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In 1993, John Major and Albert Reynolds, heads of government from the United

Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland, respectively, issued a joint statement now known as the

Downing Street Declaration. This was a twelve-point document, which summarized the desires

of both the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland to achieve peace in Northern Ireland

within the decade. Peace Agreements in 1973 and 1985 had varying degrees of success, but both

indicated a mutual commitment by Britain and Ireland to engineering peace in the contested

region of Northern Ireland. For the first time ever, the Downing Street Declaration stated that

parties linked with paramilitaries would be allowed take part in talks if linked paramilitary

groups abandoned violent conflict. This statement represented a unique turning point in The

Troubles, suggesting that both sides were willing to recognize the legitimacy of the cause of

formerly violent organizations by holding talks with their political wings so long as violence

ceased. The declaration was made around the same time SDLP leader John Hume and Sinn Fein

leader Gerry Adams were developing a new political strategy for the Republican community in

Northern Ireland, characterized by peaceful political progress. The declaration, coupled with the

results of the Hume-Adams Talks was enough to produce a brief PIRA ceasefire in 1994. The

Northern Ireland, and the Republic of Ireland in the notion that peace could be achieved in

Ulster.

Primary

Summary of the Text of the Declaration (Document text provided by Cain.ulst.ac.uk)

The Downing Street Declaration recognized that the “most urgent and important issue

facing the people of Ireland, North an South, and the British and Irish Governments together, is

to remove the conflict, to overcome the legacy of history and to heal the divisions…” resulting

from The Troubles. The Declaration reasserts the right of the people of Northern Ireland to self-

determination and the British Government’s desire to “see peace, stability, and reconciliation

established by agreement among all the people inhabiting the island.” Furthermore, Reynolds

and Major cite a renewed desire to “work to create a new era of trust… in which every effort

must be made to build a new series of trust between [nationalist and unionist] communities.”

Echoing the wording of the Anglo-Irish agreement eight years prior, Taoiseach Reynolds

“recognizes the need to engage in dialogue which would address the honesty and integrity of the

fears of all traditions.” Most importantly, the Taoiseach and the Prime Minister are “determined

to build on the fervent wish of both their peoples to see old fears and anomalies replaced by a

climate of peace.” In the statements that followed the release of the actual declaration itself,

Reynolds said “I was not prepared through inaction to condemn the people of Northern Ireland to

another 25 years of violence. They deserve better” The Taoiseach continues “…let December

1993 be the moment we begin to resolve the conflict in Northern Ireland… no one should be

afraid of peace. Here is the opportunity for peace. Here, let us all make our stand” (December 15,

1993).

Recognizing the incredible significance of the Downing Street Declaration, the Irish

Times hailed the declaration, leading off with “PROSPECT OF IRA CEASEFIRE IN THE

BALANCE AFTER JOINT DECLARATION. SINN FEIN PLANS TALKS WITHIN NEXT

FEW DAYS” (December 16, 1993). Once again, the article makes note of Unionist opposition,

as the UUP “expressed deep misgivings of yesterday’s statement.” The Times embraces the

declaration as a “historic affirmation that the British Government would uphold the democratic

wish of ‘a greater number of the people’ of Northern Ireland to support the Union.” Of greater

significance is the mention of the prospect of Sinn Fein once again entering the fold in

government peace talks.

London Times

The London Times chose to highlight the uncertainty it felt that prevailed throughout

Northern Ireland following the release of the declaration reading “ULSTER HOLDS ITS

BREATH ON PEACE ACCORD” (December 16, 1993). The article describes John Major and

Albert Reynolds as standing “shoulder to shoulder” challenging “the men of violence to put

down their weapons and negotiate a permanent peace in Northern Ireland.” Again, “… hardline

Unionists were left isolated with cries of treachery” but Major encouraged them to “grasp the

opportunity for peace” because “another might not come their way.” In a powerful statement, the

article quotes Major as saying “we cannot go on spilling blood in the name of the past.” An

important analysis presented in the Times article discusses how both Reynolds and Major found

a way to appease the majority of concerned parties in the release of the declaration. Still, Mr. Ian

Paisley expressed his disgust with being “told that in three months’ time the IRA who had

butchered, slaughtered, and murdered his constituents would be invited to sit down as

opposition Prime Minister Major responded “I wish to take action to make sure there’s no

bloodshed of this sort, no more coffins carried away week after week because politicians will not

have the courage to sit down, address the problems and find away through.”

Academic

Contrary to Sunningdale and the Anglo-Irish Agreement, the Downing Street Declaration

was not a legislative document. It was instead a reassertion of a commitment to conflict

resolution. The Downing Street Declaration reminded the population of Great Britain and Ireland

that peaceful progress would be the only path forward for all parties hoping to gain from the

peace process. Perhaps most importantly, the declaration (and the Hume-Adams Talks) put

increased pressure on the IRA to cease its armed campaign (Hennessey 1997:288). While the

cessation of the IRA’s armed campaign was vital to the peace process, Coakley (2002) argues the

mandate of a referendum in the Republic of Ireland into any future peace agreements in Northern

Ireland was equally valuable in developing mutual trust between both governments and both

communities (p.25). Viewing Sunningdale and the Anglo-Irish Agreements as essentially

impotent peace agreements, Fay (1999) remarks that the Downing Street Declaration was “the

beginning of the peace process” (p.64).

Synthesis

Fay’s (1999) assertion that the Downing Street Declaration was the ‘beginning’ of the

peace process is valid, but fails to recognize Lederach’s position that conflict is best analytically

framed as a process. As positive Conflict Transformation (concentrated efforts at peacebuilding)

is both a process and an end result (Berghof definition of Conflict Transformation), it seems

incorrect to say that the Downing Street Declaration marked the beginning of the peace process

erupted, through dialogue—both positive and negative. This paper locates the Downing Street

Declaration as part of the process of Conflict Transformation. The foundation of the Downing

Street Agreement was built on top of years of conflict and patchwork peace agreements. Its

primary purpose was to bury the violence of the past and fill in the gaps of prior peace

arrangements by displaying an even stronger commitment to mutual recognition and

understanding. Unlike Sunningdale and the Anglo-Irish Agreement, the Downing Street

Declaration gave political parties and also paramilitary groups time to digest its stated goals.

There was no immediate legislation to vote on—simply just a renewed commitment to peace in

Northern Ireland. The Downing Street Declaration represented a renewed commitment to peace

that would ultimately lead to the most groundbreaking and successful peace agreement in the

history of Northern Ireland.