RENDIMIENTO ACADÉMICO

It seems clear th a t Hadow gradually grew attuned to those in support of appeasem ent and th a t he drifted tow ards these figures in the mid to late 1930s as the policy gained momentum under Chamberlain. This m eant an autom atic shift away from m any of his colleagues in the Foreign Office who continued to support a policy of containm ent of Germany and Italy. The shift was clear from the tim e of his posting in London b u t had begun developing as early as his time in Vienna. Officials in the Foreign Office grew aware of Hadow's divergence from th eir own views and expressed th e ir differences largely in m in u tes on his despatches; his earliest and gradually most trenchant critic being Sir Orme Sargent. Sargent, who was head of the C entral D epartm ent and became A ssistant U nder-Secretary of State, is described by M artin G ilbert and Richard Gott as the strongest opponent of appeasem ent in the Foreign Office: "He refused any comprom ise, how ever a ttractiv e superficially"[l]. S arg en t advocated a "classical" policy for B ritain in th a t she could not allow any one power to dominate Europe. Germany was therefore to be contained by alliances; preferably Franco-British, but the Soviet Union should be included if necessary.

O thers in th e lânii(jr\C?p[<cc who opposed conciliation of

right-w ing states as the prime object of foreign policy included laurcAce. Collier, Phipps, Sir Reginald Deeper, D uncan Sandys, Sir Ralph W igram, and V ansittart, the latte r being well-known for his stringently-voiced criticism of any pro-G erm an line. V an sittart grew to deplore the tendency in B ritain to divorce G erm an dom estic b ru tality from possible aggression abroad, because he realised th a t N azism w as incapable of such a division[2]. T hat these officials supported containm ent is not to say, however, th a t they did not, a t different tim es, recommend limited concessions to both Germany and Italy, but the basis of the m ajority of their recommendations rested on a strong defence and a curbing of these countries' aims. In this crucial sense they differed from Hadow.

T hat Hadow could deviate from the Foreign Office line is due to changes in its role and the workings w ithin this institution, and a lack of agreem ent between certain factions which made a clear-cut policy difficult to define. K eith M iddlem as w rites in

Diplomacy of Illusion th a t in the days when Eyre Crowe headed the Foreign Office it would have been inconceivable for Heads of D epartm ents or Ambassadors to by-pass the norm al channels of com m unication or directly comm unicate w ith m em bers of the Cabinet[3]. B ut a quick succession of Foreign Secretaries after 1929 weakened this system and heads of departm ents acquired greater freedom. A rthur H enderson, the M arquess of Reading,

Sir Sam uel H oare, and S ir Jo h n Simon w ere all Foreign S ecretaries d u rin g th e y ears Hadow w orked in V ienna. H enderson had been caught up in Geneva w ith the post-w ar settlem ents and the League of Nations, Reading was only Foreign Secretary for four m onths, Hoare had been forced to resign, and Simon served three years b u t showed a lack of initiative and was disliked and m istru ste d in th e Foreign Office. T hese circum stances com bined w ith th e general erosion of th e dominance of the Foreign Office due partly to the form ation of special m inisterial committees probably helped to cloak any major differences of opinion betw een Hadow and his superiors during the early 1930s.

In the years he worked under Phipps in A ustria Hadow grew to have little respect for the latter. Sharing the n atu ral cynicism of m any anti-appeasers, Phipps possessed m any of the qualities of a good diplomat. This probably gave rise to impatience from Hadow who increasingly interpreted his job more loosely. The impression Hadow's sister-in-law received when she visited him in Vienna was th a t he "bullied " Phipps, and this im pression is supported by a letter Sargent wrote a t one point to Phipps: "Your letter of A ugust 12, enclosing Hadow's b rutal suggestion th at you should break your leave to come up to London and join in the A ustrian financial struggle. Hadow m ust be a hard hearted fellow and I shall be no party to his proposal"[4]. From Vienna

Phipps w ent on to become Am bassador to B erlin and, like the form er Am bassador Sir Horace Rumbold, grew alarm ed a t the excesses of the Nazi regime, describing H itler as "a fanatic who would be satisfied w ith nothing less th an the dom inance of Europe"[5]. Rumbold and Phipps were not heeded, however; Sir Ne vile Henderson, (who bficafvxc, Aft\basSGdorio2firl»V\mR3ri

Ihc latter too pro-French to understand Germany objectively[63.

Sir Walford Selby who replaced Phipps in V ienna in 1933 got on ra th e r b etter w ith Hadow despite disagreem ent over Germ an intentions, and he sent praise of Hadow's efforts on the financial aspects of his work. Selby later wrote of Hadow when describing the 1934 Vienna rebellion, "If I succeeded in any way in extricating myself from a well-nigh impossible situation I owe an im m ense debt to...Mr. Hadow...[who] was anxious to prevent the overthrow of Chancellor Dollfuss. He threw him self w ith ardour into the task of securing the distribution of funds collected by our Trade Unions in England"[7]. Selby later sharply criticised the Foreign Office of the 1930s, largely attributing "the disaster of 1939" to faulty organisation in W hitehall[8].

