Reporte de desempeño

6.9.1 It is evident that the HIP proposal that was submitted to the SPBC on

27 and 28 January 2009 drew on work previously carried out by both DEWHA and PM&C in the energy efficiency area. However, the request for a policy that related to insulation only, for all households, and as part of a stimulus measure only occurred from 19 January 2009.

6.9.2 The development of the proposal for the HIP mainly occurred in PM&C, which co-opted officers from other departments, including DEWHA.

6.9.3 Although she provided information to officers of PM&C prior to 23 January 2009, Ms Wiley-Smith (and Ms Brunoro) really only became involved in formulating the HIP on that date.

6.9.4 The request made of Ms Wiley-Smith and Ms Brunoro by PM&C, although not requiring work that was entirely new to either of them, allowed them little time properly to consider a proposal of this magnitude focused, for the first time, solely upon insulation. They worked hard to meet the tight deadline. Necessarily, their assessment of the risks attending the proposal in particular, could not have been fulsome.

6.9.5 These officers did what they could, including by including an option for the longer period over which the program should be rolled out (five years rather than two) and identifying some possible risks. The lack of industry consultation about this particular proposal, combined with a perhaps over-stated view to Mr Garrett about the extent to which industry consultation had occurred and endorsed the proposal, was, however, a real deficiency in this process.183

6.9.6 The task that Ms Wiley-Smith and Ms Brunoro undertook was also limited by the express instructions they were given not to contact industry and not to speak with colleagues.184

It was the first time Ms Wiley-Smith had been given such an ‘exhortation’, albeit that it accorded with the understood position with respect to policy formulated for a Cabinet process.185 _{It meant, for example, as Ms Wiley-Smith said, that they did not have an ability}

to assess the impact of a measure like this.186

183 Transcript (17 March 2014) 54 (M Wiley-Smith); AGS.002.008.0281, 1-2. 184 Transcript (17 March 2014) 44-45 (M Wiley-Smith).

185 Transcript (17 March 2014) 58-59 (M Wiley-Smith). 186 Transcript (17 March 2014) 45 (M Wiley-Smith).

6.9.7 The model that was presented was one given on the basis that it had its limitations for the reasons given above. It involved proposed delivery via major players in the industry with considerable experience installing insulation (what I describe as the regional brokerage model). This is a feature which, as will be seen, was one way of dealing with risks such as the personal safety of installers and to provide some assurance that insulation was being installed properly and by properly-trained and/or supervised installers. Ms Wiley-Smith and Ms Brunoro both saw that delivery model as dealing to some extent with the risks that might result if, for example, the model did not place reliance on contracted larger and more experienced companies in the industry. Their express preference for a five-year rollout was one respect in which some real attempt was made to avoid or reduce the risks which attended a program which had a much shorter time in which to be established and rolled out. It must be borne in mind also that the model then under consideration was one that involved large and experienced players, who might reasonably be thought to bring expertise and experience to the program and contracts between them and the Government, being able in some respects to mitigate risks.

6.9.8 It should not be lost sight of that the program approved by the SPBC on 28 January 2009 was one that incorporated what I have described as a regional brokerage model. That was not the program that was eventually used.

6.9.9 No meaningful advice was given to the SPBC as to the timeframe that was required for the HIP to be properly designed and implemented. Any suggestion that definitive advice was given that the task could be done by 1 July 2009 ought to be rejected.

6.9.10 DEWHA was not, at this stage at least, the lead agency on the HIP or even on its formulation. PM&C, at this stage, was directing it and imposing the short timeframes. A desire for haste is evident even at this very early stage of the HIP’s development. The time allowed to Ms Wiley-Smith and Ms Brunoro, the instructions given to Ms Wiley-Smith by Mr Johnston about a fast rollout, the desire then for an early February announcement of the program itself and the apparent preference ultimately for a two-year rollout (despite the recommendation by Ms Wiley-Smith and Brunoro and Treasury for a five-year timeframe) are all examples of a clear desire for a very expedited formulation and rollout of a large scale initiative.187

6.9.11 There are many documents about this time which show that what was contemplated was a fast and large-scale rollout.188 _{This urgency seems to have infected the entire program}

and caused less than adequate attention and consideration to be given to questions of risk generally, of personal safety and of compliance.

6.9.12 In its initial form, the HIP provided for the management of safety risks via a brokerage model and by its delivery through experienced enterprises. These elements of the program would have better provided for the training and supervision of installers. 6.9.13 No, or no proper, consideration was given to the capacity of DEWHA to continue to

design and implement such a program.

187 Transcript (17 March 2014) 79 and 83 (M Wiley-Smith). 188 See, for example, STA.001.001.0279, 1-2.