RECURSO DE APELACIÓN INDICE
D.- DIFERENCIAS CON EL REGIMEN DEL CODIGO DE PROCEDIMIENTO DEROGADO.
II.- RESOLUCIONES RECURRIBLES EN QUEJA.
"Becker's colleagues and students at the University of Chicago, Columbia, and the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) are responsible for the bulk of published output on the subject, an important sample of which is contained in the supplement to the Journal of Political Economy published in 1973" (cf. Leibenstein, 1974: 463). This volume is edited by T.W. Schultz and contains articles by Becker and Lewis, De-Tray, Willis and many others.
See also T.P. Schultz, 1971, 1976. Much of the work that
has been done on the "new home economics" is based on Western experience. A recent attempt to apply the theory to the less developed countries is notably that of Evenson (1977) in the Philippines.
2. For a detailed review see Jones, 1976: 11-29, Turchi, 1975; Namboodiri 1972; Leibenstein, 1974; Golberg, 1975: Freedman and Coombs, 1966; Easterlin, 1969; and Ben-Porath, 197A.
Leibenstein (1974: 458) conceived of the reaction of demographers to the "new home economics" thus: "To some of those who had been labouring in the vineyards of demography for decades, the efforts of economists in the sixties and seventies to develop a theory of fertility must have appeared like the invasion of a horde of primitives on a technologically advanced community proclaiming loudly their intent to reinvent the wheel". However, as will be noted in this section, it was not only demographers that were
dissatisfied with the new economic theory of fertility. Economists, including Turchi, Duesenberry, Namboodiri, Easterlin and Leibenstein himself also raised criticisms about the Becker model. Specifically, Leibenstein (1974: 469) criticized the theory on the grounds that many of the models are formulated "in the tradition of 'as i f ’ theorising", that "the theory presumes that people behave as if they were buying consumer durables in a well-organized market and in a calculating manner at every step of the way" and that it conjures up "the image of every couple having a miniature Wang calculator under their bed on which they work out the balance of the streams of expected benefits and costs, etc., prior to a decision".
21.
Duesenberry (I960: 233) in his comment on Becker’s (1960) paper pointed out the distinguishing feature between economics and sociology namely, that "Economics is all about how people make choices. Sociology is all about why they have no choices to make". He argued that from
the sociological standpoint factors like level of education, occupation and relgiion limit the range of choice open to most couples, especially in regard to bringing up children. Thus, "effective freedom of choice between quantity and quality of children is also limited by more mundane and mechanical considerations" (p.233). Duesenberry contended that even if the quality of children were measured in terms of the amount of money parents are willing to spend on their children (prices remaining constant) "the standard of living of the children is mechanically linked to that of the parents" (p.234). This should be true while children are still dependent on their parents. When they become independent, they could invest more on themselves to improve their productive and earning capacity as well as their standard of living (Schultz 1972: 153).
An additional element introduced by Duesenberry (and later incor porated by Becker (1965) and his associates in their theories) was the idea of the cost and expenditure in time which goes into improving the quality of children. He noted that "the time which parents spend on children is largely determined by social conventions. Those conventions differ among social classes" (p.234).
Another prominent critic of the Becker model was Blake (1968) whose objections were based on the following:
(a) That quality of children is beyond the control of parents and cannot be predicted in advance since biological defects are unforeseeab]e.
(b) That "the way of life at a given social level puts its mark on standards of child-quality" (Blake, 1968: 19). Both the poor and the well-to-do have no choice since their own way of life
has to be reflected in their children and their quality.
(c) That even if access to contraception were held constant,
it is not certain that the rich would desire more children.
(d) That the analogy between children and consumer durables in
untenable since it ignores exogenous sociological variables
(e.g. institutional pressures) that may be brought to bear
on individuals to marry and start a family.
From the above, it would appear that the basic source of conflict
stems from the attempt by economic theorists to explain why the expected
positive relationship between income and fertility does not hold good.
They try to explain this by postulating a positive relationship between
"taste" and income, thereby ignoring other exogenous variables that also
affect "tastes" (a fact which Becker himself acknowledged, p .211). Other
analysts, including D. Freedman (1963), Stys (1957), T. Hull (1975)
have observed a positive relationship between income and socio-economic
class and fertility (though Freedman’s analysis takes account of both
actual and expected income, i.e. the ratio between actual income and
income customary in one’s socio-economic reference group).
Other critics of the micro-economics of fertility have also stressed
other aspects. Turchi (1975: 117) for instance, noted, among other
things, the lack of empirical tests of the theoretical economic models.
He also (p.121) observed that "Although fertility decisions are
allocative decisions, they take place in a social and psychological
context which can be ignored only at great peril" - thus supporting
Blake’s view of the influence of "social and institutional factors on the
cost of a child" (Turchi, 1975: 121). Namboodiri (1972: 203) emphasizes
the need for a "dynamic framework which analyzes directly the transition
from parity to parity" rather than concentrating upon completed family
23.
.2• 1 •/*_ ___A Balance between Economics and Sociology
In his attempts to reconcile the conflicting views of economists
and sociologists, Easterlin (1969, 1975) noted that what is required
to bridge the gap between them is the development of an "analytical
framework embracing the variety of factors considered in both disciplines
and making clear their interrelationships" (1969: 127). His approach
to this involves (a) a reinforcement of some aspects of Becker's
arguments, (b) an exploration of some new dimensions ignored by Becker
and (c) an incorporation of relevant sociological veiwpoints.
