Islamic media Quran healing magic Quran recitation
1. By the term ‘Islamist’, I refer to persons pro- moting Islamism. Islamism is here defined as a political ideology of establish- ing a society and policy on Islamic prin- ciples. In practice, the term ‘Islamism’ covers a range of different policies, from radical to moderate, due to different interpretations of the Islamic principles. 2. One of the main
figures to inspire criti- cism of the western, and particular American, culture, was Said Qutb (1906–66), an Egyptian and a prominent member
popular consumer culture as indeed a result of the political dissociation from western culture. With the introduction of Islamic satellite channels, the media also offer different and new variations of Islamic cultural con- sumption, contesting the secular popular culture: an Arab popular culture that – historically and to the present day – includes all kinds of cultural practices that have no reference to Islam, including pop music, interna- tional quiz concepts, reality shows and so on (cf. Abaza 2006, Armbrust 1996, Abdelrahman et al. 2006). The mediated Islamic popular culture challenges these practices by claiming an Islamic perspective on all cul- tural practices.
The question is: how is this claim realized in Islamic TV? What kind of symbolic inventory is presented? How are Islamic symbols and global media genres combined? What kinds of identities are proposed in medi- ated Islamic popular culture? The Islamic satellite channels are part of broader religious, cultural and social changes in the Arab countries and, in this perspective, it is particularly interesting to look at the Quran in rela- tion to popular culture because of the Quran’s explicit religious status and symbolic power. The article proceeds as follows: I start by presenting some theoretical and methodological perspectives before briefly outlining the background of contemporary development in Arab-Islamic satellite television. I then turn to the analysis and discussion of different genres, such as fatwa programmes, Quran recitation and Quranic healing. Finally, I conclude with some reflections about the Quran, Islam and mediated popular culture.
New media and the return of religion
By using concepts like re-enchantment, re-sacralization and return of religion, media research draws attention to a development where media seems to become increasingly ritualized due to its performative genres as well as occupied with religious topics of great variety (cf. Hoover and Lundby 1997; Hoover 2002). The use of concepts reveals that the process described is contesting an expected, supposed or, at least for some time, prevalent lack of religion in media. Max Weber defined the modern world as characterized by rationality and secularization and, by its disenchant- ment, excluding religion from the public sphere (Weber 1976). The understanding of religion as a leftover from traditional society has since – on empirical grounds – been criticized by several researchers (for example, Casanova 1994; Hoover 2006). Casanova provides a number of examples of religion playing an active role in the political changes of different countries, while Hoover analyses religion’s place in American television.
The concepts of re-enchantment and re-sacralization have, in media research, mainly been applied to issues in western media (cf. Clark 2002), but a similar development can be identified in Arab media as well. It is, however, striking that the analytical perspective on religion in Arab media seems mostly to be occupied with its position as either an obstacle or potential for the development of a civil society, democracy and liberal values (cf. Alterman 1998; Eickelman and Anderson 1999; Galal 2002). From a critical perspective, one could argue that the analytical of the Muslim
Brotherhood, who was executed by the Egyptian state.
approaches towards Middle Eastern media are still waiting for the devel- opment of liberalization and democratization, as though this develop- ment, with the West as an example, is an evolutionistic precondition for further changes. I am not rejecting the importance of looking into the media’s role in the development of a civil society and democracy in the Middle East, but at the same time I find that by focusing on institutional political change alone, one risks ignoring other aspects of the religious and cultural development in the Middle East. If one only studies the development of religion in Arab media as formal political issues, where religious interpretations either support or reject a democratic develop- ment, it is easy to blindly repeat western discourses that point at the Islamic revival as being mainly a matter of political opposition and a non- democratic movement. The result is not only the ignorance of its connec- tion with issues closely related to globalization, like individualism, consumption and identity policies, but at the same time as a construction of Muslims only being guided by religious prescripts presented by reli- gious authorities.
