Facts: The Office of the President issued a memorandum entitled ―Prescribing Measures to Preserve the Lake Lanao Watershed, To Enforce the Reservation of Areas Around the Lake Below Seven Hundred And Two Meters Elevation, and for Other Purposes.‖ It instructed the NPC to build the Agus Regulation Dam at the mouth of Agus River in Lanao del Sur, at a normal maximum water level of Lake Lanao at 702 meters elevation. Petitioners constructed the said dam in 1978.
The Abdullahs (respondents) were owners of fishponds sitting along the Lake Lanao shore. They spent substantial amounts to construct, maintain and stock their respective fishponds with fish fingerlings. However in 1986, all these were washed away when the water level of the lake escalated and the lake shore was flooded.
They blamed the inundation on the Agus Regulation Dam, alleging that NPC failed to increase the outflow of water even as the water level of the lake rose past 702 meters due to heavy rains. They wrote letters to the NPC which was ignored, alleging that the water never rose beyond 702 meters. They were thus constrained to file a complaint for damages, alleging that the negligence and inexperience of NPC‘s employees assigned to operate the Agus Regulation Dam were the proximate causes of the damage caused to their properties and livelihood.
The trial court and the CA ruled in favor of the Abdullahs. Hence this appeal by NPC. Issue: Whether or not NPC is liable for the damages endured by the Abdullahs
Held: YES. In the case at bar, both the CA and the trial court uniformly found that it was such negligence on the part of NPC which directly caused the damage to the fishponds of private respondents. The fishponds of the Abdullahs were inundated and damaged when the water level escalated in October 1986.
When the water level rises due to the rainy season, the NPC ought to release more water to the Agus River to avoid flooding and prevent the water from going over the maximum level. And yet, NPC failed to do so, resulting in the inundation of the nearby estates.
The trial court and the CA held that the data contained in NPC‘s records collapse in the face of the actual state of the affected areas. During the ocular inspection conducted by the lower court where representatives of both parties were present, it was established that in the subject areas, the benchmarks as pointed out by the NPC representative, could not be seen nor reached because they were totally covered with water. This fact, by itself, constitutes an unyielding proof that the water level did rise above the benchmarks and inundated the properties in the area.
In the absence of any clear explanation on what other factors could have explained the flooding in the neighboring properties of the dam, it is fair to reasonably infer that the incident happened because of want of care on the part of NPC to maintain the water level of the dam within the benchmarks at the maximum normal lake elevation of 702 meters. An application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the thing speaks for itself, comes to fore. Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care.
Additionally, despite the clear mandate of Memorandum Order No. 398, it was only after many years from the time the dam was built that NPC installed said benchmarks. At that time, many farms and houses were already swamped and many fishponds, including those of the Abdullahs, damaged.
6. Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc., v. Spouses Sarangaya, G.R. No. 147746, October 25, 2005
Facts: Sps Sarangaya constructed and own a building in Isabela known as the ―Super A Building.‖ It was a 1-storey commercial building subdivided into 3 doors. Each of which was leased out. The 2-storey residence of the Spouses was behind said building.
In 1988, Perla Inc., through its branch manager Pascual, leased the first door of the Super A Building. Perla further subdivided the space into 2 wherein one part was used as an office while the other side was used as a garage for a company-provided vehicle (Ford Cortina, 14 years old) used in covering different towns within his area of supervision.
Pascual left for Pampanga without bringing the car. Three days later, he returned. Upon checking his schedule, he decided to ―warm-up‖ the car. When he switched on the ignition key, the engine made an odd sound and did not start. He did it again but to no avail. He then saw a small flame coming out of the engine. Startled, he turned it off, alighted, and started to push it out of the garage. Suddenly, fire spewed out of its rear compartment and engulfed the whole garage. Pascual was trapped inside and suffered burns on his face, legs, and arms. Meanwhile, the Spouses were watching TV when they heard 2 explosions. The smell of gasoline permeated the air and, in no time, fire spread inside their house, destroying all their belongings.
According to the city fire marshall, the incident was accidental. His report also disclosed that Perla had no fire permit as required by law. Based on this report, Spouses filed a criminal complaint for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Damage to Property against Pascual but was eventually withdrawn by the prosecutor. Thereafter, complaint for damages based on quasi-delict was filed against Perla alleging that Pascual acted with gross negligence while Perla lacked the diligence in the selection and supervision of its employee.
During trial Spouses presented a witness testifying that Pascual was seen buying gasoline and placed the container in the rear compartment of the car. In his defense, Pascual claims fortuitous event. Trial court declared Perla solidarily liable with Pascual and that despite the failure to prove the precise cause of the fire, Pascual was deemed negligent via res ipsa loquitur. CA affirmed.
Issue: Whether Perla is liable for the alleged negligence of its employee (Pascual) based on res ipsa loquitur.