The line taken by the Foreign Office from 1931 to 1934 . regarding G erm any and E uropean concerns w as vague and erratic, being ham pered by in tern al differences and a lack of guidance from Simon. The central principle appeared to be to avoid any disruption of the existing order, and the Foreign Office

aim was, a t th a t tim e, to prevent shifts in balance among the g reat powers and to reconcile local difficulties and tensions. Middlemas w rites, "from the earliest years following the war, it was our policy to elim inate those parts of the Peace Settlem ent which, as practical people, we knew to be u n ten ab le and indefensible"[9]. Hadow apparently took this policy to heart.

In November 1931, when the B ritish G overnm ent was preparing for the D isarm am ent Conference, S argent began to argue w ithin the Foreign Office th a t the C abinet needed a new approach to foreign affairs. He contended in an analysis of European and world problems produced by w ar and depression th a t finances and economy, security and disarm am ent, territories and Treaty revision, were all linked, Sargent believed th at French security ag ain st G erm an im perialism was the com m anding issue, implying th a t France had reason to fear the future and th a t the Locarno agreem ents were inadequate protection. If "real stability" was to be restored to Europe, the B ritish Government should unequivocally g u aran tee territo rial order[10]. Such recommendations were too strong for the Cabinet and did not fit in with Simon's view of the situation or his cautious approach. He was being criticised a t this time for failure to take a stronger line over Japanese aggression in M anchuria, and his view th a t "we m ust keep out of trouble in Central Europe a t all costs" was not calculated to deflect H itler and Mussolini from th eir designsfll].

Even Neville C ham berlain, who was then C hancellor of the Exchequer, said of Simon, "the fact is th at his m anner inspires no confidence and th a t he seems tem peram entally unable to m ake up his mind to action when a difficult situation arises"[12].

By the late sum m er of 1933 the Foreign Office did begin to make stronger attem pts to promote effective protection of A ustria - a policy which Hadow adhered to in his defence of A ustrian independence, and one which was m ainly the resu lt of the in itiativ e of V a n sitta rt. U nlike Hadow, how ever. H itle r’s aggressive A u stria n policy confirm ed V a n s itta rt in his anti-G erm an attitude. The Perm anent U nder-Secretary of State warned the British Government th a t A ustria confronted it with a "European crisis of the first magnitude", with H itler’s "first trial of strength". He fu rth er wrote, "The future of Europe tu rn s largely on the fashion of our facing the G erm an challenge over A ustria, in w hich we are a t p resen t likely to lose. The seriousness of the challenge can only be realised if it is not seen as an isolated case...but as the first in a series of challenges, each one of which will carry with it a nearer threat to this country’l l 3].

Before 1933, Hadow's reports were fairly consistent with

I

general views in the Foreign Office and even, a t tim es, received

praise. N ear the end of 1931 Sargent wrote Hadow to thank him for his letters on the International Socialist Conference, "which V ansittart and I have read with much interest"[14]. By the end of

1933, however, criticism of m any of Hadow's observations and recommendations became apparent in the Foreign Office, m ost notably from Sargent. In commenting on a m em orandum by Hadow on A ustro-G erm an relations in A ugust 1933, S argent m inuted th a t Hadow's suggestion th at Italian policy a t this time was not averse to accepting Anschluss within the framework of a Central European Union lead by Germany and Italy was "worth reading but hardly credible". V ansittart added his agreem ent to this observation[15]. W hen, in Septem ber of th a t year, Hadow suggested B ritish m ediation in A ustro-G erm an relatio n s, V ansittart wrote, "I do not think it our business to m ediate - especially on such slender grounds as these...If the Germ ans do really desire to sober down while saving th eir faces - I doubt w hether H itler does w ant to sober down over A ustria - somebody like H err V. N eurath will make an approach to the S[ecretary] of S[tate] a t Geneva"[16]. V an sittart was voicing an objection to Hadow's recommendations which was soon to become the major one of anti-appeasers in the Foreign Office in response to his despatches: th at B ritain should not involve herself in any attem pts a t m ediation in Europe; especially th a t w hich concerned Germany.

