- COA’S AUDITING POWER- Blue Bar Coconut Phils. vs. Tantuico- Corporations covered by the COA’s auditing powers
are not limited to GOCCs. Where a private corporation or entity handles public funds, it falls under COA jurisdiction. Under Sec. 2(1), item, (d), non-governmental entities receiving subsidies or equity directly or indirectly from or through the government are required to submit to post audit.
- DBP vs. COA, January 16, 2002 -The mere fact that private
auditors may audit government agencies does not divest the COA of its power to examine and audit the same government agencies. The COA is neither by-passed nor ignored since even with a private audit the COA will still conduct its usual examination and audit, and its findings and conclusions will still bind government agencies and their officials. A concurrent private audit poses no danger whatsoever of public funds or assets escaping the usual scrutiny of a COA audit. Manifestly, the express language of the Constitution, and the clear intent of its framers, point to only one indubitable conclusion - the COA
does not have the exclusive power to examine and audit government agencies. The framers of the Constitution were
fully aware of the need to allow independent private audit of certain government agencies in addition to the COA audit, as when there is a private investment in a government-controlled corporation, or when a government corporation is privatized or publicly listed, or as in the case at bar when the government borrows money from abroad.
- BSP vs. COA, January 22, 2006 - Retirement benefits accruing
to a public officer may not, without his consent, be withheld and applied to his indebtedness to the government.
- MISON vs. COA, 187 SCRA 445, The chairman of COA,
acting by himself, has no authority to render or promulgate a decision for the commission. The power to decide on issues relating to audit and accounting is lodged in the COA acting as a
collegial body which has the jurisdiction to decide any case
brought before it.
- PHIL. OPERATIONS, INC. vs Auditor General, 94 Phil 868, COA’s power over the settlement of accounts is different from power over unliquidated claims, the latter of which is within the ambit of judicial power.
- Santiago vs. COA, 537 SCRA 740- The COA can direct the
proper officer to withhold a municipal treasurer’s salary and other emoluments up to the amount of her alleged shortage but no to apply the withheld amount to the alleged shortage for which her liability is still being litigated.
- NHA vs. COA, 226 SCRA 55, COA can validly disallow the
approval of excess or unnecessary expenditures.
ARTICLE X
(LOCAL GOVERNMENTS)
- TERM OF OFFICE OF ELECTIVE LOCAL OFFICIALS-
Socrates vs. COMELEC, November 12, 2002, What the
Constitution prohibits is an immediate re-election for a fourth term following three consecutive terms. The Constitution, however, does not prohibit a subsequent re-election for a fourth term as long as the reelection is not immediately after the end of the third consecutive term. A recall election mid-way in the
term following the third consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an immediate re-election after the third term.
- Aldovino, Jr. vs. COMELEC, GR No. 184836, December 23, 2009- The preventive suspension of public officials does not
interrupt their term for purposes the three-term limit rule under the Constitution and the Local Government Code. Preventive suspension, by its nature does not involve an effective interruption of service within a term and should therefore not be a reason to avoid the three-term limitation.
- The interruption of a term exempting an elective official from the three-term limit is one that involves no less than involuntary loss of the title to office. In all cases of preventive suspension, the suspended official is barred from performing the functions of his office and does not vacate and lose title to his office; loss of office is a consequence that only results upon an eventual finding of guilt or liability.
- Bolos, Jr. vs. COMELEC, 581 SCRA 786, March 18, 2009-
Bolos was serving his third term as punong barangay when he ran for Sangguniang Bayan member and upon winning, assumed the position of SB member, thus, voluntarily relinquishing his office as punong barangay which the court deems as voluntary renunciation of said office.
- Adormeo vs. COMELEC, February 4, 2002- The winner in
the recall election cannot be charged or credited with the full term of three years for purposes of counting the consecutiveness of an elective official’s terms in office. Thus, in a situation where a candidate loses in an election to gain a third consecutive term but later wins in the recall election, the recall term cannot be stitched with his previous two consecutive terms. The period of time prior to the recall term, when another elective official holds office, constitutes an interruption in the continuity of service.
- Lonzanida vs COMELEC, 311 SCRA 602- Voluntary
renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three-term limit. Conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.
- Borja vs. COMELEC, 295 SCRA 157- For the three term-limit
rule to apply, the local official concerned must serve three consecutive terms as a result of election. The term served must be one for which he was elected. Thus, if he assumes a position by virtue of succession, the official cannot be considered to have fully served the term.
- Ong vs. Alegre, et al., June 23, 2006- assumption of office
constitutes, for Francis Ong, “service for the full term
”
, and should be counted as a full term served in contemplation of the three-term limit prescribed by the constitutional and statutory provisions, barring local elective officials from being elected and serving for more than three consecutive terms for the same position. His continuous exercise of the functions thereof from start to finish of the term, should legally be taken as servicefor a full term in contemplation of the three-term rule,
notwithstanding the subsequent nullification of his proclamation. There was actually no interruption or break in the continuity of Francis Ong’s service respecting the 1998-2001 term.
