La relevancia de la regulación en materia de zonas de frontera

The Oslo secret peace talks between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)23 were concluded with the announcement of the Declaration of Principles (DOP) in 199324, which formed the basis for further negotiations concluded by the Israeli-Palestinian “Interim Agreement”25 _{of 1995, and the creation of “Palestinian Interim Self-Government}

Authority”26_{, which was supposed to end in 1999 when a permanent agreement would be}

reached27. It was agreed to postpone a number of issues known as the final status issues till the third year of the process. Jerusalem was one of these issues. Though the DOP did not define the outcome of the process, it was understood that it will end by the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel (Shihadeh, 1993). However, the implementation of the “Interim Agreement” was not easy, many obstacles delayed its implementation, including the suicide attacks carried out by Hamas28, the assassination of

22_{The statement proclaimed by Yasser Arafat on 15 November 1988 in which he assumed the title of}

“President of Palestine”.

23 _{The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) is an organization founded in 1964 with the purpose of the}

"liberation of Palestine" through armed struggle. It is recognized as the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people". It has enjoyed observer status at the United Nations since 1974. The PLO was considered by the United States and Israel to be a terrorist organization until the Madrid Conference in 1991. In 1993, the PLO recognized Israel's right to exist in peace, accepted UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, and rejected "violence and terrorism"; in response, Israel officially recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people.

24 _{See Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements on www.cfr.org/israel/oslo-} accords.../p9674

25_{See “The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (“Oslo 2”—}

9/28/95)” https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/interimtoc.html

26 _{he situation is the same since then till the time being.}

27 _{See Shlaim, A. (2005). The rise and fall of the Oslo Peace process; International relations of the Middle}

East, 241-61

28 _{Hamas is a Palestinian Islamic organization; it was founded in 1987 (during the First Intifada) as an}

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the Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin by a Jewish right-wing activist and the election of Binyamin Netanyahu as prime minister in 1996 (Pundak, 2001).

According to Oslo Accords the West Bank, excluding the Jewish settlements and military locations, was supposed to be transferred to the Palestinians in three portions one every six months under the arrangement of redeployment. To facilitate this process, it was agreed that it will be divided into three criteria: A, B, and C. Area C was supposed to be transferred to B, then B to A, until the whole area becomes A under the control of the Palestinian Authority (AbuZayyad, November 1, 2013). However, the implementation of the process was halted in the middle, and the West Bank remained divided into three administrative divisions: the area A, B, and C with different civic and security authorization (Jamal, 2009). First: area A, 3 % of the West Bank, with a full civil and security control by the Palestinian Authority, it includes the Palestinian cities29 and their surrounding areas. Second: area B, 24% of the West Bank with a Palestinian civil control and joint Israeli-Palestinian security control, such as East Jerusalem suburbs. And finally area C, the remaining 73% of the West Bank, with a full Israeli civil and security control. By 2000, following a series of agreements, the relative distribution of the areas had changed; area A covered 18% of the West Bank, area B covered 22% and area C 64%30. The areas in which the Palestinians had full control were as Gordon (2008: 36) described "like an archipelago of sorts, while the areas controlled by Israel were strategic corridors that interrupted the territorial contiguity of the West Bank”. The categorization of area A, B, and C was built on the Palestinian population density; all Palestinian cities with high population density were given to the Palestinian Authority with full civil and security control. After the redeployment of Israeli military forces, and the transfer of responsibility to the Palestinian Police, defined as the only Palestinian security authority, their purpose was to act systematically against all expressions of violence and terror. The Palestinian Authority was expected to prevent violence and terror against Israel, and to

29 _{The cities of Jenin, Nablus, Tulkarem, Qalqilya, Ramallah, Bethlehem and Jericho} 30_{The Agreements were Wye I, II and III and Sharam I.}

