Relato elaborado 1 30

Saying that HRM decentralization in Tanzanian governmental organizations is something worth to think about is an understatement, given the state of affairs depicted in the preceding sections. Firstly, it was shown that the existing legisla- tion tends to imply a lot of limitations regarding the realization of HRM decen- tralization. Thereafter it was argued that the quality of HRM is endangered in several respects when those limitations are actually put into practice. Finally, a description of the situation in Dodoma and Chamwino made clear that the latter is indeed happening. At first sight, this state of affairs seems to call for another local government reform program, which will once more enlarge the discretion- ary power of local authorities: still more HRM decentralization, in short. Indeed, a conclusion that can be drawn from the facts collected in this chapter is that the human resource management of LGAs would benefit from a number of thor- oughgoing decentralization measures, such as:

 A change of rules in such a way that recruitment decisions can only be made with the explicit consent of the local authorities, or even on the initiative of those authorities.

 A change of rules in such a way that local adaptations of reward systems in use become possible (salary levels becoming differently linked to jobs across districts).

 A change of rules in such a way that the task of taking care of the training and development of local civil servants is entirely transferred from the central government to the local governments.

Measures like these might indeed be beneficial, but it would be short-sighted to take them without simultaneously paying attention to a number of issues that fundamentally affect HRM quality in Tanzanian LGAs. These issues came into view in the preceding sections. Three of them are elaborated below and each of the resulting elaborations gives rise to the need for more measures to be taken in addition to extra decentralization measures.

1. Some indispensable contributions to the quality of local HRM can only be made through the centralization of decision-making. Thoughtless decentrali- zation actions might only destroy those contributions. Firstly, in regards to HRM effectiveness, a central agency will always be needed in order to keep an eye on the way local authorities do their work. Secondly, in regards to HRM efficiency, it would be a waste of resources if local authorities were made responsible for tasks such as nationwide recruiting and nationwide ne- gotiations with suppliers of training and development services. Finally, in re- gards to HRM fairness, only the influence of the central government can make sure that civil servants all over the country are treated alike. To safe- guard the quality of local HRM in these respects, a number of centralized HRM tasks thus need to be solidified rather than weakened.

2. In regards to the fairness of HRM, local authorities may sometimes be liable to give in to forces that privilege certain people in the community. As a con- sequence, forms of tribalism and nepotism in the community are suspected and this plain fact could be a reason to curtail the power of the local authori- ties somehow. It would, however, make no sense to reduce the decentraliza- tion of HRM responsibilities to that end. Entitling central agencies instead of local authorities to make certain types of decisions would only relocate the problem and would furthermore generate new problems. Rather than re- centralization, the instalment of fairness inspectors who work independently of authorities could be a solution.

3. The most fundamental issue that complicates the regulation of HRM centrali- zation and HRM decentralization is that civil servants find themselves in a situation of dual-employment. They actually have two employers. On the one hand, they are employees of their own local authority; on the other hand they are employed by the central government. By itself, this fact is already confus- ing. What makes things worse, however, is that the interests of the two em- ployers do not always coincide. A local authority may, for instance, have rea- sons to want to appoint a certain official in its own district because of the spe-

cific competences of that person and the central government may simultane- ously have reasons not to appoint that person there because those competenc- es are needed elsewhere. There is a conflict of two equally respectable inter- ests, then. In solving that type of conflict, measures in terms of HRM central- ization or HRM decentralization can only fail. They would be in favour of the interests of one party at the expense of the interests of the other. A different type of solution is needed: one that helps to integrate local and central inter- ests. It is too much to elaborate on this issue here. In any case, solutions should preferably not consist of new and meticulous demarcations of rights and responsibilities. Instead, recipes for optimizing co-decision making pro- cesses of local and central authorities are called for.

This chapter started by raising a couple of simple questions about HRM decen- tralization in Tanzanian governmental organizations. It ended by giving complex answers to these questions and, in addition to that, raising new questions. For the reader, this might be a discouraging and frustrating experience. Hopefully, how- ever, the chapter made clear to him/her that simple answers will always run the risk of being false. Hopefully, the chapter provided him/her with concepts to be used when deliberating how to act. In fact, the chapter can be seen as a series of lessons learnt from decentralization efforts in the past. Viewed that way, it may serve to equip the makers of future policies to do their job, however puzzling the lessons may sometimes feel.