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If I wish to touch you but you do not wish to be touched, I may feel ashamed. If I wish to look at you but you do not wish me to, I may feel ashamed. If I wish you to look at me but you do not, I may feel ashamed. If I wish to look at you and at the same time wish that you look at me, I can be shamed. If I wish to be close to you but you move away, I am ashamed. If I wish to suck or bite your body and you are reluctant, I can become ashamed. If I wish to hug you or you hug me or we hug each other and you do not reciprocate my wishes, I feel ashamed. If I wish to have sexual intercourse with you but you do not, I am ashamed.

If I wish to hear your voice but you will not speak to me, I can feel shame. If I wish to speak to you but you will not listen, I am ashamed. If I would like us to have a

conversation but you do not wish to converse, I can be ashamed. If I would like to share my ideas, aspirations or my values with you but you do not reciprocate, I am ashamed. If I wish to talk and you wish to talk at the same time, I can become ashamed. If I want to tell you my ideas but you wish to tell me yours, I can become ashamed.

If I want to share my experiences with you but you wish to tell me your philosophy of life, I can become ashamed. If I wish to speak of personal feelings but you wish to speak about science, I will feel ashamed. If you wish to talk about the past and I wish to dream about the future, I can become ashamed. (Tomkins, 1963, p. 192)

The Proto Germanic, Indo-European, root meaning of the word “shame” is to uncover, or expose (Lynd, 1958). Until more recently, shame has been neglected in the psychological literature (Karen, 1992). Lately, shame has been the focus of a great deal of attention and debate, and has been seen by many scholars as “the master emotion, the unseen regulator of our entire affective life” (Karen, 1992, p. 1). It is seen as a regulator because it provides feedback on individuals’ social and moral acceptability, and plays an important role in guiding behaviour and motivating individuals to adhere to cultural prescriptions and moral standards, norms and conventions.

Shame may be studied in terms of its various component parts, including emotion, cognitions and beliefs about the self, behaviour and actions, as a mechanism that has evolved for reasons

of adaptation, and its manifestation in interpersonal dynamic interrelationships, but the emphasis varies depending on the particular perspective or theoretical understanding in question (Gilbert, 1998). Each theory adds a dimension to the understanding of shame, but H. B. Lewis’ (1971) influential theoretical work will be foregrounded in this chapter. This is because phenomenology emphasises subjectivity and the self as it experiences the world; and the importance of reflective attentiveness to the individual’s lived experience, all of which is consistent with an ethnographic study such as the one presented in this thesis. This theory also informs a great deal of the distinctions between shame and guilt in chapter 3, the majority of the empirical studies described in chapter 5, and the results presented in chapter 8 in

particular. In this chapter, I limit full exploration to phenomenological perspectives on shame, with selected aspects of psychoanalytic theory, as well as selected aspects of evolutionary theory, each vast theories in and of themselves. I have explained why I am guided by

phenomenology. I include aspects of psychoanalytic theory because of the relevance of Donna Orange and colleagues’ (2008, 1997) work on intersubjectivity and its relevance to any

qualitative study, and because self-psychology provides explanations for trauma-related attachment patterns, psychological cohesion and depletion. I also include the theoretical work of the psychoanalytically-orientated Fairbairn (1943) which is central to understanding the shame-based, split self. Finally, I include aspects of evolutionary theory because of its emphasis on shame as a social emotion (unlike psychoanalysis) and its emphasis on Social Attention Holding Power (SAHP), which has implications for those in subordinated,

disempowered or socially “misattuned” positions, which mirrored the positions that many of my participants were in.

I will also mention other prominent shame theories, like affect theory and cognitive

attribution theory, but only in passing, since theories such as these do not bear relevance to the theoretical basis of my study. My study does not focus on whether shame is innate (affect theory) or a developmental accomplishment (cognitive attributional theory). Clearly, since I was working with adult women rather than children, I assumed that they had already attained the capacity for experiencing shame, either because it was innately present since infancy or because it was achieved through objective self-awareness and self-reflection, core

requirements of cognitive attributional theory. Only psychological theories on shame will be discussed here; sociological theories (from Darwin, Cooley, Durkheim, MacDougall and Goffman to name a few) are beyond the scope of this chapter since the focus of this thesis is intrapsychic (Scheff, 1988).

