Relación entre las dos herramientas

Supreme Court, 28/11/1997

Unreported, High Court, Morris J, 18/02/1997 Description

The applicant, a Russian national, left Moldova and travelled to the UK on a six-month visa. After landing in the UK she travelled immediately to Ireland, where she claimed asylum. The Department of Justice argued that she should be deported to the UK unless she left Ireland voluntarily. The High Court found that the State is entitled to return a person who intends to apply for asylum in Ireland to the first safe country they resided in after fleeing their home provided that the “safe country” is willing and able to hear the person’s asylum application. The Supreme Court upheld this finding on appeal.

Principles

Ireland is entitled to return a person who intends to apply for asylum in Ireland to the first safe country they resided in after fleeing their home, provided that the “safe country” is willing and able to hear the person’s asylum application.

438 _{The Anisimova case predates the enactment of the Refugee Act 1996, and the} operation in this jurisdiction of the Dublin Convention and, latterly, Council Regulation (EC) No. 343/2003.

Gioshvilli v The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform439 Unreported, High Court, Finlay Geoghegan J, 31/01/2003 (Leave – ex tempore)

Description

The Applicant left Georgia in 1989, lived in Russia until 1999, and subsequently sought asylum in Ireland. The Refugee Applications Commissioner, in determining his claim, stated that Russia might have amounted to a safe third country. The applicant appealed to the Refugee Appeals Tribunal. The Tribunal concluded that the applicant’s fear of persecution in Russia was not well grounded. The applicant challenged this decision by way of judicial review.

The High Court held that there were substantial grounds for the contention that refugees are not obliged to seek asylum in the first available safe country to which they flee, and that the Tribunal was not entitled to take into account the circumstances of the applicant’s departure from Russia into account as matters relating to his departure from a State other than that of which he was a national can only be considered where the applicant has no nationality.

Principles

It is arguable that refugees are not obliged to seek asylum in the first available safe country to which they flee. It is arguable that the circumstances of an applicant’s departure from a State other than that of which he is a national are not relevant where an applicant has a country of origin or habitual residence.

439 _{The Gioshvilli case predates the enactment of the Immigration Act 2003, Section 7(f)} of which inserted, inter alia, Section 11B(b) of the Refugee Act 1996, as amended, and which states that the Commissioner or Tribunal, in assessing an asylum applicant’s credibility, shall have regard to whether the applicant has provided a reasonable explanation to substantiate his or her claim that Ireland is the first safe country in which he or she has arrived since departing from his or her country of origin or habitual residence.

5.4.3 Transfer Orders

D.I.S. v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform & Ors [2002] 8 ICLMD 84

High Court, Smyth J, 07/05/2002 Description

The applicant had a visa for entry into Germany and came to Ireland and applied for asylum. The Refugee Applications Commissioner decided that the provisions of the Dublin Convention applied. The applicant raised a number of issues. The applicant claimed that the Refugee Applications Commissioner should have conducted an interview prior to deciding that the Convention applied, rather than making its decision on the basis of the questionnaire. The decision also concerned the issue of family unity when making decisions under the Convention as the applicant’s husband was having his case assessed in Ireland.

The Court held that there was no obligation on the Commissioner to hold an interview because there was no inhibition on the applicant presenting whatever evidence she considered relevant to the Commissioner. The Court also held that there was no necessary inhibition in the applicant being returned to Germany to have her application considered there while her husband’s application was determined in Ireland, as the Commissioner has discretion regarding whether to transfer. The Court further held that the decision of the Commissioner was extinguished in its effect as it was followed by the decision of the Tribunal, and that Article 3 of the Dublin Convention, when interpreted in light of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, confers a right, but not a duty, on Member States to examine claims for asylum.

Principles

The decision of the Commissioner to transfer an applicant pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 is extinguished in its effect when followed by a decision of the Tribunal. The Commissioner has discretion to decide whether an application should be transferred to a convention country for examination. Article 3 of the Dublin Convention confers a right, but not a duty, on Member States to examine claims for asylum.

D.Y. v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform & Ors [2004] 1 ILRM 151

Supreme Court, 01/12/2003

High Court, Finlay Geoghegan J, 18/12/2002 Description

The applicant applied for asylum in Ireland, having previously been refused asylum in Germany. The Refugee Applications Commissioner determined he should be returned to Germany pursuant to Section 22 of the Refugee Act 1996, the Dublin Convention (Implementation) Order 2000, and Article 10(1)(e) of the Dublin Convention. Article 10(1)(e) of the Dublin Convention provides, inter alia, that Member States are obliged to take back an applicant who has withdrawn an application and then lodged an application in another Member State, and a non-national whose application it has rejected and who is illegally in another Member State. The applicant appealed the decision to the Refugee Appeals Tribunal, who dismissed the appeal. The applicant applied for relief by way of judicial review against both decisions.

