REQUERIMIENTOS DE UN PROCEDIMIENTO DE INSPECCIÓN CON LÍQUIDOS PENETRANTES

Enough is in place to extract a general moral on how to identify a norm in the field.

What is in the field to observe are various patterns. Following Chaitin (1975) and Dennett (1991), we have a pattern iff there is a more efficient description of a series than a verbatim bit map. That of a series not captured by that more efficient description is considered noise. Importantly, a described pattern, though a regularity, need not be a description of that which is typical, frequent, or average, etc. A series with 80% noise still affords a more efficient description than a verbatim bit map of the series.

Take “When , ” to be a pattern description. If “When , ” is a norm, then exceptions in virtue of being exceptions need be subject to modification so as to correspond to it. With that in mind, let’s divide patterns into two species: mere regularities and normative regularities. That division reflects the explanatory relevance of noise or exceptions to a pattern. In the mere regularity, exceptions or noise to a pattern are just that, exceptions or noise, and the explanatory projects in respect to such noise are to explain why there are exceptions from the pattern, what it is about the world that makes some of a series instances of a pattern and some not, etc. In contrast, the normative regularity is one where the stability of the pattern is to be explained in part by the fact that exceptions or noise to the pattern (by being exceptions) are subject to modification such that they become instances of it (or are subject to elimination such that the series better approximates the described pattern). That an exception is subject to modification or elimination requires at least a further mere regularity such that exceptions become non-

exceptions or are eliminated, respectively.75So, part of the explanation of the stability of the pattern is that a corrective mechanism is in place such that exceptional members of a series are brought into line.

Noise or exceptions need not be present, however, for a pattern to be rightly a normative regularity. From the previous section, what is required is that exceptions be subject to modification so as to correspond to the norm. In the absence of noise, a pattern is rightly characterized as normative if exceptions would be subject to modification if they were to occur. That an exception would be subject to modification if it were to occur is part of the explanation of the stability of the pattern: the pattern is stable, because if exceptions to the series arose, they would be acted against. For example, at a press conference, each member of the press is wearing their press pass. There is a guard who examines each member of the press to see whether they are wearing their press pass and is prepared, if any were to fail to show their press pass, to ask them to show it. We have reason to believe there is a norm in play, even though there have been no exceptions to it: That a guard is in place serves in the explanation of why the observed pattern to date is likely to continue as it has, and that explanation is one that makes reference to the fact that exceptions to the putative norm are subject to modification so as to correspond to it.

While an exception need not have occurred for a regularity to count as normative, it does need to be case that an exception can occur. Absent the possibility of deviation, no part of the explanation of a pattern’s stability will be that exceptions are subject to modification. Even with a corrective mechanism standing by, it will not be part of the explanation of a pattern’s stability if it is just not possible for there to be any exceptions

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Since the relevant mere regularity can itself be exception-laden, not all exceptions to the normative regularity by being subject to modification will always be so modified.

on which it can act. Simply, without the possibility of deviation, there is no reason to think that exceptions are subject to modification, because there can be no exceptions. As such, no norm is in place. Think again of the press conference. Suppose that each member of the press has their press pass indelibly tattooed to their forehead before entering the conference. Our guard has been rendered redundant, though his presence and vigilance might present the appearance of a norm, e.g. “Each member of the press must have a press pass”. It would be wrong, however, to read “Each member of the press must have a press pass” as the expression of a rule of conduct, because there is no reason to think that exceptions are subject to correction. Rather, the ‘must’ is rightly that of a factual sort of necessity: it is just a matter of fact that each must wear a pass. From an explanatory viewpoint, there is just no value in explaining the relevant pattern of behavior as normative, because, despite his presence, the guard has nothing to do with the stability of the relevant pattern.

Having teased out one way in which a pattern might present the appearance of a norm without in fact being normative, let me note three more sorts of cases.

a. An ersatz norm: the absence of targeted correction76

Suppose the statistically normal life of a car is 20 years, but suppose that in Seattle we notice that cars on the road are less than 10 years of age. It is statistically normal that cars on the road in Seattle are less than 10 years of age, because the heavy precipitation there enhances the rate at which cars rust out. Is “Cars in Seattle are less than 10 years old” the statement of a norm or a normative regularity? Well, no, but it might strike one, given the above, to appear to be. “Cars last 20 years” is a pattern in the

world, so we know how things ought to be if it were not the case, as it is in Seattle, that there is a further regularity, namely rain-induced rusting out of cars. So, if it were not for the heavy rainfall in Seattle, cars would exhibit a pattern different from that they do exhibit in Seattle. What explains why the cars in Seattle exhibit the pattern they do and its stability is the presence of some further causal mechanism, i.e., rainfall. So wouldn’t the rain, by the above, be a corrective mechanism explaining the stability of a pattern? If so, “Cars in Seattle are less than 10 years old” looks to be a statement of a norm according to the theory.

