Relaciones de los acogedores con los menores

The aim of this dissertation is to develop new insights into the important relationship between active shareholders and NAS in family firms and to derive implications for the corporate governance structure of these organizations.

To operationalize this goal, the study first reviews the current state of theory directed research into family firms and corporate governance (Chapter 2), before it investigates, analyses and interprets the empirical reality of family firms in order to derive new theoretical constructs that improve our understanding of the topic (Chapters 3 and 4). The resulting conceptual model has been consolidated into a set of fresh new propositions that are critically discussed in the context of existing theory. Finally, I translate the emerging framework into a practitioner-oriented three-step analysis process (Chapter 5) intending to operationalize the framework for the application in practice. The contents and results of each chapter are briefly summarized below.

Chapter 2 provides a comprehensive and exhaustive review of the prevailing theories in family business research and their implications for corporate governance. The review covers empirical articles published in different academic journals between 1964 and 2010 as well as books and dissertations published between 1957 and 2010. Overall the sample comprises of 235 publications including journal articles (82%), books (9%) dissertations (3%) and other sources (6%). The results indicate that a comprehensive theory of the family firm is missing and that the theory-based discussion of family firms is dominated by three commonly accepted frameworks being PAT, ST and RBV. On their own none of these frameworks explains either the specificities and dynamics of family firms in general, or the nature and dynamics of the relationship between active shareholders and NAS. Accordingly, existing theoretical constructs are unable to explain

why NAS follow complementing or conflicting objective functions as compared to their active counterparts and how corporate governance influences this relationship.

Based on the results of the literature review, Chapter 3 develops a theoretical explanation why NAS choose certain roles and how this role selection affects their objective functions. Based on the analysis of the empirical data gathered in seven case studies, I propose a conceptual framework suggesting that NAS engage in four generic roles being co-entrepreneurs, traditionalists, active investors and silent shareholders. For each role the framework indicates why and under which circumstances goal alignment or goal misalignment occurs and why, as a result, conflicts between active and NAS may arise. My results indicate that the role selection by NAS is influenced by the level of identification/emotional proximity and the desire for active participation on the part of the individual shareholders. The level of identification/emotional proximity is influenced by the emotional value (i.e. social status, reputation, feeling of belonging) and emotional costs (reputational risk, conscientiousness, social constraint) of the NAS, while the desire for active participation depends on the relative size of the shareholding of the NAS and their (self-) perceived level of competence.

Chapter 4 expands the analysis to include corporate governance. I find that corporate governance indeed influences the relationship between active shareholders and NAS by providing the boundary conditions for interactions between shareholders. It thus influences the role selection and role stability of NAS. The proposed construct suggests that family governance influences the dimension relevant for role selection by NAS and thus the level of goal alignment between active shareholder and NAS, unfolding a preemptive impact on conflict within the firm. By contrast, I propose that a well-defined business governance improves the willingness to engage in give-and-take, unfolding a curative effect on the conflict level within the firm. Moreover, the proposed model extends

the theoretical discussion of corporate governance in family firms by combining the perspectives of PAT and ST, suggesting that both may be equally valid for family firms, depending on the distribution of NAS among the different roles. Thus, PAT prescriptions are more applicable if shareholder relationships are characterized by a low level of identification and goal alignment, while ST finds application if the reverse is true. To summarize, these findings propose that corporate governance configuration can in fact influence the behavioral outcomes of family shareholders and therefore can be used to influence the level of goal alignment between active shareholders and NAS in family firms.

The proposed framework and associated insights have important implications for the management and governance of family firms with dispersed ownership structures. For this reason Chapter 5 offers some guidelines for practitioners. I summarize the proposed framework, slightly extending it by incorporating the concept of trust and translating it into a three-step-analysis process. This process can be used by managers to assess the level of goal alignment and the corresponding aptitude for conflict within their own firm, and to identify levers for adjusting corporate governance to tackle such situations.

The results of this dissertation indicate that the active management of shareholder relationships can affect the level of goal alignment and conflict within family firms and thereby provides important insights for the strategic management of family firms. Furthermore, the results indicate that the configuration of the corporate governance structure can be used as a tool to actively influence the role selection and role stability of NAS, which in turn leads to goal alignment or misalignment and lesser or greater propensity for conflict. The study thus contributes another piece of theory-directed research of the family firm. Moreover, active managers should also take the proposed coherences between corporate governance and shareholder relationships into account when

reviewing, adjusting or designing the governance structure of their firms. Therefore, the results are of equal interest, I believe, to both researchers and practitioners.

Looking forward, a deeper understanding about the performance implications of the proposed model and the large-scale empirical validation of the construct presented here, offer promising avenues for future research. Also replication studies might help to sharpen and refine propositions and conclusions. Nevertheless, the theoretical construct and empirical evidence presented in this dissertation may serve as points of orientation for future research in the field. As the ultimate goal of developing a comprehensive theory of the family firm has not yet been achieved, the field of family business research will remain an interesting and exciting area of research.