The High Court granted the relief sought on the grounds that the decisions of the Commissioner and Tribunal were predicated on a request made to Germany that was ultra vires their powers. The Court found that the request had been made pursuant to a provision of the Dublin Convention that had not been implemented in Ireland, i.e. Article 10(1)(e). The High Court certified that its decision involved points of law of exceptional public importance and that it was desirable in the public interest that an appeal should be taken to the Supreme Court. The points deemed to be of exceptional public importance were (i) whether or not Article 10(1)(e) of the Dublin Convention had been incorporated into the law of the State and (ii) whether the Commissioner and Tribunal had jurisdiction, respectively, to make or uphold a decision that Germany be requested to take back applicants.

The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s decision, and held that Article 10(1)(e) of the Dublin Convention was not part of Irish law, and that the provisions relied upon in the decisions of the Commissioner and Tribunal did not permit the transfer of the asylum applications to other Member States.

Principles

The Refugee Applications Commissioner had no jurisdiction pursuant to the Dublin Convention (Implementation) Order 2000 to transfer an asylum applicant to another Convention country.

Y v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform Unreported, High Court, O’Neill J, 14/10/2005 (ex tempore) Description

The applicant applied for asylum having previously applied in Italy. The Refugee Applications Commissioner determined that Italy was the Member State responsible for examining his claim under Article 20(1)(c) of Council Regulation 343/2002. The applicant married a German national and withdrew his application for asylum. The applicant was subsequently detained on foot of the transfer order, and the applicant sought an investigation pursuant to Article 40(4) of the Constitution into the legality of his detention. The Minister contended that the enforcement of the transfer order was not separable from the transfer order itself, and that once the order had been valid, its enforcement could not be invalid. The applicant contended that once he had withdrawn his asylum application, the transfer order ceased to have effect, and that therefore his detention was unlawful.

The Court was satisfied that the application in Ireland was withdrawn by virtue of the provisions of Section 22(8) of the Refugee Act 1996, that the applicant’s letters of withdrawal had the effect of causing the withdrawal of all outstanding applications for asylum in any Member State, and that Italy therefore had no “take back” responsibility. The Court held that the order and its enforcement were entirely separable, and that the detention could not therefore retain validity.

Principles

The withdrawal of all outstanding applications for asylum in the Member States removes any “take back” responsibility under Council Regulation (EC) No. 343/2002. A transfer order is separable from its enforcement.

E.M. v The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2005] IEHC 403

Unreported, High Court, Finlay Geoghegan J, 15/11/2005 Description

The applicant applied for asylum having previously applied in the UK. The Minister made a transfer order against the applicant pursuant to Article 7 of the Refugee Act 1996 (Section 22) Order 2003 to allow the applicant be transferred to the UK. The applicant averred that she would

be a suicide risk if the transfer went ahead. She sought to compel the Minister, by way of judicial review, to consider the new medical evidence that indicated a real risk of suicide. The Minister contended that he had no discretion not to implement the transfer order, to revoke it, or to consider the applicant’s application for asylum.

The Court granted declarations that the Minister had a discretion not to implement a transfer order made under Article 7(1) of the Refugee Act 1996 (Section 22) Order 2003, and that the Minister was obliged, as a matter of fair procedures, to determine the applicant’s request not to implement the transfer order, and granted an injunction restraining the transfer. The Court stated that the scheme of Council Regulation (EC) No. 343/2003 was to impose on the responsible Member State an obligation to readmit the applicant to its territory, and a right, but not an obligation, on the requesting Member State to transfer the applicant. The Court also stated that the Minister was obliged to uphold the applicant’s right to life as guaranteed by Article 40.3.2 of the Constitution, and that this necessitated an implicit power not to implement a transfer order where the protection of the life of the applicant required.

Principles

The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform has discretion not to implement a transfer order made under article 7(1) of the Refugee Act 1996 (Section 22) Order 2003. The Minister is obliged as a matter of fair procedures to determine an applicant’s request not to implement a transfer order. The Minister is obliged to uphold an applicant’s right to life as guaranteed by Article 40.3.2 of the Constitution, and as a consequence has an implicit power not to implement a transfer order where the protection of the life of an applicant is at issue.

N.A.S. v James Nicholson (Acting as the Refugee Appeals Tribunal) & Anor

[2006] IEHC 29

Unreported, High Court, Herbert J, 07/02/2006 Description

The applicant applied for asylum in Ireland after previously applying for asylum in the Netherlands. Ireland applied to the Netherlands to take the applicant back under Article 16(1)(c) of Council Regulation (EC) No. 343/2003 (the Dublin Regulation). The Netherlands agreed to take the applicant back under Article 16(1)(e) of the Regulation, and the Refugee

Applications Commissioner decided that the applicant ought to be transferred to the Netherlands. The applicant appealed this decision to the Refugee Appeals Tribunal, which found that the Netherlands was the Member State responsible under Article 16(1)(e) in conjunction with Article 20(1) of the Regulation. The applicant’s challenge was based, inter alia, on the contention that the Tribunal’s decision was ultra vires S.I. No. 423 of 2003, Article 8(8) of which provides that in considering an appeal against a decision of the Commissioner to transfer an applicant, the Tribunal “shall have regard only to whether or not the Member State responsible for examination of the application has been properly established in accordance with the criteria set out in Chapter III of the Council Regulation”.

