RELACIONES INTERPERSONALES

Like earlier Stoics, Epictetus acknowledges both that there are different causes for madness, such as μελαγχολία and extreme emotions, and there are distinctions within madness (not all φαῦλοι are so incapacitated that they cannot discriminate at all between impressions). Epictetus presents μελαγχολία as an exceptional form of madness, and invariably places it alongside dreaming and intoxication (1.18.23; 2.17.33; 3.2.5). Like some, Epictetus maintains that the sage is able to resist going mad,140 _{and for Epictetus, this is achieved through exercise in logic which is the third and}

final field in his programme of practical ethics. Practice in logic aims at perfection in the area of assent (e.g. 1.4.11), and the sage is able to withhold his assent from any unexamined impression, even in compromised states such as dreaming or μελαγχολία (ἵνα μηδ' ἐν ὕπνοις λάθῃ τις ἀνεξέταστος παρελθοῦσα φαντασία μηδ' ἐν οἰνώσει μηδὲ μελαγχολῶντος, 3.2.5).141 _{In another Discourse (1.18), the}

sage is said to be invincible because he cannot be disturbed by anything outside his own volition (προαίρεσις), and Epictetus compares the wise man’s mental invincibility to the strength of an athlete’s body (1.18.20-3).

Using a similar comparison, Epictetus contrasts this sort of ‘Athletic’ strength (τόνους ἐν σώματι, ἀλλ' ὡς ὑγιαίνοντι, ὡς ἀθλοῦντι) with an alternative kind of mental ‘strength’, the kind that

140 _{e.g. Cleanthes at DL 7.127, cf. Cic. Acad. 2.51-3. This is a controversial position; cf. Chrysippus at DL 7.127.}

141 _{Cf. 3.2.1-6 and 2.17.15-17. Exercise in logic is in the area of assent; on the relationship between logic and the other} fields, see Crivelli 2007, 22.

comes from a madman (φρενιτικοῦ τόνους), which is not really strength at all, but lack of strength (τοῦτο οὐκ εἰσὶ τόνοι, ἀλλ' ἀτονία, 2.15.2-3). Epictetus brings in the example of a friend who is committed to the apparently unexamined decision to starve himself to death (2.15.4-6). Impressions need to be scrutinised before they are given assent, and Epictetus criticises his friend’s persistence in standing by his decision unreflectively (κριθεῖσιν ἐμμένειν), explaining that he should only abide by the right sort of decisions (τοῖς ὀρθῶς, 2.15.7).142 _{As an example, Epictetus}

says that if it feels like night, and appears to be night, then the friend should stick to that decision (ἔμμενε, 2.15.7). In this comparison, Epictetus relates moral and perceptual judgements. For the Stoics, both are based on impressions: perceptual impressions deliver propositional content about the visual features of an object (e.g. ‘it is night’), but impressions can also contain information about an object’s moral character (e.g. ‘x or y is good’).143

An impression that it is day or that it is night should be self-evident or obvious to most people (as we have seen, the Stoics call impressions like these ‘graspable’ or cataleptic),144 _{but if}

someone’s capacity for impressions is severely compromised to the extent that they become blind to what is obvious (as in the case of Orestes), then this is tantamount to madness.145 _Epictetus

suggests that his friend should only be committed to his decision to starve himself to death if he is just as certain about it as he is about things which are obvious or evident (e.g. whether it is night or day). By using this example, Epictetus is implicitly drawing a comparison between his friend’s moral blindness and more severe forms of blindness: the friend’s ‘mad’ conviction when he is actually ignorant is equivalent to standing by the wrong judgement that it is night even when it is day.

To most people, the presumptuous friend is clearly different from someone who arbitrarily decides that it is night or day despite clear evidence to the contrary, but as part of his therapeutic

142 _{People such as Epictetus’ friend are acting on their ‘feelings’ (πάσχουσιν, 2.15.4; cf. παθὼν, 2.15.7) rather than proper} judgement. See Girdwood 1998, 167-9, ‘feelings’ denote an initial awareness of the propositional content of an impression prior to either assent or suspension of assent (see esp. 167: ‘the preliminary stage in the soul’s relationship with a new impression’); cf. Aetius Plac. 4.12.1-5 = SVF 2.54: φαντασία μὲν οὖν ἐστι πάθος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γιγνόμενον.

