Resolución de problemas

This study will also distinguish the aforementioned issues based on Islamist and non-Islamist categories. As described earlier, such Islamist issues point to an “active assertion and promotion of beliefs, prescriptions, laws or policies that are held to be Islamic in character.”36 These Islamist issues range from moral reform to transnational Islamism. Moral reform is centred upon religious values and is characterized by coercive moralism, that is, “the stated goal of the movement is to ensure that all citizens, regardless of their individual preferences, conform to their group’s moral values and standards.”37

In this regard, PKS opposition to the “Playboy” magazine and so-called deviant Islamic sects and its strong endorsement of the anti-pornography bill and the implementation of shari’a-based laws in local governments can be included as Islamist moral reform in character. Meanwhile, transnational Islamism refers to a form of Islamic solidarity that transcends geographical boundaries by taking advantage of the concept of umma as shown in PKS enduring actions against Israel and America.

On the other hand, PKS events on anti-corruption, the reformasi struggle, anti-money politics and the like are classified as non-Islamist issues. The data shows that roughly six-in-ten of PKS’ collective events can be classified as Islamist (62.2%), but just 25.8% of them were non-Islamist in essence. The gap is

36_{ICG, Understanding Islamism, No. 37, 2005, p. 1. For a more detailed account of}

definition of Islamism, see Chapter 1 c.q. “What is Islamism?”

37_{Rory McVeigh and David Sikkink, “God, Politics, and Protest: Religious Beliefs and the}

substantial, but with a very few exceptions to this distinction making it not a cut and dry category. Curiously, PK and KAMMI’s call for President Wahid’s resignation was not only motivated by his alleged corruption involvement as widely aired in the public, but also his strong ties and associations with the Zionist government38 and his controversial plan to lift the ban on Marxism, Communism and Leninism thought.39 Graph 4 62.2 25.8 4 8 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70

Islamist Non-Islamist Both Neither

Given that there is no other party which has such a high degree of engagement in collective action, it is difficult to make comparisons. However, the finding has told us something significant about PKS. The fact that six-in-ten of PKS’ events are Islamist suggests that, in spite of PKS’ successful campaign in 2004 on an anti-corruption ticket, the party is still pushing forward its hard-line religious views. If PKS’ “clean and caring” campaign really matters, this message should be more visible in its collective actions, not just during election time. Graph

38_{Sekretariat Jenderal DPP PKS, Sikap Kami: Kumpulan Sikap Dakwah Politik PK dan PKS}

Periode 1998-2005, Harakatuna Publishing, Bandung, 2007, pp. 181-182.

39_{Marxism, Communisum and Leninism were banned with the following a decision made by}

the People’s Consultative Assembly TAP/XXV/MPRS/1966 after the so-called failed coup of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) in 1965.

4 illustrates that PKS’ actions on non-Islamist issues (e.g. anti-corruption, rule of law, etc) make up less than half of the amount of the party’s Islamist views. Through its collective actions, PKS has presented itself as being amongst the best organised Islamist force raising geographically distant issues that correspond with the increasingly anti-America and Israeli sentiment along with issues relatively closer to home, which are still Islamist in essence (e.g. support for a controversial anti-pornography bill, strong opposition to the “Playboy” magazine, etc).

3.4.5. Far and Near Enemies

Unlike other Islamic parties, PKS has shown more explicitly its concern for the plight of fellow Muslim countries, most notably, Palestine, Afghanistan, Lebanon and Iraq. This does not necessarily mean that PKS are only concerned about what is happening globally. The data shows that PKS is also concerned about what is happening in its home country.

Accordingly, a wide variety of issues addressed during PKS’ events will be classified in both challenging the relatively far enemy and the nearer enemy. Like Islamist movements elsewhere, PKS has extended its perceptions of “enemy” to both domestic and foreign foes.40 The party’s strong criticism against America’s aggressive international anti-terrorist campaign is perceived as undermining the Muslim world as shown in its grand-scale demonstrations against Bush’s state visit to Indonesia; American attacks on Iraq and Afghanistan; as well as its enduring anti-

Zionist sentiment, can be classified as PKS’ tendency to challenge its distant enemies.