One of the limitations in the literature is that most of the more prominent theories on shame depend heavily on the role of intimate attachment relationships in theorising how shame comes about. There is no engagement with the influence of the broader context, where group- based experiences of discrimination, denigration and disempowerment may also influence the development of shame and shame defenses (Kaminer, personal communication, May 24, 2012). Personal identity and group identity intersect very powerfully (Kaminer, personal communication, May 24, 2012). This is a point to which I will return in my discussion and conclusion.

Before reviewing phenomenological theory and other complementary selected sections of theories on shame, it is important to consider the following: There is no consensus in the theoretical literature whether shame is an innate, universal potential in all humans, or whether it is a developmental achievement, or whether it is evoked by certain experiences, such as for example, trauma (Karen, 1992). The contention in this thesis is that shame is a universal potentiality in all humans, but that for shame to become manifest, the individual must have achieved self-consciousness, and experienced triggering events. As such, early infantile shame-like responses, as are described in affect theory, for example, and by Gilbert (1998) in this chapter, are believed to be primitive, innate, automatically activated precursors to shame, which, as a defense against threat of attack or trauma of some kind, are developed and

elaborated upon to become the full aversive reaction they are in later childhood and

adulthood, once self-consciousness and triggering events have occurred. In my view, shame does not manifest until these two events have occurred.

There are a number of other vexing questions arising from the theories on shame. One of these questions is whether shame can be experienced internally or when alone, or whether it can only occur in the presence of an audience. In agreement with phenomenology, I would argue that shame can occur in both instances. Shame can, for example, occur when the self feels that it has not measured up to, or attained the goals of the idealised object or ideal self, thus experiencing shame in isolation (e.g. Self psychology). Equally, shame may be

experienced at the hands of an actively shaming, humiliating other, in a social context (e.g. Evolutionary theory). However, most theories, with which I concur, consider shame a social emotion. This brings me to the discussion of the main theory driving my understanding of shame: phenomenology.

Theories on the Nature and Functions of Shame

Phenomenological Theory

This study is rooted in phenomenological theory, which focuses on the subjective properties and structures of experience, although it does draw on selected aspects of other theories, such as psychoanalysis and evolutionary theory. H. B. Lewis’ (1971, 1987a, 1987b, 1987c) work is based on extensive transcripts of therapeutic interactions between her and her patients. Her main thesis, which focused on the role of the self in distinguishing between shame and guilt, is further elaborated on in the third chapter. Here, the nature, development and functions of shame from a phenomenological point of view are reviewed.

H. B. Lewis’ phenomenological formulation of shame is guided by three constructs: Freud’s construct of the superego; the self; and psychological differentiation (H. B. Lewis, 1971). The superego is understood as fulfilling a psychological regulatory function which monitors the internal workings of the psyche, and maintains some kind of homeostasis in terms of self- evaluation. This regulatory process is informed by the personal and moral values of the individual. In this monitoring role, the superego regulates human drives which can evoke shame, such as the sexual drive, but it also functions as an inhibitor of excessive pride, which is the antithesis of shame. Thus, the superego works as a psychological regulatory agency which strives to maintain a “balanced” self-evaluation and neutral self-esteem, based on the preservation of neutral affective interpersonal relationships (H. B. Lewis, 1971).

There are four features which are integral to the phenomenon of shame. Firstly, shame involves the desire to hide or disappear; to sink through the ground and cease to exist (M. Lewis, 1992). Secondly, shame involves intense psychological pain, discomfort and anger. Thirdly, shame involves feeling that the self is inadequate, defective and unworthy. Fourthly, shame involves the merging of subject and object – this fusion means that the self is unable to think clearly and ceases all activity; it is accompanied by the inability to talk and the inability to take any action. This final characteristic of shame is one of the main ways in which shame can be distinguished from guilt. In M. Lewis’ words:

Shame is the complete closure of the self-object circle. However, in guilt, although the self is the subject, the object is external to the self. The focus of the self is upon the behaviour that caused the interruption, namely the inadequacy to meet certain standards, and upon the object who suffers from that failure. Many have used terms like concern or regret as synonyms for guilt, suggesting a focus on something external to the self rather than on the self itself (M. Lewis, 1992, p. 34).