Furthermore, despite the lack of democracy, most Middle Eastern countries have been through a process of secularization. So, when Islam finds its way into new media, it is not a question of traditional Islam just moving into the media and making use of new technological possibilities. It is as a highly modern movement, in which the new Islamic revival has embraced new media, such as video cassettes, fax machines, satellite TV and the Internet (Eickelman and Anderson 1999). If we look at Arab TV’s development since its introduction in 1956 in Iraq, religious TV is a new and explosive element starting in the 1990s. Particularly with the introduc- tion of transnational and commercial Arab TV, religious TV has grown in numbers and diversity. Not that there have not been religious TV preach- ers before, or Quran radio, but these were given an isolated platform, like the Sunday service previously shown on European public service TV. Furthermore, Syria, for example, still does not transmit the Friday prayer on national TV. The new media do therefore challenge the nationally con- trolled and, in most Arab countries, distinctly secular public service TV, and have made room for religious public culture and re-enchantment. Of course, this might have consequences for the political development, but it might also affect religion and religious identities. It is the last aspect that is the scope of this article.
Being inspired by the American media professor, Stewart Hoover, and his approaches to religion and media (Hoover 2006), I will analyse the use of the Quran in Islamic media as an example of the construction of meaning and identity. Hoover argues that the media take part in the con- struction of cultural and religious meaning by offering a symbolic inven- tory that is used by the viewers in their negotiations and constructions of their identity: being religious, ethnic, gender, class and other identities. Hoover further argues that religion in late modernity is characterized by subjective processes of negotiation and individualization and, as such, the analysis needs to take into account the practices in which individuals engage (Hoover 2006: 36). The individualization of religious identity has been described as part of the Islamic revival as well (for example, Roy
2004). Hoover is arguing for the necessity to carry out reception analysis, but his theoretical approach is also helpful for the content analysis. As such, I am analysing the symbolic inventory of the different programmes: how are they constructed, from which cultural sources and, in the per- spective of the scope of this article, how do they combine Islamic sym- bols and practices with other more global popular cultural genres and practices? The Islamic channels are in this regard seen as a cultural prac- tice, where programmes are a product of, and present means for, negotia- tion and construction of meaning. One aspect of this construction is defined by the motives of the broadcasters, and before going into the spe- cific content of examples of programmes, I will dwell on the Islamic channels as a recent media phenomenon.
Arab and Islamic
On Arab TV, a number of Islamic as well as Christian satellite channels have been launched since the first Islamic channel, Iqraa (Read),3was pre-
sented in 1998. And since 9/11, the number of new religious channels has exploded, so that today, at least 21 Islamic and 11 Christian Arab satellite channels are being broadcast. Islamic channels are, in my definition, chan- nels whose main purpose is to mediate Islamic values and perspectives. The increase in religious channels must be viewed in relation to a general huge increase in Arab satellite channels. Since the introduction of the first Arab satellite channel, the state-owned Egyptian Satellite Channel (ESC1), in 1990, the number of Arab satellite channels has increased to at least 350 Arab satellite channels. Compared to religious TV channels in the United States, the number of Arab Islamic TV channels seems to be lagging behind.4Hoover writes that, in 2000, there were 245 commercial
and 15 non-commercial religious television stations (Hoover 2006: 60).5 Arab media and Arab TV are in this context defined as any media or TV channel that uses Arabic as the main language. It follows that some of the Arab satellite channels might very well be broadcast from non-Arab countries, which has often been the case, especially in the 1990s. Channels, such as the Saudi-owned MBC, started broadcasting in London in 1991. The location in Europe has been attractive, due to a higher degree of editorial freedom. With the introduction of commercial and private TV in many Arab countries, more and more channels are being launched from within the Arab world. This is true for the religious channels as well. For example, the channel Iqraa was launched by ART (Arab Radio and Television). Today, ART comprises nineteen thematic commercial chan- nels which include, for example, film, sport, cartoon and news channels. When ART started in 1994, the company broadcasted from Rome, Italy, with a smaller number of channels. Today, while the head office is still in Rome, ART has studios in Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon where programmes are produced. Commercial stations, like ART, typi- cally buy foreign entertainment channel programmes, rather than produce their own, while the religious programmes broadcast on Iqraa come mainly from their own production team.
