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There has recently been more talk about Nordic cooperation, a Nordic renaissance. The defence cooperation within NORDEFCO and outside it has been praised by many as the within the defence industry,264 as well as academics of international security policy.265 However, despite all the good publicity and positive press, it has been more talk and less progress. The references to the mosaic of memberships in international organisations and the challenges they pose are well known. Five countries, three EU members, one of which with the euro currency, and one has opted out of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy. There are three NATO members. Three autonomous areas to two EU member states, yet only one of the three is an EU member (Åland). One autonomous area has not even engaged in the sanctions imposed on Russia (Faroe Islands). Based on this starting point, Nordic cooperation seems challenging. The differing traditional security guarantees apart, some other points of criticism will be discussed below.

5.8.1. US dependence

What is often not addressed, even in Nordic forums, is each respective Nordic state’s dependence on USA. The US remains essential for their critical defence. This is addressed strongly in the primary data; relations with the USA are seen as crucial to each nation’s defence. There has been some joint action through the US-Nordic Security Dialogue, established in 2013 with President Obama and the Nordic heads of state, yet there seems to be a lack of initiatives to engage on the Nordic level with the USA. It is understood that the US administration (Obama administration) viewed the Nordic heads of state as a team in place of representatives of separate states.266 However, in terms of security and defence, Norden is still far from being a team.

5.8.2. Lack of political will

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Brattberg, Erik & Mohr, Michael (2014) U.S.-Nordic Defense Industry Cooperation: Adding Value to the Transatlantic Partnership. Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich: 1

265_{Čižik, 2017: 191} 266

Forss, Stefan & Holopainen, Pekka (2015): Breaking the Nordic Defence Deadlock Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, Pennsylvania: 37

During the Cold War, the Nordic countries took each other’s security into consideration, in their foreign policies. It is not because of a deeper sense of Nordic identity, rather conditions of necessity. In establishing and maintaining the Nordic Peace, the Nordic countries considered their neighbours’ security simply because it was a matter of national security. A fundamental obstacle to Nordic defence and security cooperation is the lack of legitimate political will that translates into actions.

Nordic politicians have expressed their interest in Nordic cooperation and in deepening defence cooperation. The Nordic defence ministers issued a statement in 2015, calling Russia the largest threat to European security and called for deeper cooperation to face the challenges caused by the Russian illegal annexation of Crimea and the Russian aggression in Ukraine.267 Indeed, there seems to be solidarity – on paper. Finland is going to buy new military aircraft by 2021, choosing between French, American and Swedish aircraft. However, the arguments for choosing a Swedish one have been few, despite the fact that if Finland and Sweden shared an air force, it would significantly improve cooperation. The complex character of modern war and indeed hybrid and asymmetrical warfare means that the most significant advances in defence cooperation is the joint procurement of weapons, same systems and information sharing. The Nordic countries have expressed their will to share information and cyber yet there is little cooperation with e.g. Estonia, a country that excels in cyber issues.

5.8.3. Different understandings of security

NORDEFCO was established, when national territorial defence was deemed irrelevant.268 The only possible exception is Finland, which has maintained a more traditional view of security, despite the end of the Cold War. The discourses about security, Russia and the world have shifted significantly, since the establishment of NORDEFCO. This means that the Nordic

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Nordic defense ministers (2015) Statement by Nordic defence ministers: Taking steps towards

enhancing the cooperation on defence Dagens Nyheter,10 April 2015 http://www.government.se/opinion- pieces/2015/04/taking-steps-towards-enhancing-the-cooperation-on-defence-/ (accessed 13 June 2017)

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countries and their defence cooperation have to shift as well, to not become irrelevant. With the return of geopolitics and regional security, will the Nordic states rise to face the challenge? Nordic cooperation during the Cold War worked on the basis of the lowest common denominator and indeed did not include cooperation in defence.

This links in with the modern age understanding of what security means, which links in to understanding of dependence and military autonomy.269 Finland has a very different view on the necessity for military autonomy, which is based on its long history and border with Russia and the USSR. This has also defined the Finnish armed forces today. The Finnish understanding of security differs from the say Danish understanding of security, as can be seen in the reading of the primary data. This means Finland would be reluctant to enter any form of Nordic military agreement, since the Finns want guarantees that can contribute to territorial integrity, with the Danes cannot provide (due to their broad understanding of security). Hence, the national understanding of security plays a defining role in making the limits of Nordic defence and security cooperation. In the primary data and overall, the Nordic countries have failed to take a common stance on Russia. Rather, Sweden and Denmark refer to values, Norway to NATO and Finland bases its take on Russia through the EU.

Does this boil down to the real problem of Nordic cooperation? That there is perhaps a lack of Nordic identity per se and that Nordic identity is simply an umbrella term for all that is Nordic cooperation; however, it does not translate to an encompassing Nordic identity – at least not within security policy. It is commonly said that there is one Nordic model with five exceptions. Is it an illusion that Norway or Denmark or even Sweden would come to the aid of Finland? Sweden failed to do so for Denmark in 1864 and for Finland during World War II. Even their military capacity to do so may be questioned. For the Nordic countries, the national security remains first priority. Without calling the Nordic security and defence cooperation void, there is also an opportunity to acknowledge that it may be in a formative phase.

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Iso-Markku, Tuomas & Jokela, Juha (2013) Nordic Defence cooperation: background, current trends and future prospects. Fondation pour la recherché stratégique, Nordika Programme n. 21/13: 10