What is central to understanding this subject-object fusion is that it is “the social significance of the act, the eye of the other that produce[s] the shame” – in other words, shame is elicited when the self is able to see the socially inadequate or defective self (subject) from the perspective of the disapproving, contemptuous other (object) (M. Lewis, 1992, p. 30). Here, to see or perceive, literally means to judge or evaluate (M. Lewis, 1992).

The notion that shame is characterised by permeable self-boundaries revolves around specific conceptions of the self, and psychological differentiation. Because the source of the shame is outside the self, the self is able to observe itself from the point of view of the other, causing a fusion or merging between the self and the negatively evaluating other (H. B. Lewis, 1971). Thus, the self is divided in shame reactions – it is being criticised and scorned by the other, while it is simultaneously acutely aware of itself. In H. B. Lewis’ (1971) view, this divided activity of the self, and the difficulty in separating the self from its negatively evaluating surroundings, makes it very difficult for the self to function effectively.

Another characteristic of shame is that it manifests more readily in individuals who are field dependent (those who find it difficult to separate or decontextualise objects from an

embedding context, such as a hidden figure in a maze of embedding lines, which illustrate their relation to significant others [separation or tendency towards enmeshment]), and have less differentiated self-concepts and body images (H. B. Lewis, 1971, 1986). Furthermore, field dependent perceivers are more influenced by the opinions of others and are more other- directed in their social relationships (H. B. Lewis, 1971). They also have more positive attitudes towards others (social skills), more self-directed hostility, and tend to have poorer cognitive restructuring skills (H. B. Lewis, 1986). Finally, they are likely to use the defenses of repression and denial, which are cognitively less differentiated defenses (H. B. Lewis, 1971). In contrast, field independent perceivers tend to isolate affect, rationalise and intellectualise, all of which are more differentiated defenses (H. B. Lewis, 1971). Thus, a field-dependent type of superego functioning would involve shame, whereas a field- independent manner of superego functioning would involve guilt (H. B. Lewis, 1971).

The stimuli which evoke shame are multiple and varied, including, for example, aggressions, defeats, disappointments or failures; however, guilt is only evoked by one’s own transgression (H. B. Lewis, 1971). Guilt is more commonly evoked by transgressions of a moral nature, while there are both moral and non-moral varieties of shame (although its moral nature is often emphasised) (H. B. Lewis, 1971).

As in evolutionary theory, discussed later in the chapter, in H. B. Lewis’ (1987a)

phenomenological understanding of shame, shame is the unavoidable response to loss of love; the loss of an important social relationship. H. B. Lewis (1987a) argues that shame, the result of the loss of the other, is inevitably accompanied by humiliated fury, the purpose of which is to protest the loss and demand restitution of the other’s positive feeling towards the self, which then leads to feelings of guilt. In order to preserve physical proximity to the love object, the self may choose to avoid him/her instead of reacting in aggression towards

him/her. The self may also repress rageful longings towards the other to protect the social tie. What is central to H. B. Lewis’ understanding of shame is that shame is about the whole self; the totality, whereas guilt involves the activity of the self, with much less perceptual feedback as a result of the self’s activities and experiences. Therefore, shame is a narcissistic reaction to the perception that the whole self has been attacked, and is evoked by an inability to live up to the ego-ideal (H. B. Lewis, 1971). It deeply affects the individual’s sense of identity. It often results in externally directed hostility, or what H. B. Lewis has termed “shame-rage”. Shame- rage can only occur in the context of an affective relationship between the self and a

significant, valued other. Hostility expressed towards this other is understood as a means of “turning the tables” against the other who has scorned or ridiculed the self, yet because the other is loved and admired, guilt about the self’s aggressive wishes or actions is evoked. In some cases, the idealised image of the other may be amended, and may become devalued, but in this case the loved or admired other is lost. More typically, shame-based rage is turned against the self because the self is passive and defective in relation to the idealised other (H. B. Lewis, 1971).