Another internationally contentious event, that is, the row between America and Iran over the Iranian nuclear program, which has attracted the world’s attention, gained only 0.4% from the total of PKS’ actions. Indeed PKS describes itself as Sunni.41 The party’s reluctance to address the issues between the U.S. and Iranian might be caused by the existence of Sunni-Shi’ah rivalry among PKS activists.

On the contrary, PKS events, which promise to bring a clean and caring government, massive mobilisation of its cadres for assisting victims of natural disasters, as well as its endorsements for the implementation of shari’a-inspired laws in some local governments and its huge collective actions to call for the enactment of an anti-pornography bill can be categorised as addressing the relatively nearer enemies.

Interestingly, the data reveals that the majority of PKS events were anchored in geographically distant enemies focusing on transnational Islamist issues rather than on relatively nearer enemies and the national interest. Nearly half of PKS’ events as recorded by the mass media were dedicated to challenge foreign foes, while 37.8% of them were concerned with domestic issues (Graph. 5). Hidayat Nurwahid, former president of the party, admitted that the relatively distant enemies (notably pro-Palestine) have been a dominant trend in PKS demonstrations.42 Another PKS key leader, Untung Wahono held:

41_{Abu Ridha, Interview, 25 September 2007.}

We must send a strong message to Israel and the U.S. which usually favours Israel over Palestine, that the attacks will receive more protests and condemnation from global publics. The easiest way to show our opposition to Israel is grand-scale demonstrations, by which our disapproval towards Israel can be reported by Western news agencies. PKS does not need to organise massive rallies that raise domestic issues because we have already articulated them through a number of PKS representatives in the legislature. In terms of PKS demonstrations, our target audience is, in fact, Westerners.43 After all, bearing in mind, this far and near enemies’ distinction is not exclusive and there is a considerable overlap between the two. For instance, PKS’ strong opposition to the release of the Indonesian version of “Playboy” magazine cannot be included as a merely domestic issue, since the magazine is considered by PKS cadres as an American-influenced publication deliberately injected into Indonesia to undermine religious and moral values.

Graph 5 48.9 37.8 3.1 10.2 0 10 20 30 40 50 60

Far Enemy Near Enemy Both Neither

3.4.6. Location, Participants, and Leaders

By wide margins, Jakarta is the most active city, where a large proportion of PKS’ collective actions were being conducted (55.6%), but just 5.8% of them are held in Surabaya, Bandung (4.9), Semarang (4%), Yogyakarta (3.6%). Other cities

like Solo, Medan, Cirebon, and Bekasi are reported at the same percentage (1.8%). Pontianak, Palembang, Denpasar, and Pangkal Pinang share the same level (1.3%). Other cities are reported at about the same level, on average no more than 1% of the total PKS collective events gathered in this work.

Graph 6 Places 55.6 5.8 4.9 4 3.6 1.8 1.3 13.7 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 Jakarta Bandung Yogyakarta Pontianak, Palembang, Denpasar, Banda Aceh, Pangkal

Pinang

There are a number of reasons why more than half of PKS’ collective actions occurred in Jakarta. First, Jakarta is the capital of Indonesia, where

Republika, Kompas as the primary sources of this study along with many news agencies are situated. Media sources are less likely to attend and report events that are far away because of the lack of journalists and it is more costly to cover the events. Second, as the centre of political and economic activities and the place where all foreign embassies are located, Jakarta provides target specific locales. PKS’ most favoured sites for demonstrations are situated in the capital including the U.S. Embassy, the United Nation’s representative, the Hotel Indonesia roundabout, the House of Parliament and others. More importantly, Jakarta is a PKS stronghold, where the party won convincingly in the 2004 elections and thus collective events are more likely to occur in Jakarta.

