Requerimientos mínimos de la Norma de Referencia: NRF-028-PEMEX-2010

According to Scott (2015), when Lord Browne introduced the Browne report (Browne, 2010), he described the report as heralding a paradigm shift for English higher education. The then minister for universities David Willetts subsequently confirmed the response to the Browne Review, in the form of the white paper (BIS, 2011), that claimed to put students at the heart of the English higher education system. Willetts (2011), asserted that the changes to the financing system would drive structural reforms, these would unleash the force of consumerism, by harnessing the power of the student. The funding shift in English higher education mainly through loans for all, instead of grants for all has been historically sketched by Nick Hillman as a gradual shift that had been taking place since 1960. Hillman (2013), who was a special advisor to the universities minister David Willetts, insists that this had been part of a historic trend to put more financial onus on the direct beneficiaries of higher education- former students (graduates)-and less on the generality of taxpayers.

2.4.2. (1) Reforms a necessity to sustainably fund English higher education

Willetts (2013), defended the shift of funding English higher education through more private sources such as income-contingent loans as a necessity. This was linked to the pressures of reduced public funding in a tough economic climate. He emphasised that alternatives in a climate of austerity, would have resulted in less funding per student or a reduction in student numbers. He argued that this would have meant damaging the quality of education, and a lower proportion of young people to go on to higher education. Willetts (2015), iterates the importance of expanding higher education and therefore not compromising upon the Robbins principle of, higher education for all those qualified who want to pursue it. He states that there was a recognition for the economic, social and individual benefits of higher education. He therefore insists that the funding reforms were the only sustainable way, to finance and maintain the quality of richness and diversity, within a range of English universities. He believed that as a result of the reforms not only universities would be better funded, but this would also help reduce the burden of financing higher education from the public purse. He claims that the reforms recognise the public benefits from higher education, although insisting

that graduates earned more than non-graduates, in justifying the shift in public (taxpayers)- private (graduates) contributions from 60/40 to 40/60 per cent.

2.4.2. (2) Money following the student will make universities responsive to student choice

Willetts (2011), also envisages that by funding following the student, would make student choice critically important to universities. He believes this would incentivise universities to strengthen the university experience, to provide theirs students with enhanced quality of teaching, and an increased quantity of contact time. This he points out would also help make student choice of institution and course much more transparent, through the introduction of metrics such as the key information set (KIS). This would require all English higher education providers to display information about factors such as employment rates, starting salaries, associated costs and contact hours on their websites. The intention would be to provide clarity of information with regards to value for money, with the intention of increasing competitive pressures upon English universities.

2.4.2. (3) A rising tide would lift all the boats

Willetts (2011), states that changes to English higher education policy were also part of the coalition’s broader plans to reform the public sector, with a purpose to modernise them in the interests of those who use them. These he clarified would be through reforming the supply side of the English higher education sector. This he explained would be achieved through what he described as the powerful driver, of making it easier for new providers to enter the system. He suggests that these new providers would do things differently, in ways none could predict, and it would be this rising ride that would lift all boats. Willetts (2012), insists that the English higher education system had been built upon the creation of successive waves of new types of institutions. He claimed that incumbents had often dismissed this as reductionism of standards, that when University College London was created in 1828, as a challenge to the Oxbridge monopoly, it was denounced as a mere lecture bazaar.

Willetts (2011), had also hoped that the supply side reforms to make it easier for new providers to enter the sector and enabling further education colleges to expand, by allocating core number controls, as to how many students each university could recruit. Institutions

were allowed to recruit any number of students with AAB results in their ‘A’ level exams. Institutions that set fees at or below £7,500 were also allowed to recruit from a flexible margin of 20,000 places. It was envisaged that this would create incentives for universities, to compete for students with good ‘A’ levels. Willetts (2011), had also visualised a level playing field for alternative providers, who he had hoped would compete by offering a more transactional model of higher education. It was also the intention that these sorts of controls and incentives would create conditions for universities to set variable fees, that they would have charged the maximum of £9,000, only in exceptional circumstances.

2.4.2. (4) An encouragement for universities to become bolder and more entrepreneurial

Willetts (2015), claimed that another reason for increasing the fees up to £9,000, was to provide universities an income stream, which would enable them to borrow more money to fund their capital investment. He illustrates, that financiers had always advised in the past that universities’ balance sheets were very conservative and they could borrow more. He had also envisaged that this would encourage universities to become bolder and more entrepreneurial. He conceded that it was a source of frustration to him, that international education chains like Laureate or Apollo had grown globally, when there wasn’t really any British equivalent. He argued that most universities had a trusteeship model, however he suggested the need for some universities with an enterprise model. He wanted these entrepreneurial universities to recognise the opportunity to operate in across continents, to expand in size, and become a great British export. To this effect he states:

I did think – and I still hope – that one or two universities would convert into a limited company in order to raise a large amount of money and expand. I had commercial investors saying to me that if British higher education came up with an investable proposition, they would put a billion into creating a global chain.

(Willetts cited in Gill, 2015:1)

It can be summed up that the intention of the funding reforms to English higher education, were aimed to influence the demand-side. This is sought to making universities more transparent in demonstrating value for money, in return for the higher fees. The reforms were also aimed at influencing the supply-side, by making it easier for new providers to

enter the sector. The reforms were created to encourage universities to compete for the best students and create conditions for charging variable fees. It was intended that universities would charge the maximum fee of £9,000 only in exceptional circumstances. It was visualised that some universities would embrace an enterprise model, raise money and expand to become a global brand. Overall it was justified that the funding reforms were the only way of sustainably funding, without jeopardising a mass higher education system.

2.4.3 The arguments against funding reforms, put market not students at the heart of the