- Navarro vs. Ermita, GR No. 180050, April 12, 2011 - The
land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands," is declared
VALID. Accordingly, Republic Act No. 9355 (An Act Creating
the Province of Dinagat Islands) is declared as VALID and
CONSTITUTIONAL, and the proclamation of the Province of
Dinagat Islands and the election of the officials thereof are declared VALID.
- League of the Cities of the Philippines vs. COMELEC, GR No. 176951, April 12, 2011- All the 16 cityhood laws, enacted
after the effectivity of RA 9009 increasing the income requirement for cityhood from P20 million to P100 million in sec. 450 of the , explicitly exempt the respondent municipalities from the said increased income requirement. The respondent LGUS had pending cityhood bills before the passage of RA 9009 and that the year before the amendatory RA 9009, respondent LGUs had already met the income criterion exacted for cityhood under the LGC of 1991.
- METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORTY- Its function is limited to the delivery of basic
services. RA 7924 does not grant the MMDA police power,
let alone legislative power. The MMDA is a development
authority. It is not a political unit of government. There is no
grant of authority to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolis. It is
the local government units, acting through their respective legislative councils, that possess legislative power and police power. (MMDA vs. BelAir Village Association, 328 SCRA 836).
- Therefore, insofar as Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 is understood by the lower court and by the petitioner to grant the MMDA the power to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers’ licenses without need of any other legislative enactment, such is an unauthorized exercise of police power. The MMDA was intended to coordinate services with metro-wide impact that transcend local political boundaries or would entail huge expenditures if provided by the individual LGUs, especially with regard to transport and traffic management, and we are aware of
the valiant efforts of the petitioner to untangle the increasingly traffic-snarled roads of Metro Manila. But these laudable intentions are limited by the MMDA’s enabling law, which we can but interpret, and petitioner must be reminded that its efforts in this respect must be authorized by a valid law, or ordinance, or regulation arising from a legitimate source (MMDA vs.
Danilo Garin, April 15, 2005).
- MMDA vs. Trackworks, GR No. 179554, December 16, 2009-
MMDA has no authority to dismantle billboards and other forms of advertisements posted on the structures of the Metro Rail Transit 3 (MRT 3), the latter being a private property. MMDA’s powers were limited to the formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installing a system and administration, and therefore, it had no power to dismantle the billboards under the guise of police and legislative power.
- MMDA vs. MenCorp Transport System, G.R. No. 170657, August 15, 2007- In light of the administrative nature of its
powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid of authority to implement the Project (Greater Manila Transport System) as envisioned by E.O 179; hence, it could not have been validly designated by the President to undertake the Project. It follows that the MMDA cannot validly order the elimination of respondents’ terminals. Even the MMDA’s claimed authority under the police power must necessarily fail in consonance with the above-quoted ruling in MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. and this Court’s subsequent ruling in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Garin that the MMDA is not vested with police power.
INTERNAL REVENUE ALLOTMENT- IRAs- are items of
income because they form part of the gross accretion of the funds of the local government unit Alvarez vs. Guingona, 252 SCRA 695).
- LGUS’ SHARE IN THE IRA SHALL BE
AUTOMATICALLY RELEASED WITHOUT ANY
CONDITION OF APPROVAL FROM ANY
GOVERNMENTAL BODY-Section 6, Art. X of the
1987constitution provides that LGUs shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them. When passed, it would be readily
see that such provision mandates that (1) the LGUs shall have a “just share” in the national taxes; and (2) “just share” shall be determined by law; (3) that “just share” shall be automatically released to the LGUs. PROVINCE OF BATANGAS VS.
ROMULO, 429 SCRA 736, May 27, 2004.
- The legislative is barred from withholding the release of the
IRA. (ACORD vs. Zamora, June 8, 2005)
- AO No. 372 of President Ramos, Section 4 which provides that
“pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation, the amount equivalent to 10% of the internal revenue allotment to local government units shall be withheld” is declared in
contravention of Section 286 of the LG Code and Section 6 of
Art X of the constitution (Pimentel vs. Aguirre, July 19, 2000).
- LOCAL TAXATION Constitution itself promotes the
principles of local autonomy as embodied in the Local Government Code. The State is mandated to ensure the autonomy of local governments, and local governments are empowered to levy taxes, fees and charges that accrue exclusively to them, subject to congressional guidelines and limitations. The principle of local autonomy is no mere passing dalliance but a constitutionally enshrined precept that deserves respect and appropriate enforcement by this Court. The GSIS’s tax-exempt status, in sum, was withdrawn in 1992 by the Local Government Code but restored by the Government Service Insurance System Act of 1997, the operative provision of which is Section 39. The subject real property taxes for the years 1992 to 1994 were assessed against GSIS while the Local Government Code provisions prevailed and, thus, may be collected by the City of Davao. (City of Davao vs. RTC, Br. 12,
August 18, 2005).
