Regulaciones y normativas de importación

Wadsworth,215 the new U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia met with Faisal in June 1954 to

discuss U.S. concerns about growing anti-American feeling in Riyad because of Buraimi, the

Point IV agreement, and unresolved problems in Palestine.216 Wadsworth anticipated that

215

George Wadsworth served simultaneously as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Saudi Arabia and Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Yemen from October 21, 1953 to January 1, 1958 (U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian).

216_{Bruce Nardulli argued that “sensitivities to the range of political threats to the regime were consistently}

viewed with more gravity than conventional external military threats” (Nardulli 2002: 490) and was a barrier to easing continued tensions in relations. Nardulli contended that “security ties unfolded under conditions in

Faisal would express Saudi displeasure about Buraimi and that the Saudis no longer felt they needed the Point IV agreement. Wadsworth also anticipated strong Saudi criticisms about

U.S. positions on military aid, especially aid to Iraq, a known adversary of the Saudis.217

Wadsworth tried to defuse Saudi criticisms by framing his explanations within the

“tremendous struggle between our Western world and Communist Russia” (Ibid,611.86A/6-

154: June 15 Wadsworth telegram #493 to the Department of State: 2452). Faisal countered in the context of deep Saudi disappointment about the lack of U.S. help on Buraimi:

“Nations, like individuals, must act in accord with the dictates of their national or self-

interest. This one result [Buraimi], small though it was, in the world scene made Saudi Arabia a loser. In dismissing the Point IV aid, the kingdom decided it would no longer trouble U.S. Government with its small problems but instead would henceforth handle them to the best of its own ability” (Ibid, 2452-2453).

Other reasons Saud abrogated Point IV

There were rumours traced to U.S. officials regarding rivalry within the Al-Saud family and speculations about an imminent revolution in the Kingdom. Furthermore, an article that was highly critical of Saud’s spending habits appeared in the Christian Science Monitor. It angered Saud.

The King was obliged to cancel the Point IV agreement with the U.S. because he received reports of statements of “high U.S. officials in the area" that the U.S. should concentrate its efforts on Prince Faisal and attempt to play him off against the King. Furthermore, a recent article in the Christian Science

Monitor [which appeared to be U.S. Government inspired) stated that a revolution could shortly be expected in Saudi Arabia due to the profligacy of

the King (Ibid,611.86A/9-2554: September 25 Bergus memorandum of

conversation: 2454).

which sensitivities to those ties were always a central, oftentimes dominating consideration. This was especially true in the most delicate area of military assistance” (Ibid, ii).

217

U.S. grant military assistance for the Near East in the period March 1950 through December 1954 shows a clear distribution heavily oriented toward the ‘northern tier’ states of Turkey $563.7 million, Iran $81.4 million, Pakistan $1.9 million and Iraq $1.5 million (Ibid, 242).

Saud considered such rumours as unwarranted U.S. Government involvement in Saudi internal affairs. To chastise the U.S. and gain some measure of retribution, Saud cancelled

the Point IV218 mission. This explanation uses Walt’s argument about transnational

penetration219 by the U.S. into Saudi domestic political matters. For the U.S., perhaps

transnational penetration was a motive for the Point IV Mission, albeit an obscure motive. For the Saudis any U.S. attempts to influence or manipulate the Saudi domestic political system only served to weaken relations and alignment.

Anthony Cordesman (2003) contended that Saud expelled the Point IV mission because

the aid amount Saudi Arabia received was insignificant in relation to U.S. aid to Israel.220

FRUS documents support both explanations.221 Saud’s perspective on Saudi-U.S. relations

and alignment was complicated and often times seemed contradictory. The following section explains Saud’s perspective in the context of elements from realist alliance theory.

Understanding Saud’s views

Saud balanced his interests. Although Saud was bitter towards the U.S. on many issues, in the context of Saudi apprehensions about Israel, or Britain undermining Saudi Arabia’s goal of strengthening its armed forces, Saud often spoke of friendly relations and a strong

alignment with the U.S. After all, the U.S. was the donor state for the Kingdom’s financial,

218

The U.S. Point IV Mission was sent to Saudi Arabia in 1951; the Saudi Government “teetered on the edge of bankruptcy” because of low revenues from oil and Hajj pilgrimages (Cordesman 2003: 106). Point IV helped to create the Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency (SAMA), which helped to stabilise Saudi finances (Ibid). However, Saud believed that U.S. aid of “$6.4 million was a pointless token compared to U.S. aid to Israel” (Ibid, 107).

