Representaciones Graficas estadísticas

Assuming the naturalist position, Quinton leads off by saying that if a thing is subject to an appetite, and is desired, then that constitutes a reason for pursuing it. So an 'appetitive utterance' about some object or action is not merely a description of empirical

fact, but a reason for action. If I tell you, for instance, that of all the hotels in town, you will most enjoy the Red Lion, and if you believe that my advice is likely to be correct, then my statement, which is really a statement about your appetites and how they may be satis­ fied, would constitute a good reason for your staying there rather than anywhere else. My advice might even be couched in highly evaluative terms ; I might say that the Red Lion is the 'best* hotel, and provided that my terms 'best', 'good' or whatever have this appetitive portion, then they do have this prescriptive nature. At the same time, though, (says Quinton) they are statements of fact, because they are concerned with the facts of your particular appetites; and so the traditional dichotomy between normative and factual statements is broken and the naturalistic fallacy can be circumvented.

Examination of the debate between Flew and Quinton shows that it is possible to maintain this novel position, but reminds us that we have to be very careful with the naturalistic use of language if are to avoid replacing the unnecessary 'is/ought' dualism with an unworkable

'schizophrenic monism*.

Quinton considers the situation in which you ask, "Where should I stay?" and are told "The Red Lion is the best hotel," meaning, roughly, that you will most enjoy the Red Lion or that the Red Lion will most effectively satisfy your desires. Therefore the statement "The Red Lion is the best hotel" does indeed afford you a reason for going to the Red Lion and not another hotel. But in reply. Flew claims that the facts of

the case show that an 'appetitive utterance* such as "You will most en­ joy the Red Lion," which is contained in the statement "The Red Lion is the best hotel,” does not, in fact, constitute a reason for action. As evidence for this claim. Flew cites the various personal motives which might prevent or preclude action, "You may, for instance, not be able or willing to afford the best, just as you may have some special reason, moral or other, which forbids indulgence on this (or any other) occa­ sion. "

Flew' s argument illustrates how the naturalistic approach can be misinterpreted if the term 'appetite' is not sufficiently defined. Flew

is correct that there are an infinite number of possible reasons why you would not in fact enjoy the Red Lion at this particular time. You might indeed find that it is more expensive than you are prepared to accept; or it might be a long way from your work and you dislike walking; or you might be on such good terms with the landlord of the Frog and Peach that you get much better than the normal service there. But all . that these factors amount to is that the original advice, and the assump­ tion in it that "you will most enjoy the Red Lion," was actually mis-^ taken. On balance, given all these other whims of yours about which your advisor was ignorant, you would not enjoy the Red Lion at all.

So for you to act on a piece of advice such as "The Red Lion is the best hotel," you must be confident that the person giving the ad­ vice has taken into consideration your own particular desires and aver­ sions, There is sufficient agreement on such questions that advice of this kind is usually taken without serious question; Quinton claims that "no special knowledge about your particular tastes is necessary to pre­ dict the action which will follow upon your sincere acceptance of this advice," For most people, the sincere acceptance of the advice would be a routine matter, because there is agreement upon what is meant by a

'good hotel* just as there is agreement upon what constitutes a 'good knife*, But personal differences do colour our judgement of these

things. Where there is agreement, Quinton's resolution of the dichotomy between normative and factual statements is indeed valid,

Flew's further question, "ought these things to be desired?" is, then, strictly meaningless. Whether some desires are morally superior to other desires is a problem that can be solved only by appeal to some value transcending those desires, a possibility which we have al­ ready excluded. Logically, then, there can be no court of appeal higher than the individual. Appetites and aversions are manifold, cover­ ing far more than simple bodily drives. You may, of course, weigh one desire against another, for example your desire for comfort against your desire to save money, or your desire for good food against your aversion to extravagance. When that has been done, then a statement of advice

15