Held: YES. Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means ―the thing or the transaction speaks for itself.‖ It relates to the fact of an injury that sets out an inference to the cause thereof or establishes the plaintiff‘s prima facie case. The doctrine rests on inference and not on presumption. The facts of the occurrence warrant the supposition of negligence and they furnish circumstantial evidence of negligence when direct evidence is lacking. The doctrine is based on the theory that the defendant either knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it and the plaintiff, having no knowledge thereof, is compelled to allege negligence in general terms. In such instance, the plaintiff relies on proof of the happening of the accident alone to establish negligence. It provides a means by which a plaintiff can pin liability on a defendant who, if innocent, should be able to explain the care he exercised to prevent the incident complained of. Thus, it is the defendant‘s responsibility to show that there was no negligence on his part. To sustain the allegation of negligence based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the following requisites must concur: (1) the accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of the person in charge; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured.
Under the FIRST, ―ordinary‖ refers to the usual course of events. Flames spewing out of a car engine, when it is switched on, is obviously not a normal event. Neither does an explosion usually occur when a car engine is revved. Hence, in this case, without any direct evidence as to the cause of the accident, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur comes into play and, from it, we draw the inference that based on the evidence at hand, someone was in fact negligent and responsible for the accident. The fact that Pascual, as the caretaker of the car, failed to submit any proof that he had it periodically checked revealed his negligence. A prudent man should have known that a 14-year-old car, constantly used in provincial trips, was definitely prone to damage and other defects.
Under the SECOND, where the circumstances which caused the accident are shown to have been under the management or control of a certain person and, in the normal course of events, the incident would not have happened had that person used proper care, the inference is that it occurred because of lack of such care. The car where the fire originated was under the control of Pascual. Being its caretaker, he alone had the responsibility to maintain it and ensure its proper functioning. No other person, not even the respondents, was charged with that obligation except him. He failed to overcome the burden to prove that he observed all that was necessary to prevent the accident from happening.
Under the THIRD, there is nothing in the records to show that respondents contributed to the incident. They had no access to the car and had no responsibility regarding its maintenance even if it was parked in a building they owned. The exempting circumstance of caso fortuito may be availed only when: (a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence was independent of the human will; (b) it was impossible to foresee the event which constituted the caso fortuito or, if it could be foreseen, it was impossible to avoid; (c) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible to perform an obligation in a normal manner and (d) the person tasked to perform the obligation must not have participated in any course of conduct that aggravated the accident.
While the Perla does not appear to have erred in considering Pascual for his position, its lack of supervision over him made it jointly and solidarily liable for the fire.
Facts: During the school year 1990-91, Timothy was a Grade 4 student at Marymount School, an academic institution operated and maintained by Child Learning Center, Inc. (CLC). In the afternoon of March 5, 1991, Timothy entered the boy‘s comfort room at the 3F of the Marymount building to answer the call of nature. He, however, found himself locked inside and unable to get out. Timothy started to panic and so he banged and kicked the door and yelled several times for help. When no help arrived he decided to open the window to call for help. In the process of opening the window, Timothy went right through and fell down 3 stories. Timothy was hospitalized and given medical treatment for serious multiple physical injuries.
A tort case under Article 2176 was filed by the parents against the CLC, the members of its Board of Directors (Spouses Edgardo and Sylvia Limon, et al). Tagario contends that CLC failed to provide precautionary measures to avoid harm and injury to its students in two instances: (1) failure to fix a defective door knob despite having been notified of the problem; and (2) failure to install safety grills on the window where Timothy fell from.
In its defense, CLC claimed that: (1) the door was not defective, (2) the fall was due to the kid‘s own negligence and (3) it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family. The RTC and CA held CLC liable solidarily with the Limon spouses (since they were the ones managing the school).
Issue: Whether CLC and Spouses Limon should be held liable for Tagorio‘s injuries.
Held: YES to CLC but NOT TO LIMON. CLC claims that no direct evidence was presented to prove that the door knob was indeed defective on the date in question. However, first, both the RTC and the CA had a factual finding that the lock of the door was defective. Second, the fact, however, that Timothy fell out through the window shows that the door could not be opened from the inside. That sufficiently points to the fact that something was wrong with the door, if not the door knob, under the principle of res ipsa loquitor. The doctrine applies where (1) the accident was of such character as to warrant an inference that it would not have happened except for the defendant‘s negligence; (2) the accident must have been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive management or control of the person charged with the negligence complained of; and (3) the accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. CLC is clearly answerable for failure to see to it that the doors of their school toilets are at all times in working condition. The fact that a student had to go through the window, instead of the door, shows that something was wrong with the door.
As to the absence of grills on the window, CLC contended that there was no such requirement under the Building Code. Nevertheless, the fact is that such window, as CLC themselves point out, was approximately 1.5 meters from the floor, so that it was within reach of a student who finds the regular exit, the door, not functioning. CLC, with the due diligence of a good father of the family, should have anticipated that a student, locked in the toilet by a non- working door, would attempt to use the window to call for help or even to get out. Considering all the circumstances, therefore, there is sufficient basis to sustain a finding of liability on CLC‘s part.
Our pronouncement that Timothy climbed out of the window because he could not get out using the door, negates CLC‘s other contention that the proximate cause of the accident was Timothy‘s own negligence. The injuries he sustained from the fall were the product of a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any intervening cause, that originated from CLC‘s own negligence.
CLC‘s argument that it exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees is not decisive. Due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees is applicable where the employer is being held responsible for the acts or omissions of others under Article 2180. In this case, CLC‘s liability is under Art. 2176, premised on the fact of its own negligence in not ensuring that all its doors are properly maintained.