The new Islamic satellite channels do not, unlike many web pages and different kinds of pamphlets with more obvious sectarian affiliation, emanate from religious groups or organizations, but rather from business 3. Iqraa is the imperative
of the verb ‘read’. The word ‘read’ was the first word revealed to the Prophet Muhammad, according to Islamic belief. Today, Muslims often refer to this revelation as a reminder of the importance to Muslims to educate themselves. 4. The number of
American citizens is a little less than 300 million, which is close to the number of Arabs, estimated to be around 300 million. Both regions are characterized by having one official common language (English and Arabic, respectively) functioning as a lingua franca in the media. 5. Hoover also states the
most recent number of American religious radio stations, which include 800 radio sta- tions, where at least part of their daily pro- grammes are religious, 650 radio stations called Gospel, and 34 radio stations that define themselves as New Age (Hoover 2006: 60).
investors and consortia. While many of the Christian channels are launched by churches or religious leagues,6 the Islamic channels are
mostly non-denominational, with Islam proclaimed as a shared value, but not declared as officially identifying with a legal school, interpretation or creed. So, Islamic channels like Iqraa, Al-Majd and Al-Risala are all owned by Saudi multimillionaires with close affiliations to the Saudi royal family. The religious channels are established as part of greater business empires, which might include other media and other kinds of business investments. Iqraa is an example of this tendency. The owner of Iqraa is Saudi multimillionaire, Salih Kamel. The focus of the programmes on Iqraa is stated as being ‘Islamic values’, which are not defined more specifically. The channel states that it promotes a moderate Islam. It broadcasts a variety of programmes, from children’s programmes and talk shows, to lifestyle programmes – all with a so-called Islamic perspective.
The commercial aspect in the business of Islamic satellite TV does not mean that the main players do not differ in religious interpretation and ide- ology, and nor does it mean that they cannot have a political, as well as a religious, aim. Obviously, the aim is to spread knowledge about Islam and to promote Islamic values and lifestyle. While the interpretation of Islam differs, the general view is that an Islamic approach exists to all aspects of life. The majority of the channels are Sunni Muslim channels, although some have Sufi7affiliations, and others are Salafi,8with close connections
to the Saudi religious establishment. But even the Saudi-owned channels differ greatly; Al-Majd is much more conservative in promoting Saudi cul- tural practices, whereas Iqraa is moderate and, to some degree, addresses Muslims all over the world, thereby representing different cultural prac- tices. But in general, the Islamic channels do not directly or openly sup- port any state or political movement.9Instead, they highlight a pious and
religious lifestyle and promote specific Islamic identity policies. Instead of discussing economic and foreign politics, the channels present and dis- cuss the lifestyle of the individual Muslim and the moral and ethical ideals of the Muslim community. The presentation claims to be universal, but might implicitly be more or less in accordance with national cultural traditions, which, as mentioned, is the case with Al-Majd, for example. As such, the channels can be seen as a politico-religious strategy for the Islamic mission (the Arabic concept of Dawa), dominated by Saudi Salafi tradition.
