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The second stage of Habermas' transformation of the public sphere, the

commercialisation of the press, is a shift from publicity in the sense of openness to the model of journalism that is more familiar today - advertising and politics.

From the mid 1 9th century the bourgeois public sphere became subject to a number of political and economic processes that led to its structural erosion (Dahlberg, 2000). There was a move toward the reintegration of the public and private domains,

resulting in the structural transformation of the public sphere away from the principle of rational-critical debate on the part of private people (Johnson, 2006).

Democracy had become widespread and the fate of the political public sphere in the face of mass capitalism underwent a process Habermas called "refeudalisation", meaning the distinction between private and public could no longer be usefully applied (Habermas, 1 989, p. 1 42). Other factors cited for the disintegration included the increase of political rights to interest groups, leisure time, the welfare state and a growing class system. With the interlocking of the public and private domains, not only do political agencies take over certain functions in the sphere of commodity exchange and social labour but also societal powers take over political functions. 'Zones of activity' (Goode, 2005) appeared that were not public or private; "This sphere could meaningfully convince neither as purely private nor as genuinely public, nor could it be unequivocally located in a realm to which either private or public law pertains" (p. 1 5 1 ).

The increased pace of modem life did not lend itself to reasoned debate and the requirements needed for this to occur were absent. This in turn reduced the integrity of the public and private spheres. The intimate sphere was being watered down by outside influences growing on family members, such as the growth of labour markets and developments in suburban architecture which opened the family home to the public. While the destruction of the relationship of private and public spheres was not limited to urban areas (Habermas, 1 989, p. 1 5 8), Habermas laments this particular development:

This surreptitious hollowing out of the family's intimate sphere received its architectural expression in the layout of homes and cities. The closedness of the private home, clearly indicated to the outside by the front yard and fence and made possible on the inside by the individualized and manifold structuring of rooms, is no longer the norm today, j ust as, conversely, its openness to the social intercourse of a public sphere was endangered by the disappearance of the salon and rooms for the reception of visitors in

general. The loss of the private sphere and of ensured access to the public sphere is characteristic of today's urban mode of dwelling and living. Whether technological and economic developments have quietly adapted

the old forms of urban dwelling to new functions or new suburban settlement forms have been developed on the basis of these experiences (Habermas, 1 989, p. 1 57).

The media were equally responsible for the transformation of the public sphere according to Habermas. His view is that the media assisted in the move toward consumption and away from his idealised literary and political spheres.

When the laws of the market governing the sphere of commodity exchange and of social labor also pervaded the sphere reserved for the private people as a public, rational-critical debate had a tendency to be replaced by consumption, and the web of public communication unravelled into acts of individual reception, however uniform in mode. (Habermas, 1 989, p. 1 6 1 )

Around 1 830 there was a transformation away from writers who were private persons to the publicness of consumer-driven mass media (Goodin & Pettit, 2006). The public sphere was changed because commercialisation of the media allowed some groups to have better representation than others, thus creating privilege. The move from a political press to a commercial model saw a shift away from political stories to entertainment. The change in concept of publicity meant individuals became the victim of the media' s "opinion management" (Habermas, 1 989, p. 1 93 ) and public relations and advertising constructed audiences, not rational individuals. The idea of rational-critical debate, from a commercial organisation' s position, was not a relevant consideration. Publicity, which once meant the exposure of political domination before the public use of reason, now adds up the reactions of an uncommitted friendly disposition. Public relations has shaped the modem public sphere to the point where the sphere has, again, taken on feudal features (Habermas, 1 989, p. 1 7 1 ).

From a modem perspective, many observers would argue the quality of the public sphere has been in decline for many years (Boggs, 1 997; Kellner, 2000; Poster, 1 995; Ryan, 1 992). There has always been a focusing on tabloid issues such as morality, celebrity and sexuality, which were in pre-mass media times the realm of the private, and delivering "human interest" stories to willing consumers as legitimate news. One school of thought would have us believe that an important part of the public sphere equates "dumbing down" to "making accessible". However, academics feel the increasingly trivial natural of the public sphere is diverting the public' s attention from more important, public matters (McKee, 2000). Issues that were once the domain of

tabloid or women' s magazines are now entering wider public discourse. Van Zoonen (in McKee, 2005) lists issues such as crime, accidents, beauty contests, weddings and sports as having no relevance in the lives of the public and should not be published or broadcast as they distract the public from real issues. Beecher (2005) agrees:

The media is dumbing down as owners, editors, producers and journalists respond to what they perceive - perhaps correctly - to be the desires of their audiences. The result is a media obsession with celebrity, fame, trivia and lifestyles, to the point where many in the so-called "quality media" now believe they cannot attract a broad constituency without large dollops of celebrity gossip and soft lifestyle coverage (p. 1 ).

