EL ÍNTERIN DE AUGSBURGO
CAPITULO 10: LA REFORMA EN LOS PAÍSES BAJOS
deliberate use of latafi to mean protection he regarded Tupou's request
as unnecessary and peculiar. Although fatata was not a completely
correct translation for protection either, it more positively committed
Great Britain to protect Tonga. Thus it was preferable in Tupou's eyes
and much closer in meaning to the English text. As was his habit when he
was not in agreement with anything, Tupou told Thomson that he must refer
the matter to some other authority and that he needed time to do so.
The people he decided to consult were the chiefs, who were then due in
Tonga for Parliament. Thomson agreed and Tupou immediately sent for them.
While waiting for the chiefs to arrive, Thomson claimed, he sought
out the feelings of the Tongatapu chiefs on the proposed Treaty and
found that Fatafehi, Tungi, Mateialona, Ata and Vaea were openly in
favour of a British Protectorate; many of the lesser chiefs felt the 33
same but were afraid to voice their opinions. The inference Thomson
drew from this of there having been a general agreement among the Tongans
to surrender their country to British protection was, at the most, only
partially correct. All the chiefs he named were still very bitter
towards Tupou for his humiliation of 'Ofa and Tungi and his rejection
of Parliament's advice to marry her. Besides, Thomson's closest friends
in Tonga were the late Tuku'aho and Tungi, and it would have been
exceptionally unusual for him not to have met Tungi earlier than after
3 May, as he claimed in his report. Thomson stayed at Fongoloa, only
about five hundred yards from Latai, and it would have been very unlikely
for him not to have visited the aged and blind Tungi soon after his
arrival, if only to see how he was. Tungi on the other hand would have
almost certainly sent Thomson a h a 'u n g a an act that would have compelled
Ibid.
Thomson to communicate with him. That Thomson soon shared the depth of
the bitterness of Tungi and his supporters against Queen Lavinia is
evident from his description of her as suffering from the dual defects
of very low birth on her mother's side and a hereditary taint of 34
scrofula, and his failure to mention her high rank through Kupu and
the suitability of her gentle and humble nature as a wife for the
haughty and often unruly Tupou. Thomson and the chiefs he named had
common grounds for opposition to Tupou, and the reduction of the King's
sovereignty would have been, especially from the point of view of the
chiefs, appropriate revenge for his recent insult. Consequently the
willingness that had been shown by Tungi and the chiefs who supported
him for a British Protectorate could not have sprung entirely from a
genuine acceptance of its terms.
35
On 16 May, Tupou and Thomson met with forty chiefs. In an error
of simple fact unexpected from a man with Thomson's official and social
experience in Tonga, he described these chiefs as nopele (nobles) or
landed and titled chiefs, although there were only thirty noble titles
in Tonga. In saying that only one noble was absent from the meeting and
thereby implying that all the rightful leaders of Tonga were consulted
about the Treaty, Thomson was using the wrong fact and drawing the
correct conclusion from it. The forty men present were most probably
all hou'eiki (chiefs) and mostly nobles, but they could not all have
been nobles. As hou'eikij however, and as constituting the majority
of Parliament, they represented Tonga in accordance with both Tongan
and Western standards.
34 35
Ibid. Ibid.
Thomson was the first to address the meeting; he explained the terms 36
of the Draft Treaty and encouraged the chiefs to accept. When Tupou
followed him, he, contrary to his earlier promises, successfully persuaded
the chiefs to accept only those parts of the Treaty which he accepted.
This suggested that the influence of the Tungi faction had failed to
overcome the strength of traditional obedience to the King and dislike
for foreign intrusion. That his speech, as Thomson and Mateialona claimed,
had been largely tailored by Father Ollier, ought not, as it did in
Thomson's report to have obscured these points. The meeting completely
rejected the British draft for Article I, and replaced it with one 37
that guaranteed the independence of Tonga for all time. When Thomson
then asked Tupou to sign the rest of the Treaty His Majesty temporized,
suggesting that he may have also been unwilling to agree to parts of the
remaining articles.
When Thomson reminded him of his written acceptance of these articles,
His Majesty, in what the Special Commissioner described as a change of
front, invited himself to dinner at Thomson's residence on the following
evening and promised to sign the Treaty before he returned home. The
probable explanation for this, however, was that the King had been
surprised and shaken by the dangerous significance that Thomson had
attached to his letter and that he needed time either to think about it
or to confer with his advisers. Also Tupou was probably still hopeful
that he would be able to persuade Thomson to accept the Treaty that he
wanted.
On the following evening, the British plenipotentiary discovered
Tupou's second major objection to the Treaty. His Majesty flatly refused
36 37
Ibid. Ibid.
to sign unless Thomson removed from Article II the requirement that Tonga
should refrain from all foreign relations of any kind 'except under the 38 sole advice and through the channel of Her Majesty's Government'.
Judging from His Majesty's stubborn resistance to Thomson's further
efforts to persuade him to drop this objection, and his apparent
inclination to scrap the Treaty altogether if his wishes were not
obliged, it seems almost certain that Tupou had finally decided, perhaps
on the basis of renewed confidence derived from Father Ollier's assurances 39
of French protection against British pressure, that there should neither
be a British Protectorate over Tonga nor British control of its foreign
relations. Without these provisions however, the Treaty would have been
virtually useless to England and Thomson's mission to Tonga would have
been a failure.
In Thomson's own words, the next developments were as follows:
Accordingly, I invited him to state what he was-prepared to sign,