219

Transnational penetration is the “manipulation of one state’s domestic political system by another state” (Walt 1985: 46) by using public officials with divided loyalties, lobbying, and propaganda. Lipsky, et al (1959) surmised that Saudi suspicion about too much U.S. influence and excessive U.S. control by the Point IV Mission may have been responsible for the sudden abrogation the Point IV agreement and expulsion of all Point IV personnel (Lipsky et al. 1959: 146).

220

See footnote in the previous chapter where it cited the vastly greater U.S. Government economic aid to Israel compared to aid for the Arabs from 1948 to 1959. Harry Ellis observed that major American help to the Arabs began only when the Eisenhower administration came into office at the beginning of 1953. This reflected the new administration's desire to repair its relations with the Arabs by demonstrating impartiality between the two sides. The U.S. Government wanted to show is determination to be fair to both sides, both in the distribution of aid and in the protection of Arabs and Israelis against military incursion by each other (Ellis 1960: 97).

221

economic, and military needs.222 Saud wanted to weaken U.S. support for Israel; he pushed the Saudi view that “Israel became major channel for communist infiltration Middle East” (U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1952-1964: 611.86A/10-154: October 1 Wadsworth telegram #138 to the Department of State: 2455-2456).

It was an accumulation of reasons that pushed Saud to cancel the Point IV mission. He wanted to send a clear message to the U.S. Government of his displeasure at U.S.

Government aloofness and ambivalence in the Buraimi dispute, U.S. support of Israel, and U.S. attention to other states in the area to the detriment of Saudi interests and needs. Saud was angry at the ease with which the U.S. granted military aid to other states while Saudi Arabia encountered many hurdles in getting aid. U.S. support for Iraq’s participation in the ‘Northern Tier’ defence arrangement added insult to injury. Saudi-U.S. relations took a

further turn for the worse with the signing of the Baghdad Pact.223

If Saud perceived that through the alignment, the U.S. imposed its will and controlled his freedom of action, one can explain Saud’s view in several ways. The Saudi state was in a bandwagon alignment with the U.S. Walt contended that a bandwagon alignment

subordinates a state to a hegemon, while a balancing alignment preserves most of a state’s freedom to act. Using Dumais-Lévesque’s argument, the U.S. was a powerful state and “predatory state” that used the alignment “to exploit the weaknesses or false sense of security” it provided for the Saudis” (Dumais-Lévesque 2009:1). Using Schroeder’s

argument, the Saudi-U.S. alignment “in some measure functions as pact of restraint (pacta de

contrahendo), restraining or controlling the actions of the partners in the alliance” (Schroeder

in Knorr 1976: 231). Saud may have felt constrained by the U.S. Saud wanted more freedom

222

This paper explained previously that the Saudis wanted to build a regular Saudi armed force for defence. Given Saudi fears about the military power of Israel, Iraq, and Egypt, the Saudis wanted to build up their military and other capabilities for defence. Similar to Ibn Saud, Saud wanted modern U.S. weapons, equipment, and training.

223

The Northern Tier agreement and the subsequent Baghdad Pact are discussed in the next section in this chapter.

to act. Furthermore, in a bandwagon alignment, perceptions of the intentions and benevolence of a dominant state can be unreliable; it can change its intentions and its

benevolence may not last for long. Saud may have looked at U.S. delays as a change in U.S. intentions and benevolence.

Saud, who as Crown Prince often defended the Saudi-U.S. alignment, now shared Faisal’s disgust with U.S. Government positions towards Saudi Arabia. Relations deteriorated

further. Several issues threatened the alignment. U.S. support of Israel, the Buraimi dispute, and the ARAMCO dispute distressed Saud and Faisal profoundly. This latter point was another complication to relations; it arose from the February 1954 Saudi agreement with Aristotle Onassis that authorised him to transport Saudi oil.