Habermas also argues the private has no place within the public. This, he feels, leads to the decline in culture of the public sphere and any requirement of participation falls to the most mundane of private behaviour (Habermas, 1 989). The Daily Star, a tabloid sold in England, provides a tangible example of Habermas' fears. McNair (2000), quoting the paper' s political editor' s thoughts on the role of the publication:

We make no bones about it. We're trying to sell newspapers to a niche market, and that niche market is primarily interested in television, sport, and looking at pretty women, plus competitions, promotions, winning this, winning that. The politics that we run doesn't sell an extra copy, as far as we're concerned. So our political coverage is very confined.

McKee (2005) points his finger at "they" (being the media organisations), but many academics complain media only produce content that is easily consumed. This avoids audiences confronting stories that are not quickly explained or that are multi­

dimensional. This leaves media aimed at the lowest common denominator, an approach Habermas equates to book clubs of the early to mid 20th century. They, he claims, developed sales and distribution strategies that lowered the "entrance

requirements" and the product needed to be digestible by all, thus rendering the public sphere reduced. Habermas considers "commercial" to be inferior and believes the public of the 1 8th century to have been better off in that they rose to the level of culture rather than, as today, culture is lowered to the masses.

McNair (2000) believes the quality of political journalism in the public sphere has declined so much that it is to the detriment of the democratic process. What we are left with is a supply of infotainment -"journalism in which entertainment values take

appeal to mass audiences which comprise the major media markets" (p. 4). McNair, like Habermas, suggests this quality is below what is needed to conduct a healthy democracy. This critique of public debate, which to some may be idealised and elitist, relates to the quality of information that is in the public sphere allowing for rational­ critical debate, a fundamental element of Habermas' normative public sphere.

3.4 Criticisms of the Public Sphere Concept

Critics of Habermas' theory of public sphere are numerous and it is beyond the bounds of this thesis to explore a comprehensive review of the l imitations and weaknesses here, but an overview of the main themes is warranted and accordingly provided.

Practical criticisms of Habermas' concept of the public sphere often begin with the narrow perspective in which the public sphere is explored through the bourgeoisie. Fraser ( 1 990) contends that Habermas' analysis of the public sphere needs critical interrogation and reconstruction if it is to be a valuable measure of democracy. Crossley and Roberts (2004) state three main problems with this issue: first, that the bourgeois public sphere was based on the idea of free and equal access between consenting participants. By stating this point Habermas is said to overlook the more coercive and power-driven attributes of the public sphere. Second, the colonisation thesis (where commercial or government interests colonise the lifeworld, see Habermas' Theory of Communicative A ction, 1 98 1 ) simplifies the complex media practices. Third, the bourgeois public sphere demeans the emancipatory potential of counterpublic spheres.

From a historical perspective Habermas ( 1 992) admits that his "diagnosis of a unilinear development from a politically active public to one withdrawn into a bad privacy, from a "culture-debating to a culture-consuming public, is too simplistic" (p. 438). Calhoun states the fundamental problem with Habermas' theory is that it "does not treat the ' classical' bourgeois public sphere and the postransformation public sphere of 'organized' or ' late' capitalism symmetrically". He also says Habermas failed to consider lower forms of rational-critical media, such as the "penny dreadfuls,

lurid crime and scandal sheets . . . and glances only in passing at the relationship of crowds and political discourse" (p. 3 3 ).

There has been criticism as to whether Habermas' idealised public sphere was ever a place where rational debate occurred (McNair, 2000). Kellner (2000) does not believe that discussions about politics ever transpired the way Habermas claimed through rational debate and consensus as politics throughout the modem era has been subject to the play of interests and power as well as discussion and debate.

Others have commented on Habermas' oversight of plebeian, proletarian working class, and women's public spheres (Negt & Kluge, 1 972; Fraser, 1 990).

Habermas' critics argue that he idealises the earlier bourgeois public sphere by presenting it as a forum of rational discussion and debate when in fact certain groups were excluded and participation was therefore limited.

Habermas intended the public sphere as an ideal, rather than an empirical entity, though he used research on Britain, France and Germany to substantiate his main ideas and this has lead to his work being labelled Eurocentric (Gunaratne, 2 006) and the extrapolation is not sufficiently contextualised.

3.5 Public Sphere Theory as a Critique of the Media

While allowing the limitations of Habermas' account of the public sphere, both as history and a normative model, it nonetheless highlights the increasingly important role the media play in politics and everyday life. It also points out how corporations, through ownership, have colonised the sphere to promote their own interests (Kellner, 2000). As opposed to Habermas' ideal public sphere of the coffee house times, the modem public sphere is dominated and controlled by political, economic and media elites. These controlling forces, it could be suggested, have no interest in opening up the system to wider public participation (Curran, 1 993), but instead continue to mould public opinion on most issues. There are also issues about the quality of debate within the media. The corporate model of media requires it to turn a profit, which in trying to appeal to as many people as possible, has been accused of dumbing-down its content.

