Capítulo 2: Estado del Arte y Marco Conceptual
2.2. Resiliencia en Sistemas Eléctricos de Potencia
Abstract
The article examines British Prime Minister Harold Wilson’s policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict during the June 1967 War, exploring why Wilson was reluctant to become an active arbitrator in the conflict and why he supported the Resolution 242 even though he sustained economic and political damage from the war. Answering those research questions helps to clarify one part of the historical background of the enduring Arab-Israeli stalemate. Three historical interpretations could be provided in the article: the first reason emanated from Britain’s wish to contain the Soviet influence in the Middle East. As a result of the June 1967 War, Israel seemed to serve as a deterrent power, the role of which Britain used to act in 1950s. Secondly, unlike Arab countries, Israel was regarded to be deserving of Western support. Thirdly, even though it turned out that Israel had territorial ambition, Britain was no longer an influential power in the Middle East to assume the required leadership to mediate the conflict. In other words, peace was not necessary for Britain and, one may go so far as to say that Britain’s reluctance to arbitrate the Arab-Israeli conflict in part caused the long-lasting and entangled stalemate of the conflict.
Keywords: The Second World War, Winston Churchill, Propaganda, Japan
* Ph.D. student, the Institute of Contemporary British History, King’s College London, funded by the Japanese Student Services Organisation.
Introduction
Despite the United States being the leading mediator of the Arab-Israeli peace process for more than 70 years, a lasting peace agreement has not been achieved. This prolonged period of conflict has impacted many of America’s Western allies more profoundly than America itself, and leads us to question: why was the United States the only major power to lead a peace process? Why did other countries not propose a viable peace plan and lead a wider peace initiative in the region? The aim of this article is to depict a historical picture by focusing on Western allies’ reactions, thereby clarifying one of the reasons why a lasting peace settlement has eluded the region for so long.
As a case study, it will focus on British Prime Minister Harold Wilson’s policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict during the June 1967 War. Wilson was known for his attempts to mediate between the United States and North Vietnam. His peace initiative was, in part, motivated by a desire to avoid Britain’s militarily involvement in the Vietnam War,1 but he also hoped
that mediating this conflict would bring some international prestige to Britain at a time when its power and influence was waning.2 Despite the
1 Wilson also faced the growing unpopularity of the war at home and increasing pressure from Labour backbenchers to take action for peace, particularly after the United States began its bombing campaign and introduced ground troops. Rhiannon Vickers, “Harold Wilson, the British Labour Party, and the War in Vietnam,” Journal of Cold War Studies, vol. 10, no. 2 (Spring: 2008), 43. Wilson’s support also complicated London’s relationship with members of the Commonwealth, most of whom were either opposed to the war or neutral, and no doubt played a part in establishing the British as too pro-American in the eyes of General de Gaulle of France, thus contributing to the delay in Britain’s entry into the EEC. Sylvia Ellis, Britain, America, And the Vietnam War
(Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2004), 270.
2 John Dumbrell and Sylvia Ellis, ‘British Involvement in Vietnam Peace Initiatives, 1966-1967: Marigolds, Sunflowers, and “Kosygin Week”,’
ambition, Wilson was not eager to be actively involved in the peace settlement of the June 1967 War even though he later lamented that the negative outcomes provoked by the war, namely the closure of the Suez Canal and an Arab oil embargo, in part, resulted in the November 1967 Sterling devaluation.3 It is true that UN Resolution 242 was based on the
British proposal. But the main content, namely requiring Israeli withdrawal from ‘territories’—one interpretation of which was that Israel should not necessarily return all of the lands occupied in the June 1967 War—, partway caused the protracted conflict. People involved in the UN negotiation indeed realised the meaning of this clause, foreseeing that the peace settlement would not be achieved easily.4 It is therefore important to explore why
Wilson was so reluctant to become an active arbitrator in the Arab-Israeli conflict and was satisfied with the flimsy UN Resolution while sustaining damage from the war.
With regard to Britain’s policy towards the Middle East, events before and during the 1956 Suez Crisis as well as political interactions between the Gulf and South Arabian nations have attracted much attention by scholars. But its policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict after 1956 has been generally overlooked. While Mosh Gat has broadly analysed the relationship between Britain and Israel during the 1967 War, he did not cover some important newly declassified documents as the book was published in 2003. Although Simon C. Smith has analysed Britain’s policy during the June 1967 War, the analytical focus has been limited in exploring the Anglo-American
3 Scott Newton, ‘The Sterling Devaluation of 1967, the International Economy and Post-War Social Democracy, The English Historical Review, vol. CXXV, no.515 (2010), 919.
cost Britain the balance of payment £20m a month.
4 Author’s Skype interview of Kunio Katakura, 27 September 2016. Katakura was an Arabic-trained diplomat of Japanese Foreign Ministry from the time and later became Ambassador to Iraq, UAE and Egypt in 1990s. See also Sydney Dawson Bailey, The Making of Resolution 242 (Dordrecht, Boston and Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985), 143-196.
relationship.5 Within this respect, this article will also contribute to the
development of the research in this field.
It is also valuable to look at the June 1967 War in order to consider the historical background of the stalemated conflict. The June 1967 War markedly changed the balance of power in favour of Israel. Washington found an opportunity in Israel’s overwhelming victory to curtail the Soviet influence in the region, which resulted in the origin of America’s overt and obvious support for Israel. One might perhaps indicate that Israel’s invincibility backed by the United States and the clause of Resolution 242 made the country less prone to compromise to the peace negotiation, which frustrated the Arab neighbours over the occupation, jumping to commence the Yom Kippur War. The shift in balance of power between Israel and the Arab states also consolidated the influence of the Palestinian liberation movements, partly originating the terrorist activities nowadays.
The analysis of this article is based on the archival documents stored in The National Archives (TNA), Kew, and, to a lesser extent, The Lyndon B. Johnson Library (LBJL), Austin, Texas. The other sources include the author’s interview to related persons, the official report of parliamentary debates and the related volumes of the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS).
5 Moshe Gat, Britain and the Conflict in the Middle East, 1964-1967: The
coming of the Six Day War (Westport, Connecticut and London: Praeger, 2003); Simon C. Smith, Ending Empire in the Middle East: Britain, the United States and post-war decolonization, 1945-1973 (London and New York: Routledge, 2012).