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Let me now discuss a theoretical choice I have made and a problem that might stem from this preference. An association sequence is a sequence of features associated with an object or a kind. When a word is used metaphorically, the association sequence attached to the denotation of the word is accessed by the interpreters. A complication seems to arise from this account. It is justly claimed that words which seem to have the same denotation might be used metaphorically to mean different things. For instance, Searle (1993, p.105) points out the differences among the metaphorical uses of “pig”, “hog” and “swine”, which are different names of the same kind.24 If the association sequences are attached to kinds, synonymous words which denote the same kind should not be able to be used to imply different metaphorical meanings, but they are. So, what makes this possible?

In response to this problem, what I assume is that a kind or object might be attached to more than one association sequence. In the example above, the kindpig

is attached to at least three different association sequences. Of course, these associ- ation sequences have common features, since they are characterizing the same kind, but there can be some significant differences. I believe, these significant differences make two or more different terms for the same entity worth having in our lexicon. They are signifying different characterizations. If one limits the semantic content of a word to its truth-conditional content, these words are semantically no different. Their substitution does not change the truth-value of the sentence they are part of. Thus, any difference synonymous words make should be at the pragmatic level.25

23_{An extreme case could be someone’s talking to or writing something to herself. What would}

be the purpose of using metaphors or any other indirect communication form in this situation? In these cases, I think we could either say that the speaker/writer communicates with herself (or her future self) or accept that there is no communicative purpose here.

24_{Camp (2012, p.295) emphasizes the same idea:“Metaphorical interpretation is a function of}

the particular expressions uttered, and not just of their semantic values.”

25_{I think this one kind (or object) but different association sequences approach is along the lines}

of Salmon’s (1986) solution to Frege’s puzzle. Salmon claims that an agent might grasp the same proposition by means of different guises. In the belief attribution statements, although the way one takes a proposition is not part of the semantic content, it is pragmatically implicated. For this reason, in a given context, one of the two semantically equivalent belief attributions might be pragmatically more apt (and less misleading) than the other. For instance, one might understand the proposition that the sentence “Hesperus appears in the morning” expresses differently from the one “Phosphorus appears in the morning” expresses, though these two propositions are the same. The pragmatic difference explains why the belief in a single proposition can be attributed by one sentence but not the other. I can elaborate this idea by employing association sequences. If the direct reference theory, which is advocated by Salmon, is true, there is no semantic difference

Metaphorical use of fictional and mythological terms also requires explanation. Consider this:

(24) I am Anna Karenina. (Camp 2009, p.112)

In this example the name of a fictional character is used metaphorically. If fic- tional entities are non-denoting terms to what is the relevant association sequence attached? The ontology of fictional characters and speaking about them is a con- troversial issue in metaphysics and philosophy of language. I do not want to enter this discussion here. I will assume that there are fictional and mythological entities, and relevant association sequences can be considered to be their characterizations. Although there might be other solutions, for the simplicity, I prefer this option.

One might suggest attaching the association sequences to phrases, rather than objects and kinds. Indeed, this is what Stern (2006, pp.263-4; 2011, p.289) suggests. The metaphorical associations, in his view, are attached to phrases. In this way, he explains the differences in metaphorical interpretations of co-referential terms. This suggestion might seem attractive at first. Every phrase has its own association se- quences: for instance, “swine” and “pig” carry different association sequences. The problem with fictional and mythological terms also does not arise for this sugges- tion. The association sequence is attached to the name “Anna Karenina”, not the fictional entity. This is a charming suggestion for people who do not like abstract entities. Despite these virtues, I reject Stern’s suggestion for at least two reasons. First of all, it does not seem plausible to me to think that these association se- quences are attached to words. Considering our ordinary phenomenology, it should be said that when we are thinking about the associated features of encyclopaedias, for instance, we are not characterizing the word “encyclopaedia” but the kind en- cyclopaedia. The second problem is related to the link between a phrase and an association sequence. Stern seems to assume that every phrase is attached to just one set of associations. However, this cannot be true. There is no one-to-one cor- respondence between phrases and association sequences. Consider Kripke’s famous Paderewski example. In this example, Peter thinks that there are two Paderewskis, one is a pianist, and the other is a politician, and associates two different sets of beliefs with the name “Paderewski”. However, Peter is mistaken, and the pianist

between “Hesperus is Hesperus” and “Hesperus is Phosphorus”. The only difference arises from the different association sequences the words “Hesperus” and “Phosphorus” signal. When one learns that Hesperus is Phosphorus, the information she obtains, stems from the recognition of the fact that two association sequences are attached to the same object. In one association sequence the object is characterized as “the celestial body in the sky in the morning”, whereas in the other it is characterized as “the celestial body in the sky in the evening”. The recognition that these features belong to the same object explains how a new piece of information is obtained.