Let me try to explain why it is not. The rust-inducing rain responsible for the short-lived cars is not acting on exceptions so as to ensure “Cars in Seattle are less than 10 years old.” That is, the rain is not just falling on the 11 or 12 year old exceptional cars and, thereby, eliminating them from the population of cars on the road and ensuring the stability of the pattern. The rain is acting on every car and in so doing speeding up the rate of dissipation. The pattern is as stable as it is, because all the cars, independent of whether they are exceptions or not to “Cars in Seattle are less than 10 years old”, are acted against. There are, then, no practical consequences to being an exception, and so, no reason to think “Cars in Seattle are less than 10 years old” is the statement of a norm.

Let’s modify things slightly. Let’s make the cars under ten years of age immune in someway to the rusting effects of precipitation. So, for example, at the factory, each car is treated with an anti-rusting agent, and that anti-rusting agent wears off at or around the ten year mark independent of whether the car is rained upon. Now, we have rendered rain impotent in respect to the younger cars, and it is only capable of having causal effects on those older cars. So, it might seem that we have got it so that rain acts only on

those exceptional cases, i.e., cars over ten years of age, and so achieved a normative regularity. However, it is still only a merely apparent norm, and it is so for the same reason as before. While the rain is now only causally efficacious in inducing rust on the older cars, the rain does not act on the older cars alone. Rain still falls on each and every car. The problem is, as it was before, that the rain does not act on some exceptional case because it is an exceptional case – that is, the rain does not fall on a car because it is over ten years of age. It is this that we need to report a norm.

To think that being an exception is consequential is to think that something is acted against because it is an exception. That a car is one, two, or twenty years old does not make it subject to modification in the scenarios above. What we need is a corrective mechanism that acts on an exception because that exception fails to act or be in a way corresponding to the norm. Larry in his garden does not act on every daffodil, but he acts only on those out of line because they are out of line. The dean does not act on every applicant, but only on those applicants of a certain race because they are of that race. A causal mechanism is not a corrective mechanism (and, thereby, a regularity is not normative) unless the causal mechanism acts on exceptions in virtue of their being exceptions. So, if rain only fell on older cars in virtue of their age, then we might have cause to view the pattern “Cars in Seattle are less than 10 years old” as a normative regularity.

b. An ersatz norm: random correction

Suppose “When , ” to be a pattern description and the explanation of why the series approximates the pattern description as well as it does – that is, why the pattern is

as stable as it is – is that historically exceptions have been acted on so as to make them instances of the pattern. However, let us suppose that the occasions in which exceptions have been brought back into line are the result of varied random forces.77 For example, we observe a pattern in an ant’s foraging behavior: whenever the ant starts out to forage, it turns 90 degrees from its initial position before proceeding. We also observe on a few occasions that it fails to turn before proceeding. However, in each exceptional case, a distinct random something occurs to our ant to put him back on the track that he would have been on had he turned, e.g., the wind knocks him back on course, he slips on some sand, a leaf falls in his path forcing him to turn, etc. In such a case, it is right to think that there only appears to be a norm in play and not there is in fact a norm. The pattern to date presents the appearance of stability, but it is not in fact stable because there is nothing causing it to be stable. We can explain what caused each exception to be altered. What we cannot explain is what causes exceptions to be altered; this is just what it means to say that the “corrective” events are random. This brings out the importance of the earlier comment: part of the explanation of the stability of the pattern is that a corrective mechanism is in place such that exceptional members of a series are brought into line. Without such a corrective mechanism in place, we do not have reason to believe that a pattern is stable because exceptions are subject to modification, and so, we do not have reason to believe that there is a norm in play.

c. An ersatz norm: merely historical correction

Norms are temporal: they exist at some times and not at others. The norms governing the ritualistic cannibalism of the Fore Highlanders of Papua New Guinea,

governing the custom of the “Sacred Spring” among the Italian highlanders of the fifth century B.C., or governing verb conjugation among Carthaginians are all clear examples of norms that once were but are no longer – that is, they once had causal influence on the world but no longer do. If a pattern has gone out of existence, then it should be clear enough that there is no longer a norm. But, there is a sort of a case where a pattern was once a normative regularity but no longer is – that is, there was a period in which the stability of the pattern was explained by appeal to exceptions being subject to modification but no longer is. For example, the man that continues unconsciously to lay his coat over puddles for women to cross unsullied would have been conforming to a norm if the relevant norm of social etiquette applied, but in the present case, when the continued existence of such a norm is doubtful, his action neither conforms nor fails to conform. He acts as he does, because there was a certain norm but not because there is such a norm. If he were now to fail to act as he ought to have in the past, he is not subject to criticism for his failure. The stability in his pattern of behavior is not to be explained by the fact that he is subject to criticism for failing to so act. He then appears to conform to a norm because of the historical connection of his behavior to modifying acts. However, there is no reason to think that exceptional acts on his part are subject to correction, and so there is no reason to think that a norm persists.