Wittgenstein appears to proceed from the belief (in common with Frege and Russell) that it should be possible to develop a universal logical language which can describe all truth to a more fundamental insight. The insight being that a single formal language is not possible, and
attendant to that, that different ‘language games’ are possible and likely. The use of language is dependent on the use of rules dependent on context. What Wittgenstein seemed to have retained (beyond the problem of how thought relates to the world) is that meaning is dependent on the use of rules. Not the firm rules of a formal logic, however, but normative rules that were developed from practical considerations among communities of language- users. This led to his criticism of the philosophic tradition, which he argued to be involved in ‘the wrong game’. It develops elaborate explanations of phenomena that are misunderstood or misrepresented, such as thinking as a mechanism of the brain. Wittgenstein’s point is that this need not be the case. The statement ‘I think’ is used in various ways in relation to the involvement with other people. It suggests an object, ‘I’, that is performing an action very much in line with the idea of Descartes’ ‘soul’. The word ‘I’ need however not imply an inner space or some fundamental core of myself, accessible only to me. “I am going to the shop” is a description of a behaviour, or an explanation of it to another person. “I am afraid” is a direct expression of an emotional state, usually used to reveal this to another person.
Some of the commentators discussed above approach Wittgenstein from an analytical perspective, which focuses more on form and logic than on the Romantic element which is also present in his thought. The analytical approach is probably due to the particular way in which Wittgenstein deconstructs utterances, so as to bring about better understanding. An example of his deconstruction is made evident by the way that he identified that the mind is spoken about in the same way that a physical object is. By inference the mind is accorded the same properties as that of a physical object. Such a use of language is misleading, and creates confusion. Wittgenstein helps to explain that the mind is neither a ‘thing’, nor a ‘no-thing’.
Wittgenstein considered his approach to be a form of therapy to help the confused philosopher avoid the entanglements that come about from the everyday use of language. The everyday use of language is not the problem. It is rather the misuse of every day language which is interpreted in a certain way to construct elaborate theories that ‘explain’ the surface phenomena (i.e. metaphysics). The problem gets compounded when the misuse of everyday languages is linked to the assumption that a word has a specific ‘essential’ meaning rather than being able to be used in a variety of ways. Wittgenstein developed the concept of the perspicuous representation to help dig down into the grammar or rules of language use. He uses the concept of a language game, to consider the context in which a community of language users uses language, and the concept of family resemblances to help identify the different language games.
It may be said that Wittgenstein tends towards the Romantic use of language that considers expression to be important. Wittgenstein considers language as a means of expression and not necessarily as a form of description. It through expression that the rules governing expression and language use (language games) determined by language users are made, and by means of which the meaning of the words is able to be understood. This notion has been picked up by social constructionists to mean that the mind is a social construct because experience can be described in speech. This tool of describing experience in speech, using words, is also used when people are alone and not interacting with others. It provides a way to ‘grasp’ the world as it is experienced. However, without the language community (which teaches the meanings of words), this grasping would be impossible. Without it people would mostly live in the moment, or live sequences of direct experiences without reflection. Such a form of living raises the question whether animals live like this. The notion that the ‘mind’ exists could be as a consequence of a process of social construction. The next chapter will deal with this notion more thoroughly in the next chapter, where its implications and the notion of living in the moment will be more closely examined.
Chapter Five
A REFLECTION ON WITTGENSTEIN’S PERSPECTIVES
5. Wittgenstein’s Notions of Philosophy of Psychology
The thoughts which I publish in what follows are the precipitate of philosophical investigations which have occupied me for the last sixteen years. They concern many subjects: the concepts of meaning, of understanding, of a proposition, of logic, the foundations of mathematics, states of consciousness, and other things. (Wittgenstein, 1958, p. vii)
So begins the preface to the Philosophical Investigations. It was written in 1945, in the last year of the Second World War. It clearly outlines that Wittgenstein will be remarking on concepts such as meaning, understanding and states of consciousness. The word ‘concepts’ usually refers to structures in the mind used to ‘grasp’ categories of entities in the world (developed mainly by Kant). Wittgenstein shows that this idea – of determinate psychological concepts and categories – is not useful as a means to explain how people use words to refer to aspects of the world. He argues that the way in which people actually use words in everyday language does not fit the theoretical model of formal ‘concepts’ as both philosophers of mind and cognitivists use it. Wittgenstein considers the meaning of concepts to be derived from the context in which they are used. In the Philosophical Investigations, he considers how language relates to human behaviour, how language is used, how language is a form of behaviour, and by extension, how language is a form of life. Language is regarded as a tool or an instrument of social activity. Budd has noted:
The aim of the philosophy of psychology is the construction of perspicuous representations of everyday psychological concepts; this aim is achieved by the delineation of the grammar of psychological words; the importance of the philosophy of psychology derives from its underlying purpose, which is the dissolution of philosophical problems about the nature of the mind; these problems can be treated successfully only by attaining a synoptic view of the ordinary language of psychology. The
philosophy of psychology is purely descriptive and in no way explanatory. (1989, pp.1-2)
Budd explains that Wittgenstein’s aim was to develop a representative overview or perspicuous representation (Übersichtlich Darstellung) of every day psychological words, terms and concepts. His aim was to dissolve philosophical problems of mind. The representative overview encompasses a description of the everyday use of the words but does not function as an explanation.