Paderewski and the politician Paderewski are the very same person (Kripke 2011, p.154). So, in this example, there is only one phrase, but Peter associates two dif- ferent feature sequences with it. One phrase can be used in two different ways to access to two different association sequences Peter has in mind. If a phrase can have more than one set of associations, a problem similar to the above-mentioned one with co-referential terms arises.26 It is not clear how Stern’s suggestion on attach- ing association sequences to the phrases helps us in distinguishing two sequences attached to a phrase. In sum, I find Stern’s idea both counter-intuitive and not helpful in all possible cases.27

Another suggestion might be to think that association sequences are attached to the concepts of objects and kinds. For the purposes of the discussion, we can assume that concepts are mental representations of objects and kinds. Thus, in this suggestion, concepts, in a sense, link association sequences to objects and kinds. For instance, there is the kind tiger, its concept tiger, and the association sequence

that is attached to tiger. This suggestion might also seem tempting for similar

reasons mentioned in favour of the previous suggestion, but I do not accept it ei- ther. I will give three reasons. First, as mentioned above, proper names can be used metaphorically, which means that they are used to imply certain associations. I argued that names still refer to their ordinary referents in their metaphorical uses and association sequences are attached to the objects names refer to. How can the metaphorical uses of proper names be explained if one assumes that associa- tion sequences are attached to concepts? One would need to assume that there are individual concepts. Individual concepts are functions from possible worlds to indi- viduals. So, for instance the individual concept expressed by “Winston Churchill” is a constant function which picks out the same individual, Winston Churchill, in all possible worlds (Abbott 2010, p.54). But what is the purpose of these concepts, if names are rigid? In other words, if the referent of a name is not determined by any concept related to a name, then what does the individual concept do?28 _Individual

26_{Stern might reply that there is only one association set which features related to all different}

aspects of the man are attached to. This seems very implausible to me. If all associations related to a phrase are in the same chunk of associations, then a natural consequence of this idea is to assume that one has just one set of associations attached to all namesake people (for instance all Matthews) she knows. This consequence is unacceptable, I believe.

27_{Glanzberg (2008) explores which types of linguistic elements get interpreted metaphorically}

and concludes that major lexical categories can be interpreted metaphorically whereas functional categories, such as determiners and tenses, cannot. This result seems to strengthen my position against Stern’s. If metaphorical associations are attached to phrases, it is hard to find a principled basis why functional categories do not receive metaphorical interpretation. On the other hand, there is a straightforward explanation if we consider metaphorical associations attached to contents. Since phrases, such as “every”, “the” and “some”, are not referring expressions, they do not get metaphorical interpretations.

concepts seem to be idle entities in terms of linguistics. Hence if one wants to argue that association sequences are attached to concepts, in order to explain the meta- phorical use of proper names, one will need a theoretically problematic assumption that association sequences are attached to linguistically idle individual concepts.

Secondly, intuitively association sequences seem to beabout objects and kinds.29

Thinking that association sequences are attached to the concept of an object or a kind would amount to their being related to the object or the kind indirectly. I believe this indirectness clashes with the intuitive idea that these associated features say something about these objects or kinds. They do not seem to say something about concepts, but objects or kinds.

Thirdly and finally, if we attach association sequences to the concepts the ap- pealing theoretical parallelism between clausal implicatures and phrasal implicatures would get lost. Recall that clausal implicatures are carried by propositions (or what- is-said in the Grice’s original sense). If the Russellian conception of proposition is accepted, namely propositions are considered to be entities constituted by individ- uals and properties, it would follow that clausal implicatures are generated by a constitution of objects and properties (or kinds). On the other hand, phrasal im- plicatures are assumed to be generated by parts of propositions, and in this picture these parts can only be objects and kinds. If we think of association sequences as phrasal implicature candidates, it would be natural to think of them as attached to objects and kinds.