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assume responsibility for the personal security of the Palestinians under its sovereignty. In area B the Palestinians implemented civilian authority while Israel continued to be in charge of security (Shlaim, 2005). There was a different interpretation of the term “joint Israeli- Palestinian security control”. For the Israelis: security means only the security of Israel, not the Palestinians’ security, Israeli security forces actually interfere in area B only when there is a threat to its own security, but it will not interfere when it comes to the Palestinian security (AbuZayyad, October 20, 2013), he further explained: when a car accident occurs between two Palestinian cars, for example, the Israelis do not interfere. On the other hand, Palestinian police cannot move freely from Area A to B because they have first to coordinate with the Joint Security Coordination office, which usually takes up to forty-eight (48) hours to be convened within according to the Cairo Protocol. This is useless in case of emergencies. This classification of A, B, C, was supposed to be temporary whereas area C would-be gradually transferred to area B, and B to the area A in 18 months until all the West Bank, except for Israeli military bases and settlements, would become area A with Palestinian full control of civilian affairs as well as security. All this was not carried out by the end of 1999, the designated time-frame according to the Oslo Accords. Prime Minister Ehud Barak was against the transformation, and suggested to postpone it to the final status agreement (AbuZayyad, October 20, 2013). Gordon (2008) argues that the overarching logic of the

Oslo Accords could be summarized with “Israel transferred all responsibilities relating to the management of the population to the Palestinians themselves while preserving control of Palestinian space” (Gordon, 2008: 35).

Economically; the 1993 signing of the Declaration of Principles and the conclusion of the Paris Protocol in April 1994, as Gross (1999: 1556), put it “were to signify the dawn of an old-new era. This era was "old" in the sense of a return to the format of economic integration before the First Intifada; that is from 1967-1987, but "new" insofar as that integration was based on a consensual, rather than unilateral, understanding”. Fischer et al. (2001) presented the assumptions for a vibrant Palestinian entity done by a group of Palestinian,

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Jordanian, Israeli, and American economists31 in 1993, before the Oslo negotiations had reached them or the public. They recommended that the Palestinian economy would be dominated by the private sector and markets will decide the allocation of resources. Free trade in goods and capital among the Palestinian entity, Israel and Jordan and at least, some 100,000 Palestinian workers would be again allowed to work in Israel, since the number was reduced for security reasons during the First Intifada. In addition to a Palestinian economic administration that would be created to manage the financial system, including the chartering and supervision of new banks; and some arrangements regarding taxes that would be spent on Palestinian infrastructure. And finally, foreign aid, that would have to play a major part in the economic development of the new Palestinian entity. Fischer et al. (2001) further argued that some of the conditions above were met; some of the greatest important were not. Support from the donor community, for example, has been generous, and it is definitely not responsible for the inadequate growth performance. But the freedom of trade in goods and services between the Palestinian economy and Israel, and with Jordan, expectations were not valid, Fischer et al. (2001: F264) explained:

“…indeed the Palestinian economy has not only suffered from lack of adequate access to world markets, but also, and probably more importantly, from restrictions on the movement of goods

and people between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and at times even among cities and

villages in the West Bank. This negative environment has been the result of the permits system

and the intensification of controls; including periods of closure which Israel has imposed often in

response to security incidents or at times when the risk of security incidents was perceived to be high”.

The Israeli restrictions on the free movement of Palestinians since 1993 reduced the number of Palestinians who were allowed to work in Israel. Fischer et al. (1994) argued that

31_{As presented by Stanley Fischer, Patricia Alonso-Gamo, and Ulric Erickson von Allmen in their article}

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sustained large labor flow from the West Bank and Gaza to Israel would be essential for the Palestinian economic development, especially in the beginning; the Palestinian economy needs time till investments increase and so does the demand for labor. However, the political situation worsened in the years 1995-6, because of the Israeli closure policy which reduced the number of working permits. Consequently, the employment of Palestinians in Israel and the settlements deteriorated causing a deep recession in the Palestinian economy (Fischer, Alonso‐Gamo, & Von Allmen, 2001). Both Parties in signing the Oslo Accords did not fulfil their promise; Israel promised there would not be any more settlements on Palestinian land; Palestinians promised there would be an end to violence. While well- intentioned, the Oslo negotiations eventually fell apart (Smith, 2010). The failure of the peace talks led to the outbreak of the Second Intifada in 2000, a wave of violence and counter violence on both sides had started. More on the Second Intifada in the next section: