RENDIMIENTOS Y COSTOS

Stop and searches began to decline in 2009/10 (figure 6.1), initially primarily driven by the curtailing of exceptional powers (table 6.1). Use of section 44 fell by 56% in 2009/10 to just over 90,000 recorded searches from over 210,000 encounters in the previous year 2008/09 (table 6.1). It continued to fall in 2010/11 as it was repealed that year following a European Court of Human Rights judgement ruling that it was too broad to protect against arbitrary detention.39 _{Coinciding with this judgement, section 60 use fell moderately in}

2009/10 to under 120,000 searches but declined precipitously from 2010/11 following its own legal challenge.40 _{From thereon, volumes declined from the tens of thousands in the}

years 2010/11 and 2011/12 to just over 5,300 in 2012/13, or by 89% on the previous year.

Section 1 and other powers requiring reasonable suspicion (“PACE searches”) saw comparatively fewer reductions over this initial period and even increased in 2009/10. It increased again in 2010/11 such that it more than compensated for the reductions in section 60 use that year, or for 78% of the reductions in section 44. This suggests that there may have been a displacement effect as officers resorted to invoking suspicion-based powers where they would have otherwise used an exceptional power. This supports previous research suggesting that the threshold of reasonable suspicion operates as a weak procedural safeguard due to officers' widely divergent interpretations of what it entails (Quinton, 2011; HMIC 2013; also chapter 4). It was only later from 2012/13 that PACE searches fell more substantially following the significant national government scrutiny of those powers discussed throughout the findings. In 2012/13, there were just over a million searches representing a fall of 11% (or 130,000 fewer searches) and use fell by another 11% in 2013/14 to under a million for the first time since 2007/09 (see table 4.1), and

39 _{In the case of Gillan & Quinton v United Kingdom (2010); as discussed in the second part of this chapter.} 40 _{In the case of Roberts v The Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, also discussed in this chapter.}

finally by another 40% in 2014/15 to over half a million searches (over 360,000 fewer searches).

Overall, the total combined volume of recorded street searches fell by 64% from over 1.5 million encounters during the peak year of 2008/09 to 540,870 in 2014/15, or by 58% since the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition government took office in May 2010. Whereas over 30 people were searched per 1,000 of the population under any street power during their peak in 2008/09, this declined from 2009/10 onwards leading to 11 persons searched per 1,000 of the population in 2014/15 (table 6.2(a)).41 _{As table 6.2(a) shows,}

these overall reductions arose from the curtailing of exceptional powers but suspicion- based powers had remained largely stable at around 24 searches per 1,000 of the population until 2012/13, at which point their use fell dramatically to a rate of 11 persons searched per 1,000 of the population in 2014/15.

Table 6.2 - Rates of searches per 1,000 of the population, 2008/09 to 2014/15

(a) England and Wales

2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15

Section 1 23.4 23.8 24.9 23.1 20.5 18.2 10.9

Section 60 3.0 2.4 1.3 1 0.1 0.1 0.02

Section 44/47A 4.2 1.9 0.2 - - - -

Total 30.7 28.1 26.3 24.1 20.4 18.3 10.9

41 _{Searches per 1,000 of the population is a widely used method for estimating the scale of police-initiated} contact but caution is required in interpreting those figures. Police data does not disaggregate repeat stops of an individual and census data both overestimates the population size before the census day in 2011 and underestimates it thereafter. For a good discussion of this in relation to arrest rates see Delsol (2015:86).

(b) England and Wales, excluding London 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 Section 1 15.8 16.1 16.3 15.6 15.2 14.3 8.7 Section 60 0.8 0.7 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.05 0.02 Section 44/47A 0.2 0.5 0.03 - - - - Total 16.9 17.2 16.5 15.8 15.3 14.3 8.7

Notes: (1) Figures include searches by the British Transport Police.

(2) Section 1 figures include other powers that require reasonable suspicion (see Appendix A). Sources: Home Office (2011a, 2012a, 2013a, 2014b) and ONS (undated).

Since these are national figures, they mask the significant regional differences between forces in how these powers are used even amongst comparatively similar forces (see: Willis, 1981; EHRC, 2010; HMIC, 2013). London accounts for a considerable portion of searches to the extent that any changes in use within the capital distorts national trends. Between the years analysed, London accounted for between 42% and 32% of total PACE searches and also 76% and 22% of section 60 use. Once excluded, the data reveals that whilst searches elsewhere were lower, they are still high and have remained remarkably stable since 2008/09, particularly under PACE which only fell more substantively in 2013/14 and again in 2014/15 following an intensification of government scrutiny (table 6.2b). A number of police officers interviewed argued that stop and search was essentially a 'London problem'. Staff from national policing bodies criticised this perception, for example:

“Because one of the problems you get around stop and search is that this belief is that it’s a London issue because some of the forces are like ‘well if the Met get it right, you know, the problem goes away’. They don’t recognise that it’s a national or even global issue around how these are used. So that conversation isn’t always well accepted elsewhere outside of London. It’s mixed, I mean, some people accept it and have made big progress in terms of how they use it others less so. It depends how attentive or how important it is to the chief officer group if I’m honest.”