In 1934, ju st before the attem pted Nazi putsch in Vienna, Hadow sent Sargent a despatch on the effect of the SA revolt in Germany on A ustrian public opinion. "If a G erm an collapse

would deliver A ustria from the political m enace of Nazidom", Hadow wrote, "it is also expected by A ustrians to produce economic suffering, and possibly a form of communism hardly less dangerous to the life of this country, th an a N azi victory". R.A. Gallop of the Southern D epartm ent commented, "I cannot resist the feeling th a t Vienna is getting on Mr. Hadow's nerves and th a t his view of the situation is unnecessarily gloomy. Perhaps this is not u n n atu ral while he rem ains the 'cook and captain bold' (this despatch is self-typed) with Mr. Pollard as the 'crew of th e N ancy brig'"[17]. S argent appeared to be in agreem ent w ith this view. In his comments on a letter from Hadow containing notes which expressed despair over A ustria's economic situation leading to a loss of all th a t G erm an visitors m eant to the country, concern over the lack of discipline and corruption in A ustria, and the suggestion th a t A ustro-G erm an relations had practically ceased to exist, Sargent w rote, "I am getting a little tired of Mr. Hadow's oft-repeated conclusion to the effect th at A ustria is bound to collapse unless succour reaches her speedily from G reat B ritain. W hat does Hadow really wish to imply when he says this? I rath er suspect th at he has repeated this phrase so often th a t it has ceased to have any real m eaning for him"[18].

By 1934 Hadow was irritating Sargent to the extent th at the latter sent a com plaint to V ienna over the state of Hadow's

typew riter which he wished had a larger script and a blacker ribbon. "Even if the first of these deficiencies is beyond remedy surely the second m ight be rectified by the purchase of a new ribbon"[19]. V an sittart, however, was not so critical and in A ugust w rote to th e M inister in V ienna W alford Selby congratulating Hadow on the "detailed an d illum inating" memorandum recently sent, "It is full of inform ation and shows how much of the A ustrian background he has acquired during his service in Vienna. He deserves the greatest credit for it"[20].

Hadow also received criticism from Duncan Sandys of the Central D epartm ent, who, a t one stage, m inuted th a t he doubted the accuracy of Hadow's reports of an approaching G erm an compromise w ith A ustria. Sandys had joined the Foreign Office in 1930, and worked as Third Secretary in Berlin under Sir Horace Rumbold who was Am bassador there from 1928 to 1933. Both Sandys and Rumbold had become aware of the implications of the Nazi regime and Rumbold sent London warnings of its brutality and potential aggression abroad, while Sandys retu rn ed to London convinced of the need for a positive British policy. Sandys was too junior, however, for his opinions to carry weight, and when in 1933 he expressed his fears and views on B ritish policy in the event of German occupation of the Rhineland, Simon merely com m ented, "we cannot consider hypothetical issues"[21]. Sandys resigned from the Foreign Office in 1933 in protest against

the G overnm ent’s G erm an policy and became a Conservative M.P. in 1935, later joining the anti-appeasem ent groups of Eden and Churchill. Gilbert and Gott w rite th at Sandys was "a realist, not a visionary"t22]. His understanding of the situation was not likely to coincide w ith Hadow's inspired conclusions.

While in A ustria, Hadow had expressed his own opinions often, but his early adoption of appeasem ent had yet to m eet with any great disagreem ent in London. Knowledge of the implications of N azi G erm any was still unclear despite w arnings from Rumbold, and avoidance of confrontation in Europe was an implicit concern. Hadow's drift towards appeasem ent was a t this tim e slow and vague enough th a t he could correspond privately and am icably w ith another anti-appeaser Sir R alph W igram. Wigram, was head of the Central D epartm ent, close to Churchill and V ansittart, and "a great friend of France". W hen Sandys resigned from the Foreign Office Wigram believed he was right to go: "I wish I'd done it long ago. I left it too long". J u s t after the German occupation of the Rhineland, Wigram m ade the famous statem ent, "War is now inevitable...I have failed to m ake the people here realise w hat is a t stake"[23]. Hadow often addressed W igram as "Wigs" and had no qualms over m aking observations to him on the despatches from V ienna w hich he saw as a "reflection of my departing chief’ (Phipps)[24].

growing and was represented by the still fairly strong Eyre Crowe tradition kept up by V ansittart and the beginnings of appeasem ent in Sim on's cautious approach. The Foreign Office shared Hadow's pessim istic view of A ustria and w as sym pathetic regarding N azi attack s on h er G overnm ent, b u t a p a rt from initiatives taken by V ansittart in the late sum m er of 1933 (while Simon was away on holiday), in which effective protection of A ustria was promoted more energetically, this m oral support did not actually express itself in stronger political action. Hadow, already, w as arguing for approaches to G erm any, w hereas V an sittart and Sargent saw strong alliances w ith France and Italy as the key to the prevention of Anschluss.

At this tim e Hadow received a personal letter from the Liberal M.P. Bernays which gave a fairly clear indication of the difference in views between Hadow and a large p art of the Foreign Office. Bernays had had a talk w ith Anthony Eden, who became Foreign Secretary in 1935, and pu t forward Hadow's case for a

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