It is important to note that the increase in Arab satellite channels paral- lels the development of transnational media in general. It has resulted in a growing specialization, where religious channels are just one among a range of other specializations. A range of new programmes mixing popu- lar culture, Islam and religious teaching has been introduced. It is not only the religious satellite channels that broadcast religious programmes, but many of the 350 secular satellite channels are also now broadcasting a greatly diverse range of different programmes, including religious pro- grammes. Entertainment is the most popular genre, which applies to Islamic TV as well. Concepts of entertainment are the same: quizzes, car- toons, films, lifestyle programmes, talk shows and so on. The religious programmes are in turn influenced by Islamic symbols, rituals and identity positions; for example, in programmes about ‘How to find a spouse in the
6. Among the Christian channels are, for exam- ple, Sat7, launched in 1996, and governed by an independent international board where the majority of the members are elected representatives of Middle Eastern and North African churches and ministries. Tele Lumiere (1991) and Noursat (2003) are both supervised by the Assembly of Catholic Patriarchs and Bishops in Lebanon, and are directed by a commit- tee involving religious leaders from various denominations and a group of laity. Aghapy TV was launched in 2005 by the Coptic Orthodox Church in Egypt. 7. In 2008, a new private channel is being launched in Egypt, defining itself as Sufi- affiliated (according to a personal interview with the BBC, 17 December 2007).
Sufism is a philosophi-
cal, sometimes denoted as a mystical, movement within Islam, aimed at fulfill- ing the love between God and man. 8. Salafi refers to the
celebration of the first Islamic leaders, namely the Prophet Muhammad and the three leaders who fol- lowed him – seeing them as the incarnation of the true Islamic society and practice, and therefore as exam- ples to follow. 9. It is possible to discuss whether a channel like Al-Manar (The Lighthouse) is religious and/or
proper Muslim way’10or ‘How to wear your Muslim headscarf in different
fashions and styles’.11In addition, the core ritual elements of Islam, such
as Quran recitation, praying and the interpretations of halal and haram (lawful and unlawful in Islam) have assumed media form. Few have until now studied the Islamic media as part of popular culture. Even though a range of religious programmes use the very popular talk-show concept, in- depth studies of these programmes (Galal 2003; Roald 2001; Skovgaard- Petersen 2004) focus first and foremost on the changes in interpretation of the Quran, but only peripherally include the relationship to popular culture. Between text and sacred power
The Egyptian-born professor, Abuzaid,12writes about the meaning of the
Quran in his introduction to his book:
The Quran is a text which we can describe as centrally representative of the Arab cultural history. It is not because I want to simplify the description of the Arab-Islamic civilization that I name it a ‘text civilization’. […] When the cen- tre of the civilization is the text, considered one of the bases, there is no doubt that the exegesis, regarded as the other face of the text, is a very important instrument in the cultural and civilizing production of knowledge.
(Abuzaid 1990: 9)
Abuzaid is an example of the secular approach to Islamic interpretation, where intellectual effort is the core element that replaces the sacred power of the book. In his book, Abuzaid focuses on text analysis, stressing that the Quran is only the Quran because human beings continuously authorize its divine meaning. As such, he challenges the literal interpretation that some neo-fundamentalists would defend, and his approach can be seen as a part of a process, where religious authority is harshly challenged and, as a result, fragmented.
What I am going to argue is that the reconstitution of the importance, influence and meaning of the Quran is not, and nor has it ever been, only in the hands of the authorized scholar. The influence of the Quran has not only survived because of text analysis or interpretation within an Islamic legal school. It has also survived because of its inclusion in popular cul- ture, where it has been reconstructed as a meaningful symbol and sacred power by the Arab-Muslim population. Despite the importance of the written word and interpretative imperatives, most Muslims, from a histor- ical perspective, have not been able to read, let alone understand the text. This is partly due to a high degree of illiteracy in the Arab world and partly due to the classical Arabic of the Quran, which is difficult to under- stand without scholarly or linguistic training. Other means of maintaining the emotional and spiritual relationship between Muslims and the Quran have therefore been necessary, and of a less intellectual character. As the Quran is considered to be the direct word of God, it does not only consti- tute the Islamic law (the Sharia), it also embodies all the mystical power of a holy symbol and therefore every single printed edition of the Quran is considered sacred, powerful and blessed. On this basis, the Quran, as writ- ten text, has been transformed into popular use, such as using calligraphy to write Quranic verses to decorate wall pictures, books or buildings and, political. The channel
is owned by Hezbollah, and the goal is mainly political, not religious.