- G.R. No. 165827, National Power Corporation vs. Province of Isabela, represented by Hon. Benjamin G. Dy, Provincial Governor, June 16, 2006)- the NAPOCOR is not exempt from
paying franchise tax. Though its charter exempted it from the tax, the enactment of the Local Government Code (LGC) has withdraw such exemption, the Court said, citing its previous ruling in National Power Corporation vs. City of Cabanatuan.
- MCCIA vs. Marcos, September 11, 1996- The power to tax is
may be exercised by local legislative bodies, no longer merely by virtue of a valid delegation as before, but pursuant to direct authority conferred by Section 5, Article X of the Constitution. An “agency” of the Government refers to “any of the various units of the Government, including a department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled corporation, or a local government or a distinct unit therein;” while an “instrumentality” refers to “any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered
institutions and government-owned and controlled corporations.” It had already become, even if it be conceded to
be an “agency” or “instrumentality” of the Government, a taxable person for such purpose in view of the withdrawal in the last paragraph of Section 234 of exemptions from the payment of real property taxes, which, as earlier adverted to, applies to MCIAA.
- PPA vs. Iloilo City, November 11, 2004- The bare fact that the
port and its facilities and appurtenances are accessible to the general public does not exempt it from the payment of real property taxes. It must be stressed that the said port facilities and appurtenances are the petitioner’s corporate patrimonial properties, not for public use, and that the operation of the port and its facilities and the administration of its buildings are in the nature of ordinary business.
- MIAA vs. CA, et al., July 20, 2006- MIAA’s Airport Lands and
Buildings are exempt from real estate tax imposed by local governments. MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation but an instrumentality of the National Government and thus exempt from local taxation. Second, the real properties of MIAA are owned by the Republic of the Philippines and thus exempt from real estate tax. The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are property of public dominion and
therefore owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines. The Airport Lands and Buildings are devoted to
public use because they are used by the public for
international and domestic travel and transportation. The
and thus are properties of public dominion. As properties of
public dominion, the Airport Lands and Buildings are outside the commerce of man. Real Property Owned by the
Republic is Not Taxable.
- When local governments invoke the power to tax on national government instrumentalities, such power is construed strictly
against local governments. The rule is that a tax is never
presumed and there must be clear language in the law imposing the tax. Any doubt whether a person, article or activity is
taxable is resolved against taxation. This rule applies with
greater force when local governments seek to tax national government instrumentalities.
- Another rule is that a tax exemption is strictly construed against the taxpayer claiming the exemption. However, when Congress grants an exemption to a national government
instrumentality from local taxation, such exemption is construed liberally in favor of the national government instrumentality.
- PRESIDENT’S SUPERVISION- National Liga vs. Paredes, September 27, 2004- Like the local government units, the Liga
ng mga Barangay is not subject to control by the Chief Executive or his alter ego.
- The President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a local government unit if he or she finds that the latter has acted contrary to law. This is the scope of the President’s supervisory powers over local government units. Hence, the President or any of his or her alter egos cannot interfere in local affairs as long as the concerned local government unit acts within the parameters of the law and the Constitution. Any directive therefore by the President or any of his or her alter egos seeking to alter the wisdom of a law-conforming judgment on local affairs of a local government unit is a patent nullity because it violates the principle of local autonomy and separation of powers of the executive and legislative departments in governing municipal corporations. (Dadole vs. COA, December 3, 2002).
- Leynes vs. COA, 418 SCRA 180- By upholding the power of
LGUs to grant allowances to judges and leaving to their discretion the amount of allowances they may want to grant,
depending on the availability of local funds, the genuine and meaningful local autonomy is ensured.
- Batangas CATV Inc. vs. CA, 439 SCRA 326- In the absence of
constitutional or legislative authorization, municipalities have no power to grant franchises.
ARTICLE XI
(ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS)
- IMPEACHMENT- Estrada vs. Desierto, April 3, 2001Section
3(7) of Article XI provides for the limit and the consequence of an impeachment judgment. Conviction in the impeachment
proceeding is not required before the public officer subject of impeachment may be prosecuted, tried and punished for criminal offenses committed.
- READ: Francisco, et al. vs. House of Representatives, November 10, 2003- definition of “TO INITIATE IMPEACHMENT”- proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice.
- Gutierrez vs. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice, GR No. 193459, February 15, 2011- The proceeding is
initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow.
- A vote of 1/3 of all the members of the House shall be
necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee or override its contrary resolution, De Castro vs. Committee on Justice, Batasan Pambansa, September 3, 1995.
- Resignation by an impeachable official does not place him
beyond the reach of impeachment proceedings; he can still be impeached.
- Salumbides vs. Ombudsman, GR No. 180917, April 23, 2010-
coterminous employees like petitioners as in their case, there is neither subversion of the sovereign will nor disenfranchisement of the electorate. The unwarranted expansion of the Pascual doctrine would set a dangerous precedent as it would, as respondents posit, provide civil servants, particularly local government, with blanket immunity from administrative liability that would spawn and breed abuse of bureaucracy.
- The 1987 Constitution, the deliberations thereon, and the opinions of constitutional law experts all indicate that the