1955: Further deterioration in Saudi-U.S. relations

Threats to U.S. interests in Saudi oil development

ARAMCO opposed the agreement because it violated terms of the oil concession. The Saudis injected the issue of Saudi sovereignty into the dispute. The U.S. Department of State and ARAMCO feared the possibility of Saudi expropriation and nationalisation of ARAMCO properties and the cancellation of the Dhahran base agreement (United States Department of State, 1955-1957. FRUS. The Near and Middle East Volume XIII, Saudi Arabia:

886A.2553/2-955: February 9 Fritzlan memorandum of conversation: 250-251). The U.S. Government analysed a series of moves the Saudis could take if the Saudis won in court or in arbitration. In order to prevent any disruption to the flow of Saudi oil and revenues, the Saudis would use experts from Russia and satellite countries to produce and market Saudi oil products. This would be followed by expropriation and nationalisation of Aramco's

properties and cancellation of the Dhahran agreement (Ibid, 886A.2553/3-455: March 3 Allen memorandum to Murphy: 251, 253). This was a disturbing and threatening scenario for the

U.S.: the U.S. loses its oil interests and strategic position in the Saudi Arabia; the Russians gain a foothold in the Kingdom.

The U.S. Government expected a further unfavorable drift in relations and the alignment. The U.S. Department of State wanted to improve its negotiating position by not showing that U.S. interests in Saudi Arabia are “of such a magnitude to warrant resorting to extreme measures to satisfy Saudi demands” (Ibid). The U.S. did not want to be blackmailed. Similar to General Collins downplaying U.S. long-term interests in Saudi oil in 1950, the U.S. Department of State now wanted to downplay the importance of Dhahran in Saudi Arabia. There were indications that the U.S. Department of Defense “no longer places the same degree of importance on Dhahran Airfield” compared to the past (Ibid). However, a new source of Saudi anguish emerged: “the principal cause of Saud’s current anti-U.S. feelings is U.S. military aid program for Iraq and U.S. support for Iraqi participation in the

‘Northern Tier’ defense arrangement” (Ibid).224

The Department of State drafted the following recommendations.

Give the King and his advisers no reason to suppose that there is the slightest chance of our changing our policy toward Iraq and the ‘northern tier’

development or that we entertain any doubts as to the success of this policy; convince him that regional defense arrangements taking shape in the north are in his own security interests. Continue and expand our present military training efforts in Saudi Arabia to temper Saudi feelings toward us, but [recognise] that such types of help will not reverse the present [downward] trend [of relations and the alignment] (Ibid).

The U.S. shifted its focus to the "Northern Tier”, the line of countries that formed a border between the U.S.S.R. and the Middle East. Turkey and Pakistan signed an agreement in 1954

224

Iraq was still an enemy of Saudi Arabia. U.S. military aid to Iraq and support of its membership in the Baghdad Pact meant that the U.S. contributed overtly to the strengthening of Iraq’s power. Also see earlier footnote regarding the military aid given to Iraq.The US signed a military aid agreement with Iraq on April 21, 1954. Michael Cohen pointed out that Dulles justified this overt move on the grounds that the strategic stakes in Iraq were high. The amount of American military aid to be granted was made contingent upon the effectiveness of Iraqi participation in area defense plans which promised to contribute to the security of the region (Cohen 2004: 79 ).

to increase security and stability in the region (U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, Milestones: 1953-1960, the Baghdad Pact: pars.1-2).

Northern Tier agreement225 and the Baghdad Pact226

Iraq announced its intention to join a pro-Western alliance and sought to prevent its possible isolation in the Arab world by persuading other Arab states to join the alliance. Anticipating the formation of the Baghdad Pact, Egypt called an emergency meeting of the Arab League in January 1955. Egypt believed that no member of the Arab League should enter pacts with Western powers because such pacts undermined Arab sovereignty and independence. Egypt tried and failed to get Iraq expelled from the Arab League. On

February 24, 1955, Turkey and Iraq signed an agreement that became the Baghdad Pact. The pact was a regional anti-Soviet defence alliance. The purpose was to prevent communist incursions by strengthening regional defence and preventing the Soviets from infiltrating the Middle East. In April 1955, Britain announced its intention to join, followed by Pakistan and Iran. Jordan considered joining, but the King could not overcome domestic opposition to the pact. The U.S. signed individual agreements with each of the nations in the pact, but did not

