Even if the HIMA institutions work closely together in a partnership, and many people on direct questioning will point to aspects of the project that they consider less fortunate – for instance the lack of focus on urban factors in deforestation and the woodfuel business, this still does not seem to lead to any true discussions about major issues which could lead to change of direction. There are few critical voices raised when it comes to issues concerning the main framework of the project. I believe reasons for this can be found in the NGO context.
As we have seen, possibilities of good cooperation between the implementers, efficient implementation, and sustainability exist in the HIMA project. But, although the implementers are labeled partners, working together in partnership, plain equality should not be taken for granted. Crewe and Harrison (1998:87) warn that the talk of partnership often fails to address potential conflict and inequalities. The issue of power is significant in relation to partnerships where the funding always goes in the same direction (Crewe and Harrison 1998:77). We are reminded about Mauss’ work on “the gift”; that to accept a gift without returning or repaying is to face subordination (Mauss 1995; see also Crewe and Harrison 1998:88). Gifts are not free and this includes gifts given as development aid (Nustad 2003:21;
Crewe and Harrison 1998:88). Funding for NGOs and development projects might come with a range of explicit or implicit conditionalities for the receivers.
This is relevant for the HIMA project as JECA and SEDCA are always on the receiver side (though they do forward some money to SCCs). CARE has multiple identities in this
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regard as a receiver of money from Norway and a giver of funds within the current project as well as in the past. They are and have been the main financial supporter of the local
organizations. Thus, CARE can be said to stand in a strong position vis-à-vis JECA and SEDCA. CARE’s connection to Norway through the HIMA project can also raise their position in relation to the Department. However, being a representative of the state gives the Department a sense of authority with regard to the other main implementers. Their role in initiating JECA can further indicate possible power imbalance in the Department’s favor. That said, the donor might need the receiver as much as the other way round (Crewe and Harrison 1998:74, 77), for instance for a sense of legitimacy and connection to the grassroots that the local organizations can provide to CARE, the Department, and Norway. I still consider CARE and the Department to be much stronger institutions in the HIMA project partnership than the local NGOs.
For organizations and analysts with more radical political hopes for NGOs, it is important that such organizations work as “watchdogs” in relation to the state, questioning decisions and lobbying for political change. Several scholars, however, emphasize how close relationships between the state and NGOs can hinder a critical stance (see for instance Mercer 1999:248; Hulme and Edwards 1992:17-18; 1997; Fisher 1997:454). If NGOs like CARE, JECA, or SEDCA raise difficult issues or even support opposition towards the government, it might cause serious strain on the relation, affecting for example funding, support, and room to exist for NGOs. I believe this can be the case for small NGOs in their relations to larger international organizations as well, as in the partnership between local organizations and CARE in the HIMA project. When there are strong differences in power between “partners” it might be hard for those at the bottom to raise critical opinions, especially as they rely on the others for funding and assistance.
JECA and SEDCA do not seem to act as watchdogs in the HIMA project, neither towards the Department nor CARE. It can be argued that such expectations put undue stress on small organizations that run on a short-term basis dependent on much more powerful entities for funding and assistance. Through the NGO context it becomes difficult to imagine a strong watchdog role for the local NGOs. When the state has restricted the plurality of organizational life for a long time, and then only in times of difficulty opens it up and even itself initiated NGOs, functioning as a watchdog can be imagined to be hard for small NGOs.
This is so for JECA which was, as discussed previously, initiated by the Department itself, and is funded by CARE/the HIMA project. It should also be remembered that the state
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encouraged service provision NGOs and not politically-minded organizations. Although we have seen that the space for NGOs has been opened since the 1980s, the state still holds a strong grip which is evident in President Shein’s quote. CARE and the Department’s close relationship institutionally and on a personal level makes it hard to perceive the possibility of criticism or suggestions for major changes in the project framework between them.
In sum, I believe this leads to a kind of partnership where important questions about the way forward are not raised. Having NGOs or others in a kind of watchdog role could have positive implications for the HIMA project itself and the people it affects by securing the implementers make sound decisions, or at least making it more necessary for them to give reasons for choices. I would argue that there are aspects to the existing framework that could be questioned, and in this thesis I raise some issues of concern.
Concluding Remarks
This chapter has dealt with the main implementing stakeholders of the HIMA project and their close relationships with each other. The roles of the history of NGOs in
Tanzania/Zanzibar and the current trend of development “partnerships” have been highlighted as possible backgrounds for the blurring of boundaries between the state and NGOs that the HIMA project exemplifies. Close relationships between the implementers were investigated in order to see the implications they have on the HIMA project and the possibilities of REDD. It has been argued that the close relationships have advantages in terms of good cooperation, efficient implementation, and sustainability, yet at the same time, they create a climate where critical, and possibly needed, questions are not raised.
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