Lynd (1958, p. 50) captures H. B. Lewis’ (1971) assertion of shame’s pervasiveness and effect on the whole self by explaining that:

An experience of shame of the sort I am attempting to describe cannot be modified by addition, or wiped out by subtraction, or exorcised by expiation. It is not an isolated

act that can be detached from the self. It carries the weight of ‘I cannot have done this. But I have done it and I cannot undo it, because this is I’.

It is this experience that makes shame unspeakable; shame comes with uncodified detail and with diffused feeling; there is no readily expressive language of shame – the irrational threat implied in shame is abandonment terror, in contrast to the fear in guilt of mutilation (Lynd, 1958). Implied in this inability to communicate shame is profound loneliness and isolation, and may lead to depersonalisation and dehumanisation (Lynd, 1958).

In H. B. Lewis’ understanding, shame can occur in private or in public; of central importance is that the self perceives that it is being negatively evaluated, either in reality or in fantasy (H. B. Lewis, 1971). Shame involves a great deal of self-imagery and self-consciousness, and involves significant perceptual feedback, particularly autonomic activation, including blushing, sweating and accelerated heart rate (H. B. Lewis, 1971). These reactions make shame an involuntary, acutely painful experience. Shame has been recognised as an

involuntary experience that consumes and overwhelms the self, takes the individual off guard, caught unawares, for a number of decades (Lynd, 1958). Shame reactions result in what has been described as “an implosion of the self”, accompanied by the body curved in on itself, head bowed and eyes closed (H. B. Lewis, 1971, p. 37). M. Lewis (1992) similarly argues that the phenomenological experience of shame includes not only the wish to die, hide or

disappear, but leads to the disruption of current behaviour, confusion and loss of speech, and a physical shrinking of the body. Consequently, shame is associated with more body awareness than guilt, and tends to be experienced as a primitive, irrational reaction in which body functions are out of control (H. B. Lewis, 1971; Lynd, 1958). Shame has been described as a wordless state, characterised instead by the imagery of watching or being observed (H. B. Lewis, 1971). Thus, in shame states, there is a split between affect and cognition – with limited cognitive activity and a flood of affective (and autonomic) activity (H. B. Lewis, 1971). Like H. B. Lewis (1971), Lynd (1958) argues that shame is also activated by a sense of incongruity and alienation in the social environment, manifest in the discrepancy between the reality of what is happening and what is expected to happen (Lynd, 1958). This is

accompanied by a breakdown in trust (and associated social isolation and estrangement), which involves questioning one’s own adequacy or questioning the values of the social context which contradict what one has been led to expect (Lynd, 1958).

H. B. Lewis’ (and M. Lewis’) phenomenological understanding of shame not only focuses on the emotional experience of shame, it includes as central feature a sense of heightened

consciousness of the self, self-awareness or self-attention, which is where these scholars overlap with cognitive attributional theorists. H. B. Lewis (1971) in particular argued that shame is located not only in the flood of affectivity and autonomic arousal which

accompanies it, but also in our thoughts about our selves, and that these thoughts involve the real or imagined disapproval of significant others. For these scholars, shame is not only a disruption or reduction of positive emotions, but is also a state of exaggerated awareness of the self which is considered inadequate (M. Lewis, 1992).

Psychoanalytic and Psychoanalytic-based Understandings of Shame

It is important to note at the outset that, surprisingly, Freud had “no consistent theory of shame. Shame received relatively little attention in the Freudian corpus, especially as

contrasted with anxiety and guilt” (Broucek, 1991, p. 12). Freud’s limited attention to shame meant he understood it only as reactive, inhibitory, and prohibitive, opposing the pleasure principle and preventing engagement in natural but shameful behaviours, including sexual activities such as voyeurism and exhibitionism or activities centred round waste elimination (Broucek, 1991). Later psychoanalysts, such as Erik Erikson (1950) (focusing on the eight stages of the life cycle, of which one is the battle between autonomy and shame and doubt), Piers and Singer (1953) (focusing on the tension between ego and ego ideal), Wurmster (1987, 1995) (focusing on extending the classical psychoanalytic tradition of examining shame in relation to voyeurism and exhibitionism) and A. P. Morrison (1989) (focusing on understanding narcissism from the point of view of tension between ego and ego ideal) did however, attend to shame, but none of these theorists produced a full and substantial theory