Meanwhile, among the total of PKS events that mobilised a number of participants (n= 141), 41.8% of them were attended by thousands of the party’s participants and 25.5% of them were attended by hundreds of protesters. Surprisingly, 7.8% of PKS’ events were converged on by hundreds of thousands of its sympathisers, while 3.5% of them involved tens of thousands of people. Even more so, there were thousands of people gathered in 5.7% of PKS actions. But there were just 5.7% of PKS’ events that succeeded in mobilising dozens of protesters. PKS actions that occur in Jakarta involve grand-scale demonstrations and most are related to the virulent strain of anti-Zionist and American sentiments.

Finally, the measurement, which is based on the involvement of significant actors or leaders in an event, is politically and culturally significant. Hence, those events are more likely to be reported.44 In many instances, this significance may arise because of the social status of an actor, notoriety or celebrity.45 In the case of PKS, however, there are no outstanding leaders or extraordinary party figures. Unlike other parties who rely on particular leaders or charismatic people such as Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono for the Democrat Party, Abdurrahman Wahid for the Nation’s Awakening Party (PKB), Megawati for the Indonesian Democracy Party- Struggle (PDI-P), PKS seems to be less attentive politically to individual leaders.46

44_{For a detailed account of the significance of actors, see David Synder and William R.}

Kelly, “Conflict Intensity, Media Sensitivity and the Validity of Newspaper Data,” American Sociological Review, 42, 1977, pp. 105-123.

45_{Ortiz, Myers, Walls, and Diaz, “Where Do We Stand,” p. 399.}

46_{For a detailed account of the significance of political leadership in Indonesia, see R.}

William Liddle & Saiful Mujani, “Leadership, Party and Religion,” Comparative Political Studies,

Accordingly, in order to drive up coverage, PKS tends to maximize the size of participants in its actions.47 Nonetheless, the media, which covers PKS events, still needs a leader or actor which can represent the party and thus become the focus of the coverage. The data illustrates that among other leader of PKS actions captured in this study, Hidayat Nurwahid, former president of PKS, who resigned from the position after being elected as the chairman of the People’s Consultative Assembly, is the most media-cited person (22.1%). Media preference also goes to Tifatul Sembiring, which serves currently as the president of the party (19.9%). Al- Muzammil Yusuf, a senior leader of PKS and the chairman of the Palestine caucus in the parliament, makes up 5.1%, while Ahmad Heryawan, the leader of Jakarta branch of PKS (4.4%). Other leaders are reported at about the same level, on average no more than 1.5% of the total PKS/PK/KAMMI events gathered in this work. Graph 7 Action Leaders 4.4 5.1 2.2 2.9 2.2 2.9 22.1 2.2 2.2 19.9 2.2 31.7 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 AHM AD HE RYAW AN ALMUZ AMMI L YUS UF ANDI RAHM AT ANIS MAT TA BAG US W IYONO FITR A AR SIL HIDAY AT NURW AHID RIDW AN THAL IB ROFI MUN AW AR TIFA TUL SEMB IRIN G UNT UNG WAHO NO Othe rs

Illustration 2

Caption: PKS supporters march toward the United States Embassy during an anti-Israel rally in Jakarta (date unspecified). Available at zioneocon.blogspot.com/ Indonesian%20rally.jpg.

Illustration 3

Caption: Thousands of protesters from PKS rally in front of the Danish Embassy in Jakarta on 6 February 2006, to demand an apology for the publication of caricatures of Prophet Muhammad (JP/Mulkan Salmona). Available at newscompass.blogspot.com/ 2006_02_01_ archive.html

CHAPTER 4

BETWEEN DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCES: THE EMERGENCE OF PKS AND ITS POLITICAL

OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES

In this chapter, I will apply the fundamentals of social movement theory to illuminate the dynamics of PKS and reveal that the party is not an unusual social movement organisation (SMO). In this chapter, I will discuss theories of political opportunity structures and examine the double track of political opportunity structures; the international contexts and domestic possibilities for political opportunities that facilitated or constrained the emergence of PKS.