225

Cohen explained that during Dulles’ 1953 tour of the Middle East and South East Asia, Dulles was

impressed above all by two countries - Turkey and Pakistan. The US would act as godfather in encouraging the Turks to establish military links with Pakistan, as the first stage in the foundation of the Northern Tier security pact. Dulles concluded that the defence of the Middle East, with its rich oil reserves, should be built upon defence ties with those states that formed the Northern Tier of the Middle East - Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan. In Dulles's opinion, those states were concerned more with the dangers of Soviet encroachment or invasion than with Western colonialism, or the State of Israel. On 19 February 1954, Turkey and Pakistan announced their intention to sign a mutual defence pact, which they did on April 2, 1954 (Cohen 2004: 73, 76).

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The Eisenhower administration looked to regional organisations to reconcile its desire for Middle Eastern security with reduced defence budgets and the Pentagon’s reluctance to commit US forces. The bulk of U.S. expenditure went to Turkey and Iran in the hope that along with Pakistan, they would form a ‘Northern Tier’ to deter Soviet expansionism. The Americans hoped to bring these countries together with Britain to co-ordinate regional defence. This was secured on 24 February 1955 by the Baghdad Pact. The alliance ultimately failed because the US did not join amidst intense Arab opposition (Dobson and Marsh 2001: 97). Also see Goold- Adams, R., 1962. John Foster Dulles: A Reappraisal. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts; Monroe, E., 1963.

Britain's Moment in the Middle East, 1914-1956. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press; Hahn, P.L., 1991. The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945-1956: Strategy and Diplomacy in the Early Cold War. Charlotte,

N.C.: University of North Carolina Press; Holland, M.F., 1996. America and Egypt: From Roosevelt to

Eisenhower. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers; Takeyh, R., 2000. The U.S., Britain, and Nasser's Egypt: 1953- 57. Basingstoke, England: Macmillan; Watt, D.C. and Almog, O., 2003. Britain, Israel, and the United States, 1955-1958: Beyond Suez. London: Frank Cass; Yesilbursa, B.K., 2005. The Baghdad Pact: Anglo-American Defence Policies in the Middle East, 1950-1959. London: Frank Cass.

formally join it (Ibid). The Baghdad Pact angered the Saudis. Faisal expressed bitterness and deeper anti-U.S. feelings. Saudi enmity against the Hashemites resurfaced. Ambassador Wadsworth reported that Faisal's reaction to the Turk-Iraqi pact was “unwonted vehemence that I could not but sense underlying jealousy rooted in Saudi Hashemite rivalry and

bitterness in defeat, which boded ill for future Saudi-American relations” (op.cit, 682.87/2- 2755: February 27 Wadsworth telegram #416 to the Department of State: 253). Regardless of its concerns, the U.S. Department of State did not want to be “blackmailed, show any signs of weakness, and would not change its stance on any of the issues” (Ibid, 682.87/2-2755:

March 5 Hoover telegram #387 to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia: 255-256). The U.S. held its ground.

Realist alliance elements explain the U.S. position

Clearly, to a great extent the Americans played down the importance of Saudi Arabia vis- à-vis U.S. defence plans in the area. In the broad perspective, the U.S. appeared to place greater importance on wooing other states; it discounted the overall value of Saudi Arabia for U.S. defence against the Soviets. In other words, except for Saudi oil, the U.S. looked at Saudi Arabia as a very weak state with no other material capabilities to add to the U.S. bandwagon. Saud and Faisal perceived that the strategic and political importance of Saudi Arabia was no longer as valuable to the U.S. as it was in the past.

The imbalance in the Saudi-U.S. alignment was clear. As the stronger power in the alignment, the U.S. controlled the issue of the Northern Tier and, subsequently, the Baghdad Pact. Using Walt’s theory (1985: 282, 32), this paper characterises Saudi Arabia as a weak and vulnerable state that the U.S. could pressure into asymmetrical concessions and accept a subordinate role. Walt pointed out that in a bandwagon alignment certain restraints are placed on the subordinate state’s freedom to act. Thus, Saudi Arabia as the weak state could not exert enough serious pressure or influence on the U.S. to stop it from pursuing the