The Court held that the Tribunal’s decision was ultra vires because the Tribunal was restricted to considering Chapter III of the Regulation, which did not contain Articles 16 or 20.

Principles

The Refugee Appeals Tribunal is restricted to consideration of Chapter III of the Dublin Regulation when dealing with appeals regarding transfer.

5.4.4 Age Assessment

A.M. v Refugee Applications Commissioner [2005] IEHC 317

Unreported, High Court, Finlay Geoghegan J, 06/10/2005 Description

An asylum applicant claimed he was a minor at the time of his asylum application. The Refugee Applications Commissioner interviewed him to assess his age and assessed him to be not under 18 years of age. The applicant was thereafter processed by the Commissioner as an adult, and was in due course issued with a negative asylum determination. The applicant challenged both the age assessment and the refugee status determination.

The Court quashed the decision assessing the applicant’s age, finding that minimum procedural requirements for such a procedure include (i)

that an applicant be told the purpose of the interview in simple terms; (ii) that an applicant is entitled to be told in simple terms the reason or grounds why the interviewer considers the claim to be false and given an opportunity to deal with such matters; (iii) that the applicant is entitled to be told of any reservations held by the interviewer with regard to identity documents and is given an opportunity to deal with the matter; (iv) that if the decision is adverse to the applicant that he is clearly and promptly informed of the decision and its reasons; and (v) that the possibility and procedure of reassessment is communicated orally and in writing. The Court found that these requirements were not met in the instant case. Principles

Minimum procedural requirements for age assessment of minors in the asylum process include (i) that an applicant be told the purpose of the interview in simple terms, (ii) that an applicant is entitled to be told in simple terms the reason or grounds why the interviewer considers the claim to be false, and to be given an opportunity to deal with such matters; (iii) that the applicant is entitled to be told of any reservations held by the interviewer with regard to identity documents and is given an opportunity to deal with the matter; (iv) that if the decision is adverse to the applicant that he is clearly and promptly informed of the decision and its reasons; and (v) that the possibility and procedure of reassessment is communicated orally and in writing.

A.S.O. (A Minor) v Refugee Applications Commissioner & Ors [2006] IEHC 28

Unreported, High Court, Clarke J, 01/02/2006 (Leave) Description

The Refugee Applications Commissioner initially assessed the applicant to be a minor. The Health Service Executive assigned a project worker to the applicant, and subsequently requested that the Commissioner carry out another age assessment. The Commissioner carried out a second test and determined that the applicant was over 18. The applicant challenged the second age assessment on the ground that it was in breach of fair procedures, and also challenged the subsequent refugee status determinations on the ground that they were materially affected by the allegedly unsound age assessment test.

In granting leave, the Court held that it was arguable that the correct procedures, as outlined in A.M. v Refugee Applications Commissioner440 _were

not applied in the second age assessment, and that it was arguable that the Commissioner and Tribunal’s considerations were materially affected by the second age assessment, particularly with regard to credibility. Principles

Fair procedures must be applied in age assessments of applicants for asylum. It is arguable that a refugee status determination affected by adverse credibility findings in an age assessment test would be unsound for having regard to irrelevant matters.

5.4.5 Suspension of Applications

Z.B. v Refugee Applications Commissioner & Ors [2006] 1 IR 503; [2005] IEHC 452

High Court, Finlay Geoghegan J, 16/12/2005 Description

The applicant applied for asylum on the basis of a well-founded fear of persecution in Iraq. After his interview with the Refugee Applications Commissioner, the applicant contacted the Commissioner office and was told that a decision had been made and would be sent to him within ten days. When that time passed and he did not receive the decision, the applicant wrote to the Commissioner imploring her to send the decision to him. The Commissioner wrote to the applicant stating that her office had decided to suspend the determination of a number of applications relating to Iraqi applicants. The applicant’s solicitor requested a copy of his file from the Commissioner office. The Commissioner then sent the applicant’s solicitor a copy of what was later referred to as a draft of the Commissioner’s decision. The draft decision was to the effect that the applicant be declared a refugee. The applicant applied for judicial review, contending that the Commissioner was not entitled to suspend consideration of his application.

The Court found that the Commissioner’s decision to suspend consideration of applications of Iraqi nationals, including the applicant,

appeared to have been prompted by the commencement of military operations in Iraq in 2003. The Court held that the Commissioner’s decision to suspend consideration of the applicant’s claim was ultra vires and invalid, as there was nothing in the Refugee Act 1996, as amended, indicating that the Commissioner had the power to suspend such applications, and that the clear scheme of the 1996 act was that applicants were entitled to have their claims investigated and determined in a timely manner.

Principles

The Refugee Applications Commissioner does not have jurisdiction to suspend consideration of categories of asylum applications. Asylum applicants are entitled to have their applications investigated and determined in a timely manner.

5.4.6 Accelerated Procedures

Z v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform