subject of institutional reform or capacity enhancement strategies. The mere installation of Parliament is considered to be enough in the context of perhaps more pressing needs. Political institutions are thus approached by donors as requiring technical assistance to restructure the institution, better manage it and make it more efficient and effec- tive. The National Assembly itself responds to this technical approach by meas- uring its own successful functioning quantitatively in terms of the number of laws prepared and adopted, and the MPs questions as part of parliamentary over- sight (Assemblée Nationale n.d.). Although the parliamentary institutions do re- ceive considerable attention from a variety of donor organisations, much of the funds and means are allocated to the provincial assemblies that were in an em- bryonic state and would require significant institution building to facilitate the much awaited decentralisation process (Niane and Baba Unpublished, 2009).14

The technical assistance programmes with the National Assembly are execut- ed mainly by UNDP and other INGOs such as AWEPA (Association of Europe- an Parliamentarians for Africa), DAI (Development Alternatives Inc.), EISA (Electoral Institute Southern Africa) and USAID (United States Agency for In- ternational Development) that are often subcontractors to UNDP itself. Activities

14 _{Interviews with USAID representatives, Kinshasa 28 October 2009 and EISA representative 2, Kin-} shasa 05 November 2009.

include capacity building in for example parliamentary core activities such as drafting laws and parliamentary oversight, as well as the donation of equipment and setting-up of offices, and thematic workshops and seminars on issues such as corruption, good governance and the rule of law.15 _{Another strand of projects is}

concerned with MPs representational role, and aims to facilitate the relation and exchange between MPs and their constituencies (for example EISA 2007).16 Congolese NGO’s, Civil Society Organisations (CSO’s) and Community Based Organisations (CBO’s) also undertake projects of this kind, often funded by one of the mentioned international agencies involved in parliamentary support. In the provinces as well as in Kinshasa itself, ateliers d’échange are organised by local civil society groups, aimed at bringing the MPs together with their electorate. The CSO’s involved argue that there is little interest of the MPs to participate – sometimes they carefully avoid contact with civil society in their constituencies – but they also argue that if CSO’s do not take the initiative there will not be any exchange at all.17

A few general conclusions can be made. Some organisations have made a de- liberate choice to work primarily with, or allocate a significant part of their activ- ities to, parliamentary staff. The argument is that building staff capacity is more durable, since MPs (in theory) rotate every five years, while staff (in theory) re- mains.18 _{The problems in the functioning of the institution and its administration}

are seen as being caused by a lack of experience, understanding, knowledge, and skills. These are all technical needs that can be addressed through capacity build- ing efforts such as training, workshops and seminars. The identified needs thus suit the capacity building agenda of the donors and the implementing organisa- tions, and justify the interventions made.

Even more so, some organisations argue that a key problem is the ‘confusion’ over the ‘role’ of the MP in a democracy.19Again, this is an issue that is ex- pected to be addressed through capacity building efforts such as training. In this respect, it is recognised that capacity building itself does not necessarily change behaviour, political mentality and culture, and that when capacity is being built it remains to be seen how enhanced capacity is being employed and used.20 The

15 _{Interviews with USAID representatives, Kinshasa 28 October 2009, DAI representative, Kinshasa 11} March 2010; UNDP representatives, Kinshasa 10 November 2009; EISA representative, Kinshasa, 05 November 2009; AWEPA representative, Kinshasa, 16 October 2009

16 _{Interviews with KAS representative, Kinshasa, 27 October 2009 and EISA representative, Kinshasa} 05 November 2009.

17 _{Interviews with civil society representative 1, Boma 30 November 2009, civil society representative 2,} Bukavu 16 March 2010, civil society representative 5, Bukavu 19 March 2010.

18 _{Interviews with UNDP representative, Kinshasa 10 November 2009, DAI representative, Kinshasa 11} March 2010 and USAID representatives, Kinshasa 28 October 2009.

19 _{Interviews with USAID representatives, Kinshasa, 28 October 2009, DAI representative, Kinshasa 11} March 2010, AWEPA representative, Kinshasa 16 October 2009.

feeling that capacity building workshops have little impact in practice is common among donors and implementing organisations. ‘MP’s seem keen to learn, but they do not implement what they have learned in their daily work’.21 Some even feel that the activities they organise ‘have no impact whatsoever’.22 _Individual

politicians that are well-known to be self-enriching and corrupt denouncing cor- ruption and advocating for more transparency is the ‘Caliban-syndrome’23 in practice - Congolese using the language western donors like to hear (Chabal 1996, 46). In practice, domestic political actors speak the same normative liberal democratic language, but do not necessarily share its underlying political subjec- tivities. It is a practice of disengagement.

Often, participants arrive late or leave early, enjoying a generous lunch and a per diem for participation. These practices raise concerns about the interest in these capacity building activities. More importantly, they emphasise the fact that there are limits to the extent to which democratisation can be built through capac- ity building while political subjectivities do not support its underlying norms. Even if subjectivities are influenced by capacity building workshops, they do not necessarily change. International assistance in democratisation is concerned with measurable output (in terms of workshops held, numbers of participants, etc.), rather than the outcome of these activities.

The engagement with the democratisation process, and the development of Parliament as a key institution for a democracy, is thus reduced to technical as- sistance and capacity building with a limited impact on Parliament as a political institution. Such workshops and assistance may indeed provide MPs and the civil servants of the National Assembly with improved skills and a better understand- ing of the role of the National Assembly in a democracy. But it does not neces- sarily affect the efficiency and efficacy of the institution, nor does it necessarily discipline its agencies to become and behave like western style liberal democrats. Although the assumption is that having put in place the framework of Parliament in a liberal democratic state order, people will not only have the commitment to make it work, but more importantly, to make it work according to the liberal democratic norm. The state building and democratisation logic tends to equate the desired outcomes of democracy with the mere creation of institutions and processes. By using a language that is normative and that aims to ‘shape’ and ‘discipline’ political subjectivities political actors are assumed to adhere to liber- al democratic principles and thus materialise the desired outcomes of liberal de-

21 _{Interview with AWEPA representative, Kinshasa 16 October 2009.} 22 _{Comment made by INGO representative, author’s field notes August 2010.}

23 _{Caliban, the half man-half fish from Shapespeare’s The Tempest, is a savage who speaks in Shake-} spearean verse. The character has become a symbol for oppressed peoples, the savage who has learned to speak the oppressors language, straddling between indigenous and imposed culture (Vaughan, A.T. and Vaughan, V.M. 1991, Mannoni, O.J.D. 1956).

mocracy (Bhuta 2008, 521-23). The assumption is thus that with the shell of lib- eral democracy (its institutional framework, which can relatively easily be built with technical projects) political subjectivities will automatically be disciplined. In addition, the depoliticised international approach does not engage with these political subjectivities either. The practice of engaging in a process of disciplin- ing Congolese political actors to become liberal democratic politicians through a technocratic and depoliticised approach thus fails.