One prominent feature of the contemporary media which Habermas' theory raises concerns about is the extent to which the public sphere drifts toward spectacle

(Kellner, 2003 ). McKee identifies two dimensions to this - the kinds of topics that are being discussed and the ways in which they are discussed. The media are prone to delivering content that places more emphasis on the appearance than the substance. Kellner (2003) argues:

. . . that media spectacles are those phenomena of media culture that embody contemporary society's basic values, serve to initiate individuals into its way of life, and dramatize its controversies and struggles, as well as its modes of conflict resolution. They include media extravaganzas,

sporting events, political happenings and those attention-grabbing events we call news. (p. 2)

History has been built on spectacle (Kellner, 2003 ) and all aspects of culture and social l ife have increased in spectacle, especially since the second half of the 20th century. As the spectacle grows, the one that follows needs to be even grander. In the cultural context this can be seen in the opening and closing ceremonies of the

Olympics and the Soccer World Cup. And in the news media, the continuing spectacle of the war in Iraq, along with the non-stories, such as the death of Anna Nicole Smith, illustrate the continued appetite for this type of drama. The media coverage of the events, and aftermath, of September 1 1 has been likened to that of a soap opera (Schirato & Webb, 2004). It has been suggested the melding of tabloid and mainstream j ournalism began in 1 98 8 with the rise of sex scandals in American politics (Sachs, 1 995), while others date this from the death of Princess Diana in

1 997.

The media are partly responsible for the way the public view politicians and the political process by offering spectacle-based politics. They have been accused of "reducing politics to image, display and the stories in the form of entertainment and drama" (Kellner, 2003). This results in the public viewing politicians and politics as a narrative and spectacle. Gitlin (1 996) compares media coverage of political issues to that of sports and entertainment, and also considers it an exercise in cynicism.

The coverage of politics and the political process, by the media, is not immune and often falls into the spectacle. Politicians are presented to the public in a wave of

publicity. Often this publicity is in no way related to issues of public concern, but

rather as a means of solidifying a power base (Goodin & Pettit, 2006). Important and

relevant public information falls by the wayside to lower level reporting:

Election campaigns, the supposed centrepiece of democratic politics, become an occasion for sound-bite advertising, celebrity gossip, staged debates and computerised calculations. (Boggs, 2000, p. 82)

The fragmentation of media is another problem of the public sphere which McKee highlights. Improvements in technology have increased the number of media channels to the point where mass communication has been broken into many niches. Garnham ( 1 992) laments this process as he believes that many public spheres, instead of a single sphere made up of subsidiaries, directly challenges democracy. Habermas ( 1 992), in contradicting this in later works, says there have always been competing public spheres. There have always been public spheres created around differing interests, ideologies and identities.

If one is to accept the notion of a normative public sphere, as described by Habermas, then there are implications for the media and principles of communication that should be adhered to in order to fulfil their role within the sphere. McNair (2000) states that any modern study of democracy is also a study of how the media report and interpret political events and issues. How the public come to understand politics is through a mediated media chain (journalists, columnists, sub-editors) that reaches the public in a set of journalistic codes and practices (existing culture of news values, personal styles, obj ectivity). This process is also susceptible to political interference by political actors and public relations people to achieve politically favourable outcomes. However, the role the media play in creating an informed public, who can express their political views, is crucial and something the media are often critiqued for falling short in.

In the current age most corporate media forms are driven by ratings, as this is the fundamental measure of success or failure in their market, and the role of media now is to deliver audiences to advertisers. Media organisations consider the audience as "a market of potential consumers" (Hoynes, 1 994, p. 33).The drive for ratings by media leaves little option but to seek out the most desirable content, as considered by the mass audience. In the past, newsrooms were protected from the pressures of profits,

but they have been increasingly required to drop their role of conduits of information to that of ratings-driven entertainers. For much of the 20th century newspapers were regarded as "high modernist" journalism because of their domination in the market, which was eroded after the introduction of other mass media, particularly television (Flew, 2007).

These critiques can be extended beyond mass media to reflect on the potential of internet-based communication for public debate. Habermas' view that ownership of the media undermines the public sphere requires us to consider the ownership of the internet. Is the internet owned by commercial interests? The answer to that would have to be no, no one entity owns the internet. That is not to say that there is not commercialisation on the intemet. Fox Interactive Media' s (which is owned by News Corp) purchase of MySpace.com in 2005 for US$ 5 80 million (News Corp in $5 80m internet buy, 2005) and Google' s near monopoly of internet searches suggest

dominant commercial players are present on the internet. Of the millions of web sites on the internet, most web browsers are visiting, or being funnelled through, web sites owned by a few large companies. Sites like hitwise.com and alexa.com (which itself is a subsidiary of amazon. corn) that rank the world' s most-visited sites show a number of familiar and powerful organisations dominating.

Sunstein (200 1 ) talks about a concept called the "Daily Me" which suggests internet news consumers are able to select their personal news diet as if they were choosing from a buffet table. This, he believes, is not without its problems. The ability for news consumers to filter the news they want to hear and ignore the rest will result in a "decrease in shared communication experiences and exposure to materials that have not been chosen in advance but that nonetheless is beneficial" ( Sunstein, 200 1 , p.48). The fragmentation that ensues from such a situation does not allow for communities to have mutual understanding. The result of this can breed extremism and hate groups. Another problem of news filtering, according to Sunstein, involves a distinctive