With respect to income, Easterlin (1969: 129) stressed that "the
income concept relevant to the decision-making process is potential
income rather than observed income". On prices, Easterlin seemed to
accept Becker's point of view that the rich spend more per child than
the poor not because "of the operation of a differential higher price
constraint" (p.130) but because "the expenditure per child which the
parents consider to be necessary" (p.131) is positively related to
income. Like Duesenberry (1960) and Mincer (1963), Easterlin recognized
the need to take account of the time required for childbearing and
rearing as relevant parameters in fertility decisions. He, however,
had reservations on whether the best price to attach to this time is
the potential earnings of the wife (as suggested by Mincer) as "a
substantial proportion of the work of childcare may be performed by
domestic help" (Easterlin, 1969: 133). This point is particularly
pertinent in those parts of the world where childcare is readily performed
by cheap domestic help. In the developing countries, the aid of the
extended family removes the conflict between child-rearing and work
force participation of mothers.
Turning his attention to tastes, Easterlin accepted that they con
stitute the most important source of contention between economists and
tastes" whilst sociology is concerned with the "formation of tastes".
The economists conceive taste in terms of a preference map or field
which embraces all possible combinations of goods which give satisfaction
to the household. The household preferences and the relative satis
faction they derive from a certain combination of goods will depend
on how many units of one good they are willing to give up in order to
gain additional units of another good. Applying this to the demand for
children, the economists view the number of children desired as dependent
on the attitudes of the household towards goods competing with children
for the household’s resources (1969: 135). Here, Easterlin basically
accepts the principle of children as consumer goods which the sociologists
argue against. At the same time, he accepts the sociological view that
tastes or preferences are shaped by factors such as education and occupation
and argues that "an adequate framework for fertility analysis calls for
explicit attention to preference phenomena and factors entering into
their formation" (p.135).
Another variable used by Becker and considered by Easterlin is
contraceptive knowledge. As was earlier noted, Becker viewed knowledge
of contraception as positively related with income. Easterlin, on the
other hand, argued that tastes differ among segments of the population
with regard to fertility control. Thus, even if knowledge of contra
ception were uniform, variations in its use may differ. Closely related
to this is the new good - coition - introduced into the analysis by
Easterlin. Coition, he argued, explains how more children may be pro
duced than are desired since its consumption leads to the possibility
of unwanted conception of a child. Elaborating on this point, Easterlin
argued that fertility control measures are possible forms of insurance,
of varying effectiveness and cost, against unwanted childbirth. At the
same time, any fertility control measure adopted involves some costs -
25.
on adoption or non-adoption after weighing the loss attributable to the
possibility of an unwanted birth against the loss arising from pecuniary
and psychological costs of the contraceptive measure under consideration.
He further argued that apart from knowledge of and access to contraception,
its adoption requires some motivation.
Overall, Easterlin's socio-economic framework cannot be said to have
eliminated all the objections raised against Becker's model. Fundamentally,
he sees children as consumer goods competing with other goods for household
resources. On the other hand, he accommodates the sociological reasoning
that tastes or preferences are moulded by factors other than income and
are not constant as the economic theory would suggest under the ceteris
peribus assumption. This point is clear in his following statement:
"Out of a balancing of preferences and constraints, decisions are reached on marriage, fertility control practices, fertility wife's labour force participation, and perhaps even husband's hours of work. In the course of the reproductive years preferences are modified by on-going experience, and income potentials, prices, and available fertility control methods may change with consequent appropriate changes in these
decisions. The fertility record of a given household reflects this balancing of preferences against constraints over the course of the full reproductive age span"
Easterlin (1969:138)
In the final analysis, Easterlin's stance is a modification of the Becker
model in an attempt to integrate factors emphasized in both economics
and sociology.’*"
Finally, with respect to universal applicability of the socio-economic
theory of fertility, Easterlin (1969: 151 ff.3) noted that his framework
is applicable to both the developed and less developed countries, but
1. Recently D. Freedman (1976) organized a symposium on the Easterlin hypothesis in which contributors (including Leibenstein, Sanderson, Lee and Oppenheimer) examined not only the ramifications of the hypothesis but also the degree of compatibility between the "new home economics" and Easterlin's model.
that there are several considerations that must necessarily be incor porated if the theory is to apply strictly to less developed countries. These include infant mortality, children's contribution to household income and children's support to parents when they are old.
2.2 Socio-psychological Approach
Fundamentally, the socio-psychological approach results from a search for a theoretical scheme "capable of incorporating the many values that children provide in various cultures" (Hoffman and Hoffman, 1973: 44). According to Fawcett (1976: 9) this approach which stresses motivations, "attempts to incorporate all dimensions of the value and costs of children that are relevant to childbearing decisions". This objective was highlighted by the Hoffmans (1973) who produced a compre hensive value scheme for the socio-psychological study of the value of children. They justified their effort on the following grounds:
(a) that existing theories about the value of children "do not deal with the variety of values that might be served by children",
(b) that the ability of existing theories relating to the economic value of children "to make accurate predictions about fertility is limitied by the fact that although non-economic values are acknowledged, they are not incorporated into theories in a meaningful way", and
(c) that "listers" have, through empirical work or thoughtful analysis, presented long lists of the values (or of the moti vations), but have made no effort to organize them into homogenous categories (Hoffman and Hoffman, 1973: 44). The Hoffmans acknowledged the fact that value schemes already existed, but argue that they were not properly categorized. It may be noted, though, that several scholars (Pohlman, 1969; Chapters 4 and 5;
Rainwater, 1965; Day and Day, 1964; Caldwell, 1968; Molnos, 1973; Flapan, 1969; Berelson, 1973; to mention a few) have identified value categories relevant to the populations they studied and attempted to relate the identified values to the demand for children.
For brevity, we present a few of the value schemes that have been developed in Table 2.1 below.
Table 2.1_____ Motives for Childbearing: Conceptual Frameworks for Different Cultural Settings
HOFFMAN AND HOFFMAN (1972): All cultures 1. Adult status and social identity.