143 _{For the Stoics, a quality such as ‘goodness’ is a perceptible feature of bodies; see Frede 1987, 158.}

144 _{See e.g. SE M 7.244 where the lekton ‘it is day’ serves an example of an impression that is both persuasive (πιθανή)} and true (ἀληθής); cf. M 8.316.

145 _{Orestes is blind to what is obvious when he sees a Fury in place of Electra. Similarly, people experiencing extreme} emotions can become blind to what is obvious. See my discussion in the first part of this chapter.

approach Epictetus compares judgements in the sphere of moral action (e.g. about whether it is right to starve oneself to death or not) to more obvious perceptual errors (e.g. maintaining that it is night when it is not night). This comparison is supposed to show the friend the ridiculous nature of his stubbornness, because it relates his flawed presumption to the kind of mistake which no- one would make unless they were mad. For this approach to succeed, the friend must be able to recognise the contrast between his own moral blindness and the relative security he has in other areas of cognition.

Fools’ convictions have a degree of tenacity comparable to the wise man’s mental strength, but their beliefs lack the wise man’s clear moral discrimination (2.15.9). The sage has a firm grasp of reality coupled with the ability to withhold assent from unexamined impressions; by contrast, fools give assent to impressions indiscriminately and without examination, with the result that they become fixed in their delusions. Some hold onto their delusions with the same degree of certainty as the sage grasps truth, and Epictetus considers such a person a ‘foolish sage’ (σοφὸς μωρός) since they presume to have knowledge they do not have. These people are the most difficult to treat (δυσμεταχειριστότερον οὐδέν ἐστιν, 2.15.14), and their presumptuous conviction is directly compared to madmen (οἱ μαινόμενοι) who require hellebore in doses proportionate to the strength of their conviction (2.15.15).146 _{By way of explanation, Epictetus likens a weak mind}

(ἀσθενὴς ψυχή) to the various sicknesses of the body (2.15.20). Epictetus explains that just as a body is inclined to various different ailments (ὥσπερ ἐν νοσοῦντι καὶ ῥευματιζομένῳ σώματι ποτὲ μὲν ἐπὶ ταῦτα ποτὲ δ' ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα ῥέπει τὸ ῥεῦμα), so it is never clear what a weak mind’s inclinations are (ὅπου μὲν κλίνει, ἄδηλον ἔχει). When mental weakness is accompanied by a kind of ‘strength’ (τόνος), this combination can put the person beyond the philosopher’s help (2.15.20).

While it is possible to change the minds of some people (e.g. Epictetus’ starving friend, 2.15.13), others are unable to be persuaded of their false beliefs. Epictetus’ account of the ignorant person’s τόνος is supposed to explain the degree of presumption that exists together with their moral ignorance: those who are extremely presumptuous assume that their ignorant beliefs constitute knowledge, and the fixity of their delusions rivals the unshakable knowledge of the

sage, making them impossible to treat.147 _{In this respect, Epictetus’ account is similar to that found}

in Xenophon’s Memorabilia. As in Epictetus, Xenophon explains that presumption is what makes some forms of ignorance particularly intractable. For Xenophon presumption makes someone similar to a mad person, yet it also can be carried to such an extreme that it spills over into madness (as in the case of Anaxagoras whose presumed knowledge contradicts obvious facts). In Xenophon, those who are actually mad are characterised as beyond the help of Socrates’ philosophy.

In my discussion of Stoic doxography in the first part of this chapter, I showed that the Stoics were interested in the fact that moral ignorance gives rise to emotional responses that have the capacity to blind someone temporarily to what is obvious. For some (e.g. Posidonius, Cicero), this even seems to be the basis of the madness claim, and Chrysippus, who identifies madness with ongoing moral ignorance, holds that madness is at least most visible during instances of extreme emotion, and that it is the extreme nature of such responses which makes the term madness suitable. Epictetus takes a different approach. He is less interested in making a close connection between madness and the emotions (πάθη) typically produced by moral ignorance; instead, he emphasises the delusional aspects of moral ignorance itself. Rather than conceptualising madness as a proclivity for making a particular kind of ‘mad’ mistake, Epictetus shows how the proclivity itself, an ongoing lack of moral clarity, is just as mad as being uncertain about much more obvious appearances.