The low esteem in which the native was held had a powerful corollary in the fear that virtually every native harboured a violent hatred for Europeans and Chris tians and waited for the moment when he could destroy them. This was born of
Britain's mid-nineteenth century Indian experience and reinforced by the Alexandria riots of 1882. Such was this fear that Cromer could use the bete noi2E of a fanati- cal native revolt to induce the British government in 1893 to reinforce the army
0 of occupation and strengthen British control contested by the then Khedive A bbas.
Cromer's action apparently had a conditioning effect on the British mind. Thus the riots of 1919 and 1921, resulting in great loss of European lives were a con
firmation that Egypt's foreign residents continued to be the objects of native hatred. The ordinary British residents of Egypt were convinced that domestic quarrels
ominously tended to take 'an anti-European turn' and that 'the assumption that...the
1. Entry for March 8, 1920 in Milner's Diary, BLO, Milner Papers, Box 290, pp.147-8.
2. Murray Minute, March 7, 1921, to Allenby to Curzon, March 5, 1921, Tel. No. 141, FO/371/6294.
3. Lindsay Minute, March 7, 1921, to ibid.
4. Curzon Minute, May 23, 1921, to Allenby to Curzon, May 22, 1921, Tel. No. 351, FO/371/6334.
5. E.S. Herbert Pasha to Wingate, February 21, 1922, SAD, Wingate Papers, 240/1. 6. Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid, Egypt and Cromer: A Study in Anglo-Egyptian Relations
Egyptians had been trained to restrain their fanatical and anti-European tendencies ...has been proved up to the hilt to be a f a l l a c y . ' F a r more important, these views gained wide currency among British officials both in Cairo and in London. One important British official warned that Egyptian Muslims were 'extreme and anti-
2
foreign,' and counselled greater reliance on the Syrian element in Egypt.
The Military Court of Enquiry into the Alexandria riots of May 1921 stated the following in its conclusions:
The Court draws attention to a very important fact. Always there has existed in Egypt - at any rate among the lower classes - a fanatical hatred of Europeans. It has shown itself again and again. In 1882 when Great Britain was forced to occupy the country; at Denshawai; in 1919; and now again in 1921. Whenever the Government has grown too weak to control this feeling; or whenever the people think it has grown too weak.^
The 1919 riots were an important factor in converting the more generalised fears about the natives' hatred of Europeans into the highly specific imagery of 1882. These fears now took the form of a strong apprehension that events might throw up a new Urabi who would lead a native rising against foreign control. This was perhaps the most potent leit-motif of British thought about Egypt which was ruled so uneasily after 1919. Events came to be viewed within this context and the parallel between Zaghlul and Urabi was often repeated.
Patterson, then acting Adviser to the Ministry of the Interior, warned Allenby in April 1921, that the 'state of affairs has been described by those who remember
4
it as closely similar to that prevailing just before the Arabi rebellion.1 In the same month Allenby was warned by the Egyptian Prime Minister, Adli Pasha, that the Wafd's influence over the Egyptian army - the base of the original Urabi's power - was increasing. Allenby made provision for the early dispatch to Egypt of elements
1. V . F . Naggiar (British Chamber of Commerce in Egypt) to Allenby, May 31, 1921 in Allenby to Curzon, June 6, 1921, Desp. No. 493, FO/371/6297; and, W.E. Kingsford (British Union in Egypt) to Allenby, May 26, 1921 in Allenby to Cur zon, May 30, 1921, Desp. No. 459, FO/371/6296.
2. R. Greg to R. Furness, February 4, 1921, FO/371/ ^^^3. Syrians, who tc? Egypt around the turn of the century, were considered more trustworthy because they were an alien and often Christian element in Egyptian society.
3. Summary of the Report of the Military Court of Enquiry into the Alexandria Riots of May 19 2 1 , p.8 in Allenby to Curzon, July 5, 1921, Desp. No. 587, FO/371/6300.
59
of Britain’s Mediterranean fleet because 'I believe that Zaghlul is in such an exalted state of mind that it would not be beyond him to attempt a coup similar
1
to that of Arabi Pasha.’ Keown Boyd, Oriental Secretary at the Residency and later the Director-General of the European Section in the Department of Public Security, wrote that Zaghlul, 'sooner or later, may start a sort of Communist [sic]
2
revolution, anti-European, anti-Turk, anti-Landed classes, pure Egyptian business.' The frequency with which the Urabi leit-motif recurs was too great to be mere
3
coincidence, and Allenby was deeply affected by it. He soon came to see in Zaghlul Pasha the greatest threat to Britain's presence in Egypt and was firmly convinced 'that in all probability Zaghlul will have to be banished from the coun-
4
try for good as Arabi was.' This fear continued to preoccupy the British and it is little wonder, therefore, that when Churchill pressed his opposition to a liberal policy in Egypt, he reverted in Cabinet to the familiar spectre of the
5
slaughter of Europeans. In addition, he publicly warned that the 'mobs of Cairo and Alexandria* would make 'short work of the European and foreign populations.'^
Approaches: Cromerism and Neo-Cromerism
Built upon all these diverse and recurring themes were the two more complex and major approaches to policy which in turn eventually became a part of the overall British perception of Egypt. These approaches were what came to be known as 'Cromer- ism' and 'Milnerism'. Their particular prominence can be attributed to Cromer's
1. Allenby to Curzon, April 8, 1921, Tel. No. 223, FO/371/6294. 2. Keown Boyd to Col. Watson-, June 30, 1921, FO/371/6301.
3. Two striking examples are: 1Zaghloul no doubt relied on mob force throughout the country under most favourable circumstances...primarily to overthrow the Cabinet and next the Dynasty a la Araby.' Excerpt of a letter from Major Ander son, Senior Inspector in the Ministry of the Interior, June 6, 1921,
FO/371/6297; and, 'Today we have another Arabi, the tool of the older class of statesmen, who see in the new order of things a death-blow to their vested in terests...' E50, Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) Report, June 18, 1921, FO/371/6297.
4. Allenby made these comments to Sir Eyre Crowe on October 1, 1921, Crowe Minute, to Scott to Curzon, September 30, 1921, Tel. No. 565, FO/371/6305.
5. W.S. tijhurchillj.
f
The European Communities in Egypt, July 28, 1921, C.P.3171, CAB/24/126.6. Churchill in a speech to the British Cotton Growing Association, Times, June 7, 1921.
early success, his later unassailable authority and, in the case of Milnerism, to the position of its author and the circumstances of its espousal.
The essence of Cromerism was the translation of the political dicta of Lord Granville's despatch on British policy into a framework of administrative reality. Nominal Ottoman suzerainty over Egypt and Great Power interest in the region to a large extent imposed on Britain the need to adopt the indirect methods of a ’veiled
1
protectorate1. Inspired by Cromer's concern about these external restrictions, Granville's policy had two bases: Britain's 'giving advice1 to the nominal rulers of Egypt, and insistence 'on the adoption of the policy they recommend1 to the point, if necessary, of assuring 'that those Ministers and Governors who do not
2
follow this course should cease to hold their offices.1 The object was to secure 'that the order of things to be established shall be of a satisfactory character
3
and possess the elements of stability.' Cromer interpreted this as a policy where- 4
by 'we do not govern Egypt, we only govern the governors of Egypt.'
The strategic interests that brought the British to Egypt made stability a major concern of policy and this would of necessity lead to the attempt to recon- struct Egypt's internal administration. At the time Britain's strategic interests were not regarded as irreconcilable with the paternalist view that the Englishman
5