National/06's view suggests that this perception may explain why search rates nationwide are still consistently high outside of London. As s/he highlights, the organisational values instilled by chief officers can shape the operational practice of their officers and, as discussed throughout the findings, may account for the regional differences found between comparatively similar forces. Until very recently, exceptional powers do, however, appear to be a predominantly ‘London problem’ due to the significantly higher search rates when data from the capital is incorporated into the national figures compared to their exclusion (tables 6.(a) and 6.2(b), respectively). Section 44 is a case in point whereby the capital- and large swathes of British Transport Police’s jurisdiction- were placed under a blanket authorisation since the power was first introduced, irrespective of the threat assessment at the time (HM Government, 2011; Lennon, 2013).

Levels of ethnic disproportionality, a key focus of academic research on police-initiated stops (Bradford, 2015), increased initially but then declined during the research period although ethnic minorities were still searched at comparatively higher rates to whites (figures 6.2(a)-(b)). Nationally, under section 1, people from black backgrounds have been consistently searched at approximately 4.5 to 6 times the rate of whites, Asians were searched at 1.5 to just over twice the rate of whites, and those from mixed backgrounds at twice the rate of whites. Excluding London, where an estimated 34% of all ethnic minorities reside (ONS, undated), the rates of disproportionality under section 1 were much lower for all ethnic groups particularly blacks and Asians (table 6.2(b)). Outside of the capital, black people were searched at approximately three times the rate of whites with only marginal changes year-on-year. These differences were less pronounced for Asians and people from mixed backgrounds who have been searched at around twice the rate of whites since 2009/10.

Figure 6.2 – Racial disproportionality of street searches, 2009/10 to 2014/15

(a) England and Wales

(b) England and Wales, excluding London

Notes: (1) The figures for whites stand at 1.0 and is excluded from the graph because racial disproportionality is calculated by dividing the search rate of all groups against that of whites. (2) Section 1 figures include other powers that require reasonable suspicion (see Appendix A). Sources: Home Office (2011a, 2012a, 2013a, 2014b) and ONS (undated).

Disproportionality under the exceptional powers, however, was far greater than under section 1 despite the recent reductions in overall use (figure 6.2(a)) and again search rates were lower outside of London (figure 6.2(b)). However, as with section 1, the volume of searches fell alongside the greater scrutiny of those powers from 2012/13 onwards, particularly in 2014/15 after the Home Office (2014f) introduced a best practice scheme discussed in chapter 7. Nationally, black people were searched at significantly higher rates under section 60 compared to any other group. After initially increasing from 23 times that of whites in 2009/10 to 34 in 2010/11, it fell thereafter until it stood at 7 times that of whites in 2014/15. Outside the capital, search rates for black people also rose from 6 times the rate of whites in 2009/10 to 13 in 2010/11 and then 14 in 2011/12 before then declining until it stood at 4 times the rate of whites in 2014/15. Nationally, the section 60 rates for mixed people fluctuated throughout this period from over 5 times that of whites in 2009/10, rising to 7 in the following two years and then falling to 3 in 2014/15. Outside of the capital, search rates of mixed people were far lower, rising initially from 2.5 times that of whites in 2008/09 to over 4.5 times in the following two years, before declining to less than 3 in 2014/15. Nationally, Asians were searched under section 60 at over 5 times the rate of whites in 2009/10 rising to nearly 9 in 2010/11 before falling to twice the rate of whites in 2014/15. Excluding London, Asians were searched at roughly the same rate as whites in 2009/10 but this rose alongside rises in searches of all other groups reaching 3 times the rate of whites in 2011/12 before falling to twice the rate of whites in 2014/15. The greater racial disparities under section 60 was raised by some interviewees, particularly national police leaders and staff who gave the following explanations for it:

“Now I think officers are probably understanding of their powers at a basic level but I think introducing powers where there were fewer regulatory mechanisms in place meant that it gave the impression that doing more was okay and that it might have blurred the boundaries of where their threshold of suspicion needed to sit, or they had other tools to use if section 1 wasn’t

an appropriate power to use they could use section 44 powers- certainly in London.”

National/02 “It used to be overused on football [supporters]: there was a section 60 [authorisation] for every higher category football match and now there’s much more governance around authorisations to whether them takes place or not but, yeah, I’ll be honest and say I’m not a fan of section 60. I think it’s a without grounds powers that we can do without.”

National/04 These quotes reinforce the arguments in chapter 4 that the weak regulations governing the use of exceptional powers has resulted in them being used far more frequently than originally intended and for routine crime problems. Such use is likely to have led to the racial disparities indicated by figures 6(a) and 6(b) by exacerbating rather than inhibiting the kinds of